49 Texas opinions name it 5 courts 1891–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chambers v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 22 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993), citing Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 681 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). 2008Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 22 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993), citing Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 681 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). | 4 | 4 |
Cantu v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 22 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993), citing Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 681 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). 2008Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 22 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993), citing Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 681 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). | 4 | 4 |
Wesbrook v. Stategreen2 sentences2024The trial court stated, “Disregard the prosecutor’s last comment.” “In most instances, an instruction to disregard the remarks will cure the error.” Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. Crim. 2005See Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 115 ; Phillips v. State, 130 S.W.3d 343, 355-56 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.). | 3 | 3 |
Hawkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72 , 76–77 (Tex. Crim. 2014Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 76–77. | 2 | 4 |
Phillips v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 115 ; Phillips v. State, 130 S.W.3d 343, 355-56 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.). 2004See Wesbrook , 29 S.W.3d at 115 ; Phillips v. State , 130 S.W.3d 343, 355-56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.). | 2 | 2 |
Wages v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Poole cites us to Wages v. State in which the court held that it was error for the State to ask the jury to punish the defendant for exercising his right to trial. 703 S.W.2d 736, 741 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, pet. dism’d). 1998Poole cites us to Wages v. State in which the court held that it was error for the State to ask the jury to punish the defendant for exercising his right to trial. 703 S.W.2d 736, 741 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, pet. dism'd). | 2 | 2 |
Randolph, Emanuell Glenngreen1 sentence2024See Randolph v. State, 353 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Garcia v. Stategreen1 sentence2022See Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Gamboa v. Stategreen1 sentence2019Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Wilkerson v. Stategreen1 sentence2019The jury charge also instructed the jury that the “law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all.” An instruction to the jury to disregard improper jury argument cures the error unless the remark is “so inflammatory that its prejudicial effect could not reasonably be overcome by such an instruction.” Wilkerson v. State, 881 S.W.2d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Arroyogreen1 sentence2016See generally In re Arroyo, 988 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex. 1998) (holding that the amended Rules of Appellate Procedure provided an adequate appellate remedy that was functionally identical to 6 mandamus review previously used to review an order in which the trial court sustained a challenge to an affidavit of indigence). | 1 | 1 |
Chamberlain v. Stategreen1 sentence2015He notes that, at the guilt-innocence phase of trial, defense counsel moved for mistrial at least twenty-five times and the trial court issued at least nine instructions to disregard inadmissible testimony or improper argument offered by the State.15 15In particular, the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objections and issued instructions to disregard as to the following: (1) A statement by Novoa agreeing with the prosecutor that Y.M. was “forthcoming” with answers to questions that she posed during her interview; (2) A statement by Novoa agreeing with the prosecutor that Y.M. “freely g[ | 1 | 1 |
Archie v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Carter v. Stategreen1 sentence2006P. 33.1(a)(1), (2); cf. Carter v. State, 717 S.W.2d 60, 72, 76 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (noting, “The court sustained the challenge for cause by the State. | 1 | 1 |
Cates v. Stategreen1 sentence1999See Cates v. State, 752 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no pet.) (holding that even where the court sustained defense counsel’s objection to the prosecution’s comment on defendant’s failure to testify any error was cured and rendered harmless by the court’s instruction to disregard). | 1 | 1 |
Huffman v. Stategreen1 sentence1998The general rule is that error incurred as a result of an improper question “may be cured or rendered harmless by its withdrawal or an instruction to disregard,” unless the question was “clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury and is of such a character so as to suggest the impermissibility of withdrawing the impression produced.” Huffman v. State, 746 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Carter v. State, 614 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981). | 1 | 1 |
Carter v. Stategreen1 sentence1998The general rule is that error incurred as a result of an improper question “may be cured or rendered harmless by its withdrawal or an instruction to disregard,” unless the question was “clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury and is of such a character so as to suggest the impermissibility of withdrawing the impression produced.” Huffman v. State, 746 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Carter v. State, 614 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981). | 1 | 1 |
