mortgage clause in Arkansas

2016App. 142 , 712 S.W.2d 311 (1986), and asserted that under a standard mortgage clause, |4when an insured mortgagor causes the loss, the insurer has no liability to the insured mortgagor, and the insurance proceeds need not be applied to reduce the mortgage.

1988Here, the appellants were not listed as insureds or as mortgagees in the policy, nor was any reference made to their interest in the property. “[T]here is a presumption that parties contract only for the benefit of themselves, and a contract will not be considered as having been made for the use and benefit of a third party unless it clearly appears that such was the intention of the parties.” Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Rogers, 18 Ark.

2014We conclude that, under the foregoing Arkansas law, as stated in Farmers Home Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 355 Ark. at 24 , 129 S.W.3d at 835 , the standard mortgage clause serves as a separate contract between Appellant and Appellee “as if the [Appellee] had independently applied for insurance.” Because Arkansas law views Appellee’s contract as independent of the Ludwicks’ contract, we conclude that Appellant’s rescission of the Ludwicks’ policy based on the acts of the Ludwicks does not affect Appellee’s independent contract with Appellant. |7We note that our conclusion today is consistent wit

2014We conclude that, under the foregoing Arkansas law, as stated in Farmers Home Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 355 Ark. at 24 , 129 S.W.3d at 835 , the standard mortgage clause serves as a separate contract between Appellant and Appellee “as if the [Appellee] had independently applied for insurance.” Because Arkansas law views Appellee’s contract as independent of the Ludwicks’ contract, we conclude that Appellant’s rescission of the Ludwicks’ policy based on the acts of the Ludwicks does not affect Appellee’s independent contract with Appellant. |7We note that our conclusion today is consistent wit

1990As in the case at bar, the owner’s insurance policy in Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Mildenberger, 359 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962), contained a standard mortgage clause making loss or damage under the policy payable to its mortgagee “as interest may appear,” and provided that the mortgagee’s rights would not be invalidated by any act of the mortgagor. 359 S. W.2d at 382 .

1990As in the case at bar, the owner’s insurance policy in Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Mildenberger, 359 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962), contained a standard mortgage clause making loss or damage under the policy payable to its mortgagee “as interest may appear,” and provided that the mortgagee’s rights would not be invalidated by any act of the mortgagor. 359 S. W.2d at 382 .

1982The Court of Appeals in the case of Rawhide Farms, Inc. v. Darby, 267 Ark. 776 , 589 S.W.2d 210 (Ark.App.1979), applied the statute in a case involving default in a specific condition, but in so holding, erroneously relied only upon the original Seay v. Davis opinion as can be seen from the following quote at page 782, 589 S.W.2d 210 : Although that section seems designed to apply only to "acceleration at will" clauses, it was applied in the Seay Case where the mortgage clause was described by the Arkansas Supreme Court as providing for acceleration in the event of default at the option of the

1982The Court of Appeals in the case of Rawhide Farms, Inc. v. Darby, 267 Ark. 776 , 589 S.W.2d 210 (Ark.App.1979), applied the statute in a case involving default in a specific condition, but in so holding, erroneously relied only upon the original Seay v. Davis opinion as can be seen from the following quote at page 782, 589 S.W.2d 210 : Although that section seems designed to apply only to "acceleration at will" clauses, it was applied in the Seay Case where the mortgage clause was described by the Arkansas Supreme Court as providing for acceleration in the event of default at the option of the

1972It requires clear and decisive testimony to prove that a deed absolute in form was intended as a mortgage.” In DeLoney v. Dillard, 183 Ark. 1053 , 40 S.W. 2d 772 (1931), we said: “The law presumes that a deed absolute on its face is what it appears to be, and the burden is Sn the one claiming it to be a mortgage to overcome this presumption by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” See also Clark-McWilliams Coal Co. v. Ward, 185 Ark. 237 , 47 S.W. 2d 18 (1932); and Gates v. McPeace, 106 Ark. 583 , 153 S.W. 797 (1913).

