12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1878–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kothari v. Tessfayegreen2 sentences2024Bank, 249 Ga. 390, 393 (3) ( 291 SE2d 222 ) (1982) (finding “[i]mpossibility of performance is a defense relating to contracts, not to judgments. . . . [W]here A sues B on a contract and they enter into a consent judgment, B cannot later set that judgment aside on the basis of an impossibility of performance . . . .”); accord Kothari v. Tessfaye, 318 Ga. App. 289, 294-295 (1) (a) (i) ( 733 SE2d 815 ) (2012). 12 For the reasons outlined above, we find that the trial court impermissibly modified the divorce decree and settlement agreement to render meaningless the language providing for conditio 2024Bank, 249 Ga. 390, 393 (3) ( 291 SE2d 222 ) (1982) (finding “[i]mpossibility of performance is a defense relating to contracts, not to judgments. . . . [W]here A sues B on a contract and they enter into a consent judgment, B cannot later set that judgment aside on the basis of an impossibility of performance . . . .”); accord Kothari v. Tessfaye, 318 Ga. App. 289, 294-295 (1) (a) (i) ( 733 SE2d 815 ) (2012). 12 For the reasons outlined above, we find that the trial court impermissibly modified the divorce decree and settlement agreement to render meaningless the language providing for conditio | 1 | 1 |
Greenwood v. Greenwoodgreen1 sentence2024A trial court must use its “broad discretion to enforce the letter and the spirit of the decree . . . without modifying the original judgment that is being enforced.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Greenwood, 289 Ga. at 164 (finding, where husband failed to timely refinance a mortgage and remove wife’s liability for the mortgage in violation of a divorce decree that provided a $10,000 penalty for noncompliance, that trial court impermissibly modified the divorce decree when it held husband in contempt and, because of “market conditions,” converted the decree’s monetary penalty into a lien | 1 | 1 |
Leventhal v. Citizens & Southern National Bankgreen2 sentences2024Bank, 249 Ga. 390, 393 (3) ( 291 SE2d 222 ) (1982) (finding “[i]mpossibility of performance is a defense relating to contracts, not to judgments. . . . [W]here A sues B on a contract and they enter into a consent judgment, B cannot later set that judgment aside on the basis of an impossibility of performance . . . .”); accord Kothari v. Tessfaye, 318 Ga. App. 289, 294-295 (1) (a) (i) ( 733 SE2d 815 ) (2012). 12 For the reasons outlined above, we find that the trial court impermissibly modified the divorce decree and settlement agreement to render meaningless the language providing for conditio 2024Bank, 249 Ga. 390, 393 (3) ( 291 SE2d 222 ) (1982) (finding “[i]mpossibility of performance is a defense relating to contracts, not to judgments. . . . [W]here A sues B on a contract and they enter into a consent judgment, B cannot later set that judgment aside on the basis of an impossibility of performance . . . .”); accord Kothari v. Tessfaye, 318 Ga. App. 289, 294-295 (1) (a) (i) ( 733 SE2d 815 ) (2012). 12 For the reasons outlined above, we find that the trial court impermissibly modified the divorce decree and settlement agreement to render meaningless the language providing for conditio | 1 | 1 |
Carlin v. Fullergreen2 sentences2001Just as the mortgagee who received policy proceeds pursuant to a standard mortgage clause owed no duty to the lessor-mortgagor to apply those proceeds against the mortgage debt and was authorized under the clause to transfer to the insurer an interest in the debt commensurate with the payment received, Carlin v. Fuller, supra, 189 Ga. App. at 845 (1), Citizens Bank was not required to apply American Central’s payment to extinguish Lee’s debt and was autho *883 rized to transfer and assign the deed to secure debt and notes to the insurer pursuant to the standard mortgage clause. 2001Just as the mortgagee who received policy proceeds pursuant to a standard mortgage clause owed no duty to the lessor-mortgagor to apply those proceeds against the mortgage debt and was authorized under the clause to transfer to the insurer an interest in the debt commensurate with the payment received, Carlin v. Fuller, supra, 189 Ga. App. at 845 (1), Citizens Bank was not required to apply American Central’s payment to extinguish Lee’s debt and was autho *883 rized to transfer and assign the deed to secure debt and notes to the insurer pursuant to the standard mortgage clause. | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. American Central Insurancegreen1 sentence2001Id. at 763 (1) (b). | 1 | 1 |
