sustained defense in Ohio

2012And he refuses to come in to assist.” The trial court sustained a defense objection to this argument and ordered the jury “to disregard the last comment.” {¶ 156} In State v. Leach, 102 Ohio St.3d 135 , 2004-Ohio-2147 , 807 N.E.2d 335 , syllabus, this court held: “Use of a defendant’s pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” In Leach, two women called the police and accused the defendant of attempted rape and other crimes.

2007Thereafter, the trial court sustained defense counsel's objection in open court and instructed the jury to disregard Sergeant Bibart's remark. {¶ 32} To bolster his argument, Castle cites State v. Leach , 102 Ohio St.3d 135 , 2004-Ohio-2147 , 807 N.E.2d 335 .

2004Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 166 . {¶ 43} In regards to the prosecutor's statement in his opening that "there is not doubt in this case," the record demonstrates that the trial court sustained defense counsel's objection to this comment and that, as a result, the prosecutor re-stated that he "believe[d] the State [would] prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt." Based upon the trial court's action in sustaining Klapka' objection and the prosecutor's rephrasing of his statement, we do not find that this comment was "so prejudicial as to deny [Klapka] a fair trial." State v. Kamel (1984), 12 Ohio St.

2000Appellant's counsel also objected to the fact that the prosecutor stood in front of one of the jurors and asked "what do you think about that?" The court sustained defense counsel's objections and instructed the jury to "disregard the last comments of the jury." The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the prosecutor's conduct at trial was improper and prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the defendant, see State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160 .

2002Under Evid.R. 609, the trial court has broad discretion to prohibit questioning about more than the “name, date and place of the conviction, and the punishment imposed, when the conviction is admissible solely to impeach credibility.” State v. Amburgey (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 115, 116 , 515 N.E.2d 925 .

2002Under Evid.R. 609, the trial court has broad discretion to prohibit questioning about more than the “name, date and place of the conviction, and the punishment imposed, when the conviction is admissible solely to impeach credibility.” State v. Amburgey (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 115, 116 , 515 N.E.2d 925 .

2002Does that explain what he did or justify what he did?” And even though the trial court sustained a defense objection to these remarks, LaMar notes that the prosecutor later continued along that same line of argument, telling the jury that “[n]othing was presented that mitigated what he did, and any mitigation is greatly outweighed and absolutely eclipsed by the aggravating circumstances.” The trial court overruled LaMar’s motion for mistrial following this comment. {¶ 92} As LaMar correctly notes, “mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.04(B) are not related to a defendant’s culpability but, rathe

2002Does that explain what he did or justify what he did?” And even though the trial court sustained a defense objection to these remarks, LaMar notes that the prosecutor later continued along that same line of argument, telling the jury that “[n]othing was presented that mitigated what he did, and any mitigation is greatly outweighed and absolutely eclipsed by the aggravating circumstances.” The trial court overruled LaMar’s motion for mistrial following this comment. {¶ 92} As LaMar correctly notes, “mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.04(B) are not related to a defendant’s culpability but, rathe

2002Cf. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d at 410 , 613 N.E.2d 203 (noting that prosecutor’s conduct can be exacerbated by lack of curative instructions and by trial court consistently overruling defense objections to misconduct).

2002Cf. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d at 410 , 613 N.E.2d 203 (noting that prosecutor’s conduct can be exacerbated by lack of curative instructions and by trial court consistently overruling defense objections to misconduct).

2002Thus, we have held that it is improper for prosecutors to make any comment to the jury during the penalty phase that the nature and circumstances of the murder are “aggravating circumstances.” State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344 , 662 N.E.2d 311 , paragraph two of the syllabus.

2002Thus, we have held that it is improper for prosecutors to make any comment to the jury during the penalty phase that the nature and circumstances of the murder are “aggravating circumstances.” State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344 , 662 N.E.2d 311 , paragraph two of the syllabus.

2024Thus, any error “lacks prejudicial effect warranting reversal.” State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 94. {¶ 245} Questioning the reliability of Knuff’s statements.

2024Thus, any error “lacks prejudicial effect warranting reversal.” State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44 , 2002-Ohio-7044 , 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 94 . {¶ 245} Questioning the reliability of Knuff’s statements.

2019Henry No. 7-12-04, 2012-Ohio-5943 , the court found no violation of Evid.R. 404(B) when a deputy sheriff testified that the defendant “ended up having a couple of warrants when I ran him * * *.” Id. at ¶ 14.

