mortgage clause in Indiana

1881O’Leary v. Snediker, 16 Ind. 404 ; Jenkinson v. Ewing, 17 Ind. 505 .

1878O’Leary v. Snediker, 16 Ind. 404 ; Jenkinson v. Ewing, 17 Ind. 505 ; Duck v. Wilson, 19 Ind. 190 .

1881O’Leary v. Snediker, 16 Ind. 404 ; Jenkinson v. Ewing, 17 Ind. 505 .

1878O’Leary v. Snediker, 16 Ind. 404 ; Jenkinson v. Ewing, 17 Ind. 505 ; Duck v. Wilson, 19 Ind. 190 .

2017“Under this exception, the mortgage of the dominant estate is protected from losing its- interest in an easement otherwise extinguished when fee title to the dominant estate and fee title to the servient estate are united.” Id. at 11 (citing, generally, Pergament v. Loring Prop., LTD, 599 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1999).) Metro states, it was clearly the intent of Howell that the [e]asement not merge into the fee.

2007Id.

2007Id. at 652 .

1988In the case of Jones v. Vantress, 23 Ind. 533 , this court said: ‘The agreement to receive a mortgage was no waiver of the lien until the mortgage was executed and delivered.' ” Id. 214 Ind. at 667, 668 , 13 N.E.2d 557 (emphasis added).

1988In the case of Jones v. Vantress, 23 Ind. 533 , this court said: ‘The agreement to receive a mortgage was no waiver of the lien until the mortgage was executed and delivered.' ” Id. 214 Ind. at 667, 668 , 13 N.E.2d 557 (emphasis added).

1973App. 3d 77 , 276 N.E.2d 109, at 111 , an action by a mortgagee-owner to recover proceeds of a fire policy which contained a standard mortgage clause, the court stated that, “Therefore, since the clause only has meaning where the mortgagee purchases upon foreclosure, it is apparent that the provisions of the mortgage clause in question were clearly intended to cover the mortgagee’s interest as it succeeded to ownership through foreclosure.” Certain of the cases cited by Great American were found to contain loss payable clauses.

1973Co. of Hartford, Conn., 244 Mich. 668 , 222 N. W. 116 .” Further, where a standard mortgage clause has been shown to give rise to an independent contract, the case of Haskin v. Greene (1955), 205 Ore. 140 , 286 P. 2d 128 , has determined that the insurance company was obligated to compensate the mortgagee notwithstanding the fact that the mortgagee was the purchaser of the premises for the full amount of the debt and judgment.

1973Co. of Hartford, Conn., 244 Mich. 668 , 222 N. W. 116 .” Further, where a standard mortgage clause has been shown to give rise to an independent contract, the case of Haskin v. Greene (1955), 205 Ore. 140 , 286 P. 2d 128 , has determined that the insurance company was obligated to compensate the mortgagee notwithstanding the fact that the mortgagee was the purchaser of the premises for the full amount of the debt and judgment.

1973Co. of Hartford, Conn., 244 Mich. 668 , 222 N. W. 116 .” Further, where a standard mortgage clause has been shown to give rise to an independent contract, the case of Haskin v. Greene (1955), 205 Ore. 140 , 286 P. 2d 128 , has determined that the insurance company was obligated to compensate the mortgagee notwithstanding the fact that the mortgagee was the purchaser of the premises for the full amount of the debt and judgment.

1973Co. of Hartford, Conn., 244 Mich. 668 , 222 N. W. 116 .” Further, where a standard mortgage clause has been shown to give rise to an independent contract, the case of Haskin v. Greene (1955), 205 Ore. 140 , 286 P. 2d 128 , has determined that the insurance company was obligated to compensate the mortgagee notwithstanding the fact that the mortgagee was the purchaser of the premises for the full amount of the debt and judgment.

1925The form of the debt was changed, but the debt itself for which the mortgage was security, remained in full force.” In Conyers v. Merieles (1881), 75 Ind. 443 , the court says, “* * * and it is well settled that the recovery of a judgment upon a note secured by a mortgage is no bar to an action to foreclose the mortgage.” In Gibson v. Green’s Admr. (1893), 89 Va. 524 , 16 S. E. 661 , 37 Am.

1925The form of the debt was changed, but the debt itself for which the mortgage was security, remained in full force.” In Conyers v. Merieles (1881), 75 Ind. 443 , the court says, “* * * and it is well settled that the recovery of a judgment upon a note secured by a mortgage is no bar to an action to foreclose the mortgage.” In Gibson v. Green’s Admr. (1893), 89 Va. 524 , 16 S. E. 661 , 37 Am.

1925The form of the debt was changed, but the debt itself for which the mortgage was security, remained in full force.” In Conyers v. Merieles (1881), 75 Ind. 443 , the court says, “* * * and it is well settled that the recovery of a judgment upon a note secured by a mortgage is no bar to an action to foreclose the mortgage.” In Gibson v. Green’s Admr. (1893), 89 Va. 524 , 16 S. E. 661 , 37 Am.

1887Rucker v. Steelman, 73 Ind. 396 ; Tindall v. Wasson, 74 Ind. 495; Jones Mort., sections 65, 66 and 1462.

1887Rucker v. Steelman, 73 Ind. 396 ; Tindall v. Wasson, 74 Ind. 495; Jones Mort., sections 65, 66 and 1462.

1883This was expressly decided in the case of Holmes v. Hinkle, 63 Ind. 518 , and is in entire harmony with the doctrine that the recovery of a personal judgment upon a note secured by a mortgage is no bar to a subsequent suit to foreclose the mortgage.

1878O’Leary v. Snediker, 16 Ind. 404 ; Jenkinson v. Ewing, 17 Ind. 505 ; Duck v. Wilson, 19 Ind. 190 .