Corporation of the Royal Exchange Assurance v. Franklingreen2 sentences1966The authorities cited by the plaintiff do not support this position, and the facts alleged in the petition do not show that the insurer waived, or is estopped to make a defense based on the condition of the mortgage clause that the name of the mortgagee be inserted in the policy, or the provision that “No permission affecting this insurance shall exist, or any waiver of any provision be valid, unless granted herein or expressed in writing added thereto . . .” The facts essential to deprive the insurer of these defenses are set out in Corporation of the Royal Exchange &c. v. Franklin, 158 Ga. 6 1966The authorities cited by the plaintiff do not support this position, and the facts alleged in the petition do not show that the insurer waived, or is estopped to make a defense based on the condition of the mortgage clause that the name of the mortgagee be inserted in the policy, or the provision that “No permission affecting this insurance shall exist, or any waiver of any provision be valid, unless granted herein or expressed in writing added thereto . . .” The facts essential to deprive the insurer of these defenses are set out in Corporation of the Royal Exchange &c. v. Franklin, 158 Ga. 6 | 1 | 1 |
Pepper v. Jamesgreen1 sentence1916The description of the property, as embodied in the mortgage clause of the contract of lease which it was intended to secure, was sufficient to identify the property upon which the lien was created, Hillis v. Comer, 14 Ga. App. 30 ( 79 S. E. 930 ); Pepper v. James, 7 Ga. App. 518, 519 ( 67 S. E. 218 ); First National Bank v. Spicer, 10 Ga. App. 503 ( 73 S. E. 753 ). | 1 | 1 |
Oatis v. Browngreen1 sentence1900See Oates v. Brown, 59 Ga. 711 ; Conley v. Redwine, 109 Ga. 640 . 6. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Peoples Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America
green
2 sentences1967Co. of North America, 146 Ga. 514 (1) ( 91 SE 684 , LRA 1917D 868). 1942Peoples Bank of Mansfield v. Insurance Company of North America, 146 Ga. 514 ( 91 S. E. 684 , L. | 2 | 1942–1967 |
Adamson v. Adamson
neutral
2 sentences1967Co. of North America, 146 Ga. 514 (1) ( 91 SE 684 , LRA 1917D 868). 1942Peoples Bank of Mansfield v. Insurance Company of North America, 146 Ga. 514 ( 91 S. E. 684 , L. | 2 | 1942–1967 |
American Insurance Co. v. Hattaway
green
2 sentences1967Co. v. Hattaway, 194 Ga. 15 (3) ( 20 SE2d 406 ) which states: “Where a policy of fire insurance is rendered void as to the named insured, but the insurer by reason of the mortgage clause in the policy pays to the holder of a security deed from the insured the full amount of the secured indebtedness and takes a transfer of the debt and the security, in accordance with the terms of the mortgage clause, the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the grantee in the security deed to the extent of the debt paid.” See also Peoples Bank of Mansfield v. Ins. 1967Co. v. Hattaway, 194 Ga. 15 (3) ( 20 SE2d 406 ) which states: “Where a policy of fire insurance is rendered void as to the named insured, but the insurer by reason of the mortgage clause in the policy pays to the holder of a security deed from the insured the full amount of the secured indebtedness and takes a transfer of the debt and the security, in accordance with the terms of the mortgage clause, the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the grantee in the security deed to the extent of the debt paid.” See also Peoples Bank of Mansfield v. Ins. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
McElroy v. Board of Drainage Commissioners
neutral
1 sentence1966Co. v. Napier, 22 Ga. App. 361 ( 95 SE 15 ); 5 Couch on Insurance 2d 366, § 29:82; 11 Couch on Insurance 2d 321 et seq.; 331, 333, 334, §§ 42:666, 42:669, 42:671; 5 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 554, § 3401.) The plaintiff contends that despite the written provision that the mortgage clause is not effective unless the name of the mortgagee appears on the policy, the insurer waived this requirement by its collection of premiums from the plaintiff with knowledge of the plaintiff’s interest as a secured creditor of the insured. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Southern States Fire & Casualty Insurance v. Napier
green
1 sentence1966Co. v. Napier, 22 Ga. App. 361 ( 95 SE 15 ); 5 Couch on Insurance 2d 366, § 29:82; 11 Couch on Insurance 2d 321 et seq.; 331, 333, 334, §§ 42:666, 42:669, 42:671; 5 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 554, § 3401.) The plaintiff contends that despite the written provision that the mortgage clause is not effective unless the name of the mortgagee appears on the policy, the insurer waived this requirement by its collection of premiums from the plaintiff with knowledge of the plaintiff’s interest as a secured creditor of the insured. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Kennedy v. Manry
green
2 sentences1964They rely on Kennedy v. Manry, 6 Ga. App. 816 ( 66 SE 29 ), in which the foreclosure of a bill of sale as a mortgage was held to bar a subsequent trover action. 1964They rely on Kennedy v. Manry, 6 Ga. App. 816 ( 66 SE 29 ), in which the foreclosure of a bill of sale as a mortgage was held to bar a subsequent trover action. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Hosford v. Germania Fire Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1962Co., 127 U. S. 399 , 8 SC 1199, 32 LE 196; Universal Ins. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Real Estate Loan Co. v. Union City
