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12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2021The defense did not renew its motion for a mistrial after the curative instruction, so denial of the motion was not preserved for appellate review. “[B]ecause [Evans] failed to renew [the] motion for mistrial after the trial court denied it and then took other corrective action, this argument is waived.” Smith v. State, 302 Ga. 699, 702 (3) ( 808 SE2d 692 ) (2017). 9. 2021The defense did not renew its motion for a mistrial after the curative instruction, so denial of the motion was not preserved for appellate review. “[B]ecause [Evans] failed to renew [the] motion for mistrial after the trial court denied it and then took other corrective action, this argument is waived.” Smith v. State, 302 Ga. 699, 702 (3) ( 808 SE2d 692 ) (2017). 9. | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Thomas v. State, 270 Ga. App. 181, 183-184 (3) ( 606 SE2d 275 ) (2004). 2011See Thomas v. State, 270 Ga. App. 181, 183-184 (3) ( 606 SE2d 275 ) (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Jefferson v. Zantgreen2 sentences2004Because the trial court sustained the defense’s objection to the questioning and gave a curative instruction to the jury, Allen cannot show either that counsel’s tactical decision not to move for a mistrial fell outside "the wide range of reasonably effective assistance [cit.],” Jefferson v. Zant, 263 Ga. 316, 320 ( 431 SE2d 110 ) (1993), or that he would have been granted a mistrial but for counsel’s decision not to move for one. (b) Given eyewitness testimony that the victim was either on the ground or falling at the time Allen shot him in the head and the medical examiner’s acknowledgment t 2004Because the trial court sustained the defense’s objection to the questioning and gave a curative instruction to the jury, Allen cannot show either that counsel’s tactical decision not to move for a mistrial fell outside "the wide range of reasonably effective assistance [cit.],” Jefferson v. Zant, 263 Ga. 316, 320 ( 431 SE2d 110 ) (1993), or that he would have been granted a mistrial but for counsel’s decision not to move for one. (b) Given eyewitness testimony that the victim was either on the ground or falling at the time Allen shot him in the head and the medical examiner’s acknowledgment t | 1 | 1 |
Messick v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Messick v. State, 276 Ga. 528, 529 ( 580 SE2d 213 ) (2003) (during closing, counsel may draw reasonable inferences *504 or deductions from the evidence). 2004See Messick v. State, 276 Ga. 528, 529 ( 580 SE2d 213 ) (2003) (during closing, counsel may draw reasonable inferences *504 or deductions from the evidence). | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Stategreen2 sentences1999Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 150-151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996), summarized: “The Equal Protection Clause of the U. S. Constitution prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of race or gender, or the assumption that a venireperson will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than the person’s race or gender. [Cit.]” The party challenging the selections must first make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by pointing to relevant facts giving rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. 1999Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 150-151 (2) ( 476 SE2d 252 ) (1996), summarized: “The Equal Protection Clause of the U. S. Constitution prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of race or gender, or the assumption that a venireperson will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than the person’s race or gender. [Cit.]” The party challenging the selections must first make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by pointing to relevant facts giving rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. | 1 | 1 |
Stanley v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See generally Stanley v. State, 250 Ga. 3 (2), 295 S.E.2d 315 (1982). 1996See generally Stanley v. State, 250 Ga. 3 (2), 295 S.E.2d 315 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Stategreen2 sentences1993See Lee v. State, 262 Ga. 593, 594 ( 423 SE2d 249 ) (1992) (trial court properly sustained objection that expert testimony was not relevant to the issues at trial); Mantegna v. Professional Auto Care, 204 Ga. App. 254, 255 ( 419 SE2d 43 ) (1992) (objection to offer irrelevant expert testimony properly sustained); Barnes v. Wall, 201 Ga. App. 228 ( 411 SE2d 270 ) (1991) (trial court erred by admitting irrelevant expert testimony). [2] The trial judge did not rule the officer was not qualified as an expert in narcotics investigations, rather the court sustained the defense objection that the Sta 1993See Lee v. State, 262 Ga. 593, 594 ( 423 SE2d 249 ) (1992) (trial court properly sustained objection that expert testimony was not relevant to the issues at trial); Mantegna v. Professional Auto Care, 204 Ga. App. 254, 255 ( 419 SE2d 43 ) (1992) (objection to offer irrelevant expert testimony properly sustained); Barnes v. Wall, 201 Ga. App. 228 ( 411 SE2d 270 ) (1991) (trial court erred by admitting irrelevant expert testimony). [2] The trial judge did not rule the officer was not qualified as an expert in narcotics investigations, rather the court sustained the defense objection that the Sta | 1 | 1 |
