mortgage clause in Maryland

2023The remainder of the proceeds is payable to the mortgagor.[10] Id.

1957Dr. Glass relies heavily on the case of Arthur v. Morrow Bros., 131 Md. 59 .

1954The case of Devereaux Mortgage Co. v. Huggins, 46 Idaho 74 , 266 Pac. 421 , involved an action to foreclose a mortgage on real estate and to recover judgment for any deficiency against the estate of the deceased, the mortgage claim having been filed in the estate and rejected.

1954The case of Devereaux Mortgage Co. v. Huggins, 46 Idaho 74 , 266 Pac. 421 , involved an action to foreclose a mortgage on real estate and to recover judgment for any deficiency against the estate of the deceased, the mortgage claim having been filed in the estate and rejected.

1934The effect *504 of this agreement on the part of the mortgagee, which is known as a redemise, is to make of the mortgagor, in most respects, a tenant to the mortgagee. 2 Cruise’s Digest, p. *97; Jamieson v. Bruce, 6 G. & J. 72 ; Georges Creek Coal etc. Co. v. Detmold, 1 Md. 225, 237 ; Commercial Bldg. etc. Assn. v. Robinson, 90 Md. 615 , 45 A. 449 ; Richardson v. B. & D.

1934The effect *504 of this agreement on the part of the mortgagee, which is known as a redemise, is to make of the mortgagor, in most respects, a tenant to the mortgagee. 2 Cruise’s Digest, p. *97; Jamieson v. Bruce, 6 G. & J. 72 ; Georges Creek Coal etc. Co. v. Detmold, 1 Md. 225, 237 ; Commercial Bldg. etc. Assn. v. Robinson, 90 Md. 615 , 45 A. 449 ; Richardson v. B. & D.

1934The effect *504 of this agreement on the part of the mortgagee, which is known as a redemise, is to make of the mortgagor, in most respects, a tenant to the mortgagee. 2 Cruise’s Digest, p. *97; Jamieson v. Bruce, 6 G. & J. 72 ; Georges Creek Coal etc. Co. v. Detmold, 1 Md. 225, 237 ; Commercial Bldg. etc. Assn. v. Robinson, 90 Md. 615 , 45 A. 449 ; Richardson v. B. & D.

1934The effect *504 of this agreement on the part of the mortgagee, which is known as a redemise, is to make of the mortgagor, in most respects, a tenant to the mortgagee. 2 Cruise’s Digest, p. *97; Jamieson v. Bruce, 6 G. & J. 72 ; Georges Creek Coal etc. Co. v. Detmold, 1 Md. 225, 237 ; Commercial Bldg. etc. Assn. v. Robinson, 90 Md. 615 , 45 A. 449 ; Richardson v. B. & D.

1933The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, in applying a subrogation clause identical with the one quoted in this opinion, said, in Savings Bank of Ansonia v. Schancupp, 108 Conn. 588 , 144 A. 36 , 39: “The effect of this mortgage clause is that from the time the policy becomes void as to the mortgagor the insurance is only in favor of the mortgagee on its interest as such, and not an insurance on the property generally, to which the mortgagor, or his successor in interest therein, should be entitled.

1933The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, in applying a subrogation clause identical with the one quoted in this opinion, said, in Savings Bank of Ansonia v. Schancupp, 108 Conn. 588 , 144 A. 36 , 39: “The effect of this mortgage clause is that from the time the policy becomes void as to the mortgagor the insurance is only in favor of the mortgagee on its interest as such, and not an insurance on the property generally, to which the mortgagor, or his successor in interest therein, should be entitled.

1927The principal reasons advanced for the reversal are (a) that the mortgagor and her daughter did not meet the burden of establishing by a fair preponderance of the testimony that there was a failure in part of the consideration for the mortgage in controversy; (b) that the facts on this record take the case at bar out of the operation of the decisions in Hunter v. Chase, 144 Md. 13 , and Riley v. Woodall, 145 Md. 125 , and (c) that there was error in the refusal to admit certain evidence which the appellant contends was relevant and material, as tending to show the reality of the consideration

1927The principal reasons advanced for the reversal are (a) that the mortgagor and her daughter did not meet the burden of establishing by a fair preponderance of the testimony that there was a failure in part of the consideration for the mortgage in controversy; (b) that the facts on this record take the case at bar out of the operation of the decisions in Hunter v. Chase, 144 Md. 13 , and Riley v. Woodall, 145 Md. 125 , and (c) that there was error in the refusal to admit certain evidence which the appellant contends was relevant and material, as tending to show the reality of the consideration

1926Whatever the rule may be elsewhere, it has been repeatedly decided and is now definitely established in Maryland that, in equity, “from the time the owner of an estate enters into a binding agreement for its sale he holds the same in trust for the purchaser, and the latter becomes a trustee of the purchase money for the vendor, and being thus, in equity, the owner, the vendee must bear any loss which may happen, and is entitled to any benefit which may accrue to the estate in the interim between the agreement and the conveyance.” Brewer v. Herbert, supra; Skinner & Sons Co. v. Houghton, supra;

1926Whatever the rule may be elsewhere, it has been repeatedly decided and is now definitely established in Maryland that, in equity, “from the time the owner of an estate enters into a binding agreement for its sale he holds the same in trust for the purchaser, and the latter becomes a trustee of the purchase money for the vendor, and being thus, in equity, the owner, the vendee must bear any loss which may happen, and is entitled to any benefit which may accrue to the estate in the interim between the agreement and the conveyance.” Brewer v. Herbert, supra; Skinner & Sons Co. v. Houghton, supra;

1926Whatever the rule may be elsewhere, it has been repeatedly decided and is now definitely established in Maryland that, in equity, “from the time the owner of an estate enters into a binding agreement for its sale he holds the same in trust for the purchaser, and the latter becomes a trustee of the purchase money for the vendor, and being thus, in equity, the owner, the vendee must bear any loss which may happen, and is entitled to any benefit which may accrue to the estate in the interim between the agreement and the conveyance.” Brewer v. Herbert, supra; Skinner & Sons Co. v. Houghton, supra;

1875Davison, 34 Md., 662 ,) will not permit Lowekamp upon the theory that he is an innocent party, as purchaser of the mortgage to claim beyond just indemnity for the actual loss.