green
2 sentences1943The record in Real Estate Loan Co. v. Union City, 177 Ga. 55 ( 169 S. E. 301 ), showed that the holder of a security deed, after the death of the grantor and after the equity of redemption in the land so conveyed by the security deed had been set apart to the widow as a year’s support, in the exercise of its power of sale sold the property, as in the present case, for a sum less than sufficient to' pay the debt secured, and thus divested the interest of the widow. 1943The record in Real Estate Loan Co. v. Union City, 177 Ga. 55 ( 169 S. E. 301 ), showed that the holder of a security deed, after the death of the grantor and after the equity of redemption in the land so conveyed by the security deed had been set apart to the widow as a year’s support, in the exercise of its power of sale sold the property, as in the present case, for a sum less than sufficient to' pay the debt secured, and thus divested the interest of the widow. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Thomas
green
2 sentences1930This is the clear import of the agreement.” The same conclusion was reached in Safe Deposit Co. v. Thomas, 59 Kan. 470 ( 53 Pac. 472 ), where the first headnote is as follows: “Where, in a clause attached to a policy of insurance, it is provided that the loss shall be payable to the trustee named in a trust deed, given to secure a debt, and that the policy shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the owner of the property, and it is also ‘provided that in case the grantor or owner neglects or refuses to pay any premium due under this policy, then on demand the beneficiary shall pay th 1930This is the clear import of the agreement.” The same conclusion was reached in Safe Deposit Co. v. Thomas, 59 Kan. 470 ( 53 Pac. 472 ), where the first headnote is as follows: “Where, in a clause attached to a policy of insurance, it is provided that the loss shall be payable to the trustee named in a trust deed, given to secure a debt, and that the policy shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the owner of the property, and it is also ‘provided that in case the grantor or owner neglects or refuses to pay any premium due under this policy, then on demand the beneficiary shall pay th | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Fountain v. State
green
1 sentence1916The description of the property, as embodied in the mortgage clause of the contract of lease which it was intended to secure, was sufficient to identify the property upon which the lien was created, Hillis v. Comer, 14 Ga. App. 30 ( 79 S. E. 930 ); Pepper v. James, 7 Ga. App. 518, 519 ( 67 S. E. 218 ); First National Bank v. Spicer, 10 Ga. App. 503 ( 73 S. E. 753 ). | 1 | 1916–1916 |
First National Bank v. Spicer
green
2 sentences1916The description of the property, as embodied in the mortgage clause of the contract of lease which it was intended to secure, was sufficient to identify the property upon which the lien was created, Hillis v. Comer, 14 Ga. App. 30 ( 79 S. E. 930 ); Pepper v. James, 7 Ga. App. 518, 519 ( 67 S. E. 218 ); First National Bank v. Spicer, 10 Ga. App. 503 ( 73 S. E. 753 ). 1916The description of the property, as embodied in the mortgage clause of the contract of lease which it was intended to secure, was sufficient to identify the property upon which the lien was created, Hillis v. Comer, 14 Ga. App. 30 ( 79 S. E. 930 ); Pepper v. James, 7 Ga. App. 518, 519 ( 67 S. E. 218 ); First National Bank v. Spicer, 10 Ga. App. 503 ( 73 S. E. 753 ). | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Hillis v. Comer & Co.
neutral
2 sentences1916The description of the property, as embodied in the mortgage clause of the contract of lease which it was intended to secure, was sufficient to identify the property upon which the lien was created, Hillis v. Comer, 14 Ga. App. 30 ( 79 S. E. 930 ); Pepper v. James, 7 Ga. App. 518, 519 ( 67 S. E. 218 ); First National Bank v. Spicer, 10 Ga. App. 503 ( 73 S. E. 753 ). 1916The description of the property, as embodied in the mortgage clause of the contract of lease which it was intended to secure, was sufficient to identify the property upon which the lien was created, Hillis v. Comer, 14 Ga. App. 30 ( 79 S. E. 930 ); Pepper v. James, 7 Ga. App. 518, 519 ( 67 S. E. 218 ); First National Bank v. Spicer, 10 Ga. App. 503 ( 73 S. E. 753 ). | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Conley v. Redwine
green
1 sentence1900See Oates v. Brown, 59 Ga. 711 ; Conley v. Redwine, 109 Ga. 640 . 6. | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Morrison v. Solomon
neutral
1 sentence1878The deed of trust was not before the superior court, nor is it before us, and, therefore, we do not know what was the interest of Mrs. Mayo in the property of the trust estate, whether a life interest or a fee; but, under the ruling of this court in 52 Ga., 205 , Mrs, Mayo had the legal right, after the passing of the act of 1866, and this mortgage was made in 1872, to mortgage that interest. | 1 | 1878–1878 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.