2018State v. Treesh , 90 Ohio St.3d 460 , 480, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001). {¶ 45} In support of his prosecutorial misconduct argument, appellant complains that the state displayed case law in front of the jury and attempted to read a portion of it prior to being instructed to take it down after the trial court sustained defense counsel's objection.

2018State v. Treesh , 90 Ohio St.3d 460 , 480, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001). {¶ 45} In support of his prosecutorial misconduct argument, appellant complains that the state displayed case law in front of the jury and attempted to read a portion of it prior to being instructed to take it down after the trial court sustained defense counsel's objection.

2014State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 12 , 679 N.E.2d 646 (1997).

2014State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 12 , 679 N.E.2d 646 (1997).

2014The trial court also instructed the prosecutor to “[s]tay away from mitigating factors” and to “move on to something else.” {¶ 58} Pickens invokes State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d 381 , 659 N.E.2d 292 (1996), and State v. Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22 , 2007-Ohio-4836 , 873 N.E.2d 828 , in *473 arguing that a mistrial should have been declared, because the prosecutor improperly mentioned his youth as a mitigating factor during voir dire.

2014The trial court also instructed the prosecutor to “[s]tay away from mitigating factors” and to “move on to something else.” {¶ 58} Pickens invokes State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d 381 , 659 N.E.2d 292 (1996), and State v. Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22 , 2007-Ohio-4836 , 873 N.E.2d 828 , in *473 arguing that a mistrial should have been declared, because the prosecutor improperly mentioned his youth as a mitigating factor during voir dire.

2014The trial court also instructed the prosecutor to “[s]tay away from mitigating factors” and to “move on to something else.” {¶ 58} Pickens invokes State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d 381 , 659 N.E.2d 292 (1996), and State v. Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22 , 2007-Ohio-4836 , 873 N.E.2d 828 , in *473 arguing that a mistrial should have been declared, because the prosecutor improperly mentioned his youth as a mitigating factor during voir dire.

2014The trial court also instructed the prosecutor to “[s]tay away from mitigating factors” and to “move on to something else.” {¶ 58} Pickens invokes State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d 381 , 659 N.E.2d 292 (1996), and State v. Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22 , 2007-Ohio-4836 , 873 N.E.2d 828 , in *473 arguing that a mistrial should have been declared, because the prosecutor improperly mentioned his youth as a mitigating factor during voir dire.

2014On redirect, the prosecutor asked Sandoval, “Sir, how many seconds does it take to reach for a gun and shoot and kill a police officer?” And on cross-examination of Roberson, the prosecutor asked, “That officer had every reason in the world to be nervous, didn’t he?” In both instances, the trial court sustained defense objections and instructed the jury to “[disregard the question.” {¶ 177} Thompson “cannot predicate error on objections the trial court sustained.” Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2008-Ohio-3426 , 892 N.E.2d 864, at ¶ 162 .

2014On redirect, the prosecutor asked Sandoval, “Sir, how many seconds does it take to reach for a gun and shoot and kill a police officer?” And on cross-examination of Roberson, the prosecutor asked, “That officer had every reason in the world to be nervous, didn’t he?” In both instances, the trial court sustained defense objections and instructed the jury to “[disregard the question.” {¶ 177} Thompson “cannot predicate error on objections the trial court sustained.” Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2008-Ohio-3426 , 892 N.E.2d 864, at ¶ 162 .

2010Thus, no improper evidence was elicited during Rinn’s testimony. {¶ 93} Third, Fry argues that Donnel Juersivich, the victim-assistance advocate, improperly testified about the “cycle of violence” in Hardison’s relationship with Fry. “ ‘Generally, battered woman syndrome testimony is relevant and helpful when needed to explain a complainant’s actions, such as prolonged endurance of physical abuse accompanied by attempts at hiding or minimizing the abuse, delays in reporting the abuse, or recanting the allegations of abuse.’ ” State v. Haines, 112 Ohio St.3d 393 , 2006-Ohio-6711 , 860 N.E.2d 91