Mantegna v. Professional Auto Care, Inc.green2 sentences1993See Lee v. State, 262 Ga. 593, 594 ( 423 SE2d 249 ) (1992) (trial court properly sustained objection that expert testimony was not relevant to the issues at trial); Mantegna v. Professional Auto Care, 204 Ga. App. 254, 255 ( 419 SE2d 43 ) (1992) (objection to offer irrelevant expert testimony properly sustained); Barnes v. Wall, 201 Ga. App. 228 ( 411 SE2d 270 ) (1991) (trial court erred by admitting irrelevant expert testimony). [2] The trial judge did not rule the officer was not qualified as an expert in narcotics investigations, rather the court sustained the defense objection that the Sta 1993See Lee v. State, 262 Ga. 593, 594 ( 423 SE2d 249 ) (1992) (trial court properly sustained objection that expert testimony was not relevant to the issues at trial); Mantegna v. Professional Auto Care, 204 Ga. App. 254, 255 ( 419 SE2d 43 ) (1992) (objection to offer irrelevant expert testimony properly sustained); Barnes v. Wall, 201 Ga. App. 228 ( 411 SE2d 270 ) (1991) (trial court erred by admitting irrelevant expert testimony). [2] The trial judge did not rule the officer was not qualified as an expert in narcotics investigations, rather the court sustained the defense objection that the Sta | 1 | 1 |
Jordan v. Stategreen2 sentences1984“Where counsel makes improper remarks, the court has a duty to rebuke him so as to remove the improper impression or give adequate instructions to the jury so as to remove the prejudicial effect of the remark.” Jordan v. State, 166 Ga. App. 417, 420 ( 304 SE2d 522 ) (1983). 1984“Where counsel makes improper remarks, the court has a duty to rebuke him so as to remove the improper impression or give adequate instructions to the jury so as to remove the prejudicial effect of the remark.” Jordan v. State, 166 Ga. App. 417, 420 ( 304 SE2d 522 ) (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences1981See Brown v. State, 246 Ga. 251 (2) ( 271 SE2d 163 ) (1980). 1981See Brown v. State, 246 Ga. 251 (2) ( 271 SE2d 163 ) (1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
West v. State
green
2 sentences2026In denying Clark’s motion for new trial, the trial court stated that it “stands by its ruling at trial”; that “[t]he evidence was admissible either as intrinsic evidence or under [Rule] 404(b) to show consciousness of guilt”; and that “[t]o the extent a [Rule] 403 ruling was not explicitly announced at trial, … the probative value of that evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Clark argues that the State’s position is not supported by West v. State, 305 Ga. 467 (2019), relied on by the trial court, because the 11 State in its arguments to the trial court 2026In denying Clark’s motion for new trial, the trial court stated that it “stands by its ruling at trial”; that “[t]he evidence was admissible either as intrinsic evidence or under [Rule] 404(b) to show consciousness of guilt”; and that “[t]o the extent a [Rule] 403 ruling was not explicitly announced at trial, … the probative value of that evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Clark argues that the State’s position is not supported by West v. State, 305 Ga. 467 (2019), relied on by the trial court, because the 11 State in its arguments to the trial court | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Norwood v. State
green
2 sentences2007As in Norwood v. State, 252 Ga. 292 ( 313 SE2d 98 ) (1984), in which the trial court questioned the prosecutor in front of the jury panel to clarify that the State was not seeking the death penalty, the prosecutor’s comment here “did not reflect upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant to be tried. [Hobdy] has not demonstrated any harm attributable to the statement and this [C]ourt cannot discern any harm under the circumstances presented here.” Id. at 293 (2). 2007As in Norwood v. State, 252 Ga. 292 ( 313 SE2d 98 ) (1984), in which the trial court questioned the prosecutor in front of the jury panel to clarify that the State was not seeking the death penalty, the prosecutor’s comment here “did not reflect upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant to be tried. [Hobdy] has not demonstrated any harm attributable to the statement and this [C]ourt cannot discern any harm under the circumstances presented here.” Id. at 293 (2). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Barnes v. Wall
green
2 sentences1993See Lee v. State, 262 Ga. 593, 594 ( 423 SE2d 249 ) (1992) (trial court properly sustained objection that expert testimony was not relevant to the issues at trial); Mantegna v. Professional Auto Care, 204 Ga. App. 254, 255 ( 419 SE2d 43 ) (1992) (objection to offer irrelevant expert testimony properly sustained); Barnes v. Wall, 201 Ga. App. 228 ( 411 SE2d 270 ) (1991) (trial court erred by admitting irrelevant expert testimony). [2] The trial judge did not rule the officer was not qualified as an expert in narcotics investigations, rather the court sustained the defense objection that the Sta 1993See Lee v. State, 262 Ga. 593, 594 ( 423 SE2d 249 ) (1992) (trial court properly sustained objection that expert testimony was not relevant to the issues at trial); Mantegna v. Professional Auto Care, 204 Ga. App. 254