1972It requires clear and decisive testimony to prove that a deed absolute in form was intended as a mortgage.” In DeLoney v. Dillard, 183 Ark. 1053 , 40 S.W. 2d 772 (1931), we said: “The law presumes that a deed absolute on its face is what it appears to be, and the burden is Sn the one claiming it to be a mortgage to overcome this presumption by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” See also Clark-McWilliams Coal Co. v. Ward, 185 Ark. 237 , 47 S.W. 2d 18 (1932); and Gates v. McPeace, 106 Ark. 583 , 153 S.W. 797 (1913).

1972It requires clear and decisive testimony to prove that a deed absolute in form was intended as a mortgage.” In DeLoney v. Dillard, 183 Ark. 1053 , 40 S.W. 2d 772 (1931), we said: “The law presumes that a deed absolute on its face is what it appears to be, and the burden is Sn the one claiming it to be a mortgage to overcome this presumption by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” See also Clark-McWilliams Coal Co. v. Ward, 185 Ark. 237 , 47 S.W. 2d 18 (1932); and Gates v. McPeace, 106 Ark. 583 , 153 S.W. 797 (1913).

1972It requires clear and decisive testimony to prove that a deed absolute in form was intended as a mortgage.” In DeLoney v. Dillard, 183 Ark. 1053 , 40 S.W. 2d 772 (1931), we said: “The law presumes that a deed absolute on its face is what it appears to be, and the burden is Sn the one claiming it to be a mortgage to overcome this presumption by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” See also Clark-McWilliams Coal Co. v. Ward, 185 Ark. 237 , 47 S.W. 2d 18 (1932); and Gates v. McPeace, 106 Ark. 583 , 153 S.W. 797 (1913).

1972It requires clear and decisive testimony to prove that a deed absolute in form was intended as a mortgage.” In DeLoney v. Dillard, 183 Ark. 1053 , 40 S.W. 2d 772 (1931), we said: “The law presumes that a deed absolute on its face is what it appears to be, and the burden is Sn the one claiming it to be a mortgage to overcome this presumption by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” See also Clark-McWilliams Coal Co. v. Ward, 185 Ark. 237 , 47 S.W. 2d 18 (1932); and Gates v. McPeace, 106 Ark. 583 , 153 S.W. 797 (1913).

1972It requires clear and decisive testimony to prove that a deed absolute in form was intended as a mortgage.” In DeLoney v. Dillard, 183 Ark. 1053 , 40 S.W. 2d 772 (1931), we said: “The law presumes that a deed absolute on its face is what it appears to be, and the burden is Sn the one claiming it to be a mortgage to overcome this presumption by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” See also Clark-McWilliams Coal Co. v. Ward, 185 Ark. 237 , 47 S.W. 2d 18 (1932); and Gates v. McPeace, 106 Ark. 583 , 153 S.W. 797 (1913).

1972The applicable test is expressed in Beloate v. Taylor, 202 Ark. 229 , 150 S.W. 2d 730 (1941): “In determining whether an instrument is a deed or a mortgage the test is: Did a debt exist at the time the instrument was executed, and was the instrument of conveyance intended by the parties to secure the debt.

1972The applicable test is expressed in Beloate v. Taylor, 202 Ark. 229 , 150 S.W. 2d 730 (1941): “In determining whether an instrument is a deed or a mortgage the test is: Did a debt exist at the time the instrument was executed, and was the instrument of conveyance intended by the parties to secure the debt.

1955Co. v. Helms, 184 Ark. 308 , 42 S. W. 2d 394 , the court in discussing a similar question, stated, at page 311 of the Arkansas Reports: “But the court correctly held that the association could recover to the extent of its mortgage, as it is well settled that a mortgagee, under a standard mortgage clause, is not affected by the acts or omissions of the insured that would avoid the policy as to him. ’ ’ We note of course that the rule announced above presupposes that the mortgagee or lien holder does not authorize the settlement made by the insured.