2010Thus, no improper evidence was elicited during Rinn’s testimony. {¶ 93} Third, Fry argues that Donnel Juersivich, the victim-assistance advocate, improperly testified about the “cycle of violence” in Hardison’s relationship with Fry. “ ‘Generally, battered woman syndrome testimony is relevant and helpful when needed to explain a complainant’s actions, such as prolonged endurance of physical abuse accompanied by attempts at hiding or minimizing the abuse, delays in reporting the abuse, or recanting the allegations of abuse.’ ” State v. Haines, 112 Ohio St.3d 393 , 2006-Ohio-6711 , 860 N.E.2d 91

2010Thus, no improper evidence was elicited during Rinn’s testimony. {¶ 93} Third, Fry argues that Donnel Juersivich, the victim-assistance advocate, improperly testified about the “cycle of violence” in Hardison’s relationship with Fry. “ ‘Generally, battered woman syndrome testimony is relevant and helpful when needed to explain a complainant’s actions, such as prolonged endurance of physical abuse accompanied by attempts at hiding or minimizing the abuse, delays in reporting the abuse, or recanting the allegations of abuse.’ ” State v. Haines, 112 Ohio St.3d 393 , 2006-Ohio-6711 , 860 N.E.2d 91

2010Thus, no improper evidence was elicited during Rinn’s testimony. {¶ 93} Third, Fry argues that Donnel Juersivich, the victim-assistance advocate, improperly testified about the “cycle of violence” in Hardison’s relationship with Fry. “ ‘Generally, battered woman syndrome testimony is relevant and helpful when needed to explain a complainant’s actions, such as prolonged endurance of physical abuse accompanied by attempts at hiding or minimizing the abuse, delays in reporting the abuse, or recanting the allegations of abuse.’ ” State v. Haines, 112 Ohio St.3d 393 , 2006-Ohio-6711 , 860 N.E.2d 91

2004Since the prosecution knew that evidence to this effect would be introduced, and, in fact, such evidence was introduced, including Klapka's own testimony, this statement was "no more than an objective summary of evidence which the prosecutor reasonably expected to produce." Frazier, 394 U.S. at 736 . {¶ 45} Regarding the prosecution's other comments during opening statement, the trial court sustained objections to each of them and provided a curative instruction, instructing the jury to disregard the statement or admonishing the prosecutor to limit his comments to what evidence is going to be

2004Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 166 . {¶ 43} In regards to the prosecutor's statement in his opening that "there is not doubt in this case," the record demonstrates that the trial court sustained defense counsel's objection to this comment and that, as a result, the prosecutor re-stated that he "believe[d] the State [would] prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt." Based upon the trial court's action in sustaining Klapka' objection and the prosecutor's rephrasing of his statement, we do not find that this comment was "so prejudicial as to deny [Klapka] a fair trial." State v. Kamel (1984), 12 Ohio St.

2004He says, T had sex with Martha.’ ” {¶ 106} When the prosecutor’s comments are placed in the context of his overall argument, it is clear that his comments were not “manifestly intended * * * to be a comment on the failure of [Gapen] to testify.” Webb, 70 Ohio St.3d at 328 , 638 N.E.2d 1023 .

2004He says, T had sex with Martha.’ ” {¶ 106} When the prosecutor’s comments are placed in the context of his overall argument, it is clear that his comments were not “manifestly intended * * * to be a comment on the failure of [Gapen] to testify.” Webb, 70 Ohio St.3d at 328 , 638 N.E.2d 1023 .

2003Tracy v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 147 , 152 . {¶ 23} With respect to both of these assigned errors, the trial court sustained the defense's objections.

2002Pang v. Minch (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 186 . {¶ 67} Similarly, any reference to Washington's prior criminal record was not improper.

2001See State v. Jones (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335 , 344 (objection sustained and corrective instruction given); State v. Spirko (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 1 , 6-7 (no objection, statement solicited by defense counsel); State v. Jackson (May 21, 1999), Sandusky App. No. S-98-032, unreported (no objection by defense counsel); State v. King (June 30, 1997), Washington App. No. 96 CA 39, unreported (objection sustained).

2000However, “[a] prosecutor may state his opinion if it is based on the evidence presented at trial.” State v. Watson (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 1, 10 , 572 N.E.2d 97, 106 .

2000However, “[a] prosecutor may state his opinion if it is based on the evidence presented at trial.” State v. Watson (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 1, 10 , 572 N.E.2d 97, 106 .

2000The prosecutor's conduct must be reviewed in the context of the entire trial, see Darden v. Wainwright (1986), 477 U.S. 168 .