Orona v. Stategreen1 sentence1995See Ramos v. State, 767 S.W.2d 248, 252 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref'd) (any harm that may have occurred by an accusation by prosecution that defense counsel is playing on the jury’s sympathy would be cured by an instruction to disregard); see also Orona, 791 S.W.2d at 129-130 (statement by prosecution that defense counsel was adept at getting criminal defendants “off the hook” did not contribute to conviction). | 1 | 1 |
Ramos v. Stategreen1 sentence1995See Ramos v. State, 767 S.W.2d 248, 252 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref'd) (any harm that may have occurred by an accusation by prosecution that defense counsel is playing on the jury’s sympathy would be cured by an instruction to disregard); see also Orona, 791 S.W.2d at 129-130 (statement by prosecution that defense counsel was adept at getting criminal defendants “off the hook” did not contribute to conviction). | 1 | 1 |
Fambrough v. Wagleygreen2 sentences1979Fambrough v. Wagley, 140 Tex. 577, 585 , 169 S.W.2d 478, 482 (1943). 1979Fambrough v. Wagley, 140 Tex. 577, 585 , 169 S.W.2d 478, 482 (1943). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Veteto v. State
green
2 sentences2003In Veteto v. State, 8 S.W.3d 805 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. ref'd), the trial court sustained defense objections at trial, based primarily on the Fifth Amendment, and instructed the jury to disregard because “post-arrest silence” was not evidence. 2003In Veteto v. State, 8 S.W.3d 805 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. ref'd), the trial court sustained defense objections at trial, based primarily on the Fifth Amendment, and instructed the jury to disregard because "post-arrest silence" was not evidence. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Garrett v. State
green
2 sentences1995Id. at 859 . 1995Id. at 859 . | 2 | 1995–1995 |
Stillwell v. City of Fort Worth
neutral
2 sentences1943The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment. 162 S.W.2d 1046 . 1943The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment. 162 S. W. (2d) 1046 . | 2 | 1943–1943 |
Garza v. Attorney General
green
1 sentence2021Within this timeframe, Gordon Haley filed his 2021 statement, Wilmington filed its challenge to the statement, and the trial court sustained the challenge. 6 the declarant to prove the inability to afford costs.” Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Mendoza v. Ranger Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 779–80. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Helleson v. State
green
1 sentence2019Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Reyna v. State
green
1 sentence2013Appellant’s objections to the prosecutor’s questions that the trial court overruled were not made on the basis of the Confrontation Clause; thus, those objections did not preserve his Confrontation Clause issue on appeal. 2 See Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 179 ; Paredes, 129 S.W.3d at 535 ; see also Cavil, 2009 WL 2617780 , at *3. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Paredes v. State
green
1 sentence2013Appellant’s objections to the prosecutor’s questions that the trial court overruled were not made on the basis of the Confrontation Clause; thus, those objections did not preserve his Confrontation Clause issue on appeal. 2 See Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 179 ; Paredes, 129 S.W.3d at 535 ; see also Cavil, 2009 WL 2617780 , at *3. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Ramos v. State
green
2 sentences1985Initially, as was stated in Ramos v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Cr.App.1967), it is well settled that the prosecutor may argue his opinions concerning issues in the case so long as the opinions are based on the evidence in the record and not as constituting unsworn testimony. 1985Initially, as was stated in Ramos v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Cr.App. 1967), it is well settled that the prosecutor may argue his opinions concerning issues in the case so long as the opinions are based on the evidence in the record and not as constituting unsworn testimony. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Porter v. Southwestern Public Service Company
green
1 sentence1984Similarly, in Porter v. Southwestern Public Service Co., 489 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court held that, absent a sustained challenge, a city did not usurp the eminent domain power of a public utility by requiring it to meet certain standards under city zoning ordinances. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Mischer v. Frost neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Krueger, Hutchinson & Overton Clinic v. Lewis green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Hedgecroft v. City of Houston green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Vyvial v. State green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Ezell v. Dodson green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| McKinney v. Southwestern Liqour Co. neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Waters-Pierce Oil Company v. State neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Mann v. Mitchell neutral | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Mud Creek Irrigation, Agricultural, & Manufacturing Co. v. Vivian green | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| Lee v. British-American Mortgage Co. green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Ralls v. Parish green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Harle v. Texas Southern Railway neutral | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Cooper v. Singleton green | 1 | 1891–1891 |
| Carson v. Kelley & Sweatt neutral | 1 | 1891–1891 |
| Fagan v. McWhirter neutral | 1 | 1891–1891 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.