1955Co. v. Helms, 184 Ark. 308 , 42 S. W. 2d 394 , the court in discussing a similar question, stated, at page 311 of the Arkansas Reports: “But the court correctly held that the association could recover to the extent of its mortgage, as it is well settled that a mortgagee, under a standard mortgage clause, is not affected by the acts or omissions of the insured that would avoid the policy as to him. ’ ’ We note of course that the rule announced above presupposes that the mortgagee or lien holder does not authorize the settlement made by the insured.

1955In Berger v. Fuller, 180 Ark. 372 , 21 S. W. 2d 419 , the court construing similar language in a “future advances” clause, though under a different factual situation, stated: “This language as we construe it has reference only to the debt due primarily from the mortgagor to the mortgagee and does not include debts which might be purchased from third parties.” We recognize that the advancements made by B-K Lumber Company to Alex Redmon would be covered by the mortgage clause mentioned above if it were true,: as appellee insists, that Redmon was the agent of his grandmother and that he acted wit

1955In Berger v. Fuller, 180 Ark. 372 , 21 S. W. 2d 419 , the court construing similar language in a “future advances” clause, though under a different factual situation, stated: “This language as we construe it has reference only to the debt due primarily from the mortgagor to the mortgagee and does not include debts which might be purchased from third parties.” We recognize that the advancements made by B-K Lumber Company to Alex Redmon would be covered by the mortgage clause mentioned above if it were true,: as appellee insists, that Redmon was the agent of his grandmother and that he acted wit

1943It is stated thus, in Rushton v. McIllvene, 88 Ark. 299 , 114 S. W. 709 : ‘ ‘ The presumption, of course, arises that the instrument is what it purports on its face to be, an absolute conveyance of the land; to overcome this presumption, and to establish its character as a mortgage, the cases all agree that the evidence must be clear, unequivocal and, convincing, for otherwise the normal presumption will prevail.” We think appellants wholly failed to meet the clear and convincing rule to overcome the lore,sumption that the deed was in fact intended as a conveyance of the title.

1943It is stated thus, in Rushton v. McIllvene, 88 Ark. 299 , 114 S. W. 709 : ‘ ‘ The presumption, of course, arises that the instrument is what it purports on its face to be, an absolute conveyance of the land; to overcome this presumption, and to establish its character as a mortgage, the cases all agree that the evidence must be clear, unequivocal and, convincing, for otherwise the normal presumption will prevail.” We think appellants wholly failed to meet the clear and convincing rule to overcome the lore,sumption that the deed was in fact intended as a conveyance of the title.

1931Weinberger v. Agricultural Insurance Co., 8 N. J. 202, 76 Atl. 343 ; and Newark Fire Ins.

1927Co. v. Wigginton, 134 Ark. 152 , 203 S. W. 844 , where this court reformed a fire insurance policy so as to attach a standard mortgage clause to same instead of a loss-payable clause, and this was done on conflicting evidence.

1927Co. v. Wigginton, 134 Ark. 152 , 203 S. W. 844 , where this court reformed a fire insurance policy so as to attach a standard mortgage clause to same instead of a loss-payable clause, and this was done on conflicting evidence.

1926Lund v. Fletcher, 39 Ark. 325 ; Gauss Sons v. Doyle & Co., 46 Ark. 122 ; and Stix v. Chaytor, 55 Ark. 116 .

1926Lund v. Fletcher, 39 Ark. 325 ; Gauss Sons v. Doyle & Co., 46 Ark. 122 ; and Stix v. Chaytor, 55 Ark. 116 .

1926Lund v. Fletcher, 39 Ark. 325 ; Gauss Sons v. Doyle & Co., 46 Ark. 122 ; and Stix v. Chaytor, 55 Ark. 116 .

1919In the case of Bagnell v. Walker, 65 Ark. 325 , this court said (to quote the syllabus): To a bill to foreclose a mortgage it is no defense that the mortgagor delivered to his agent the amount- of the mortgage debt, with interest, to be transmitted to the mortgagee, if such agent failed to transmit the money to the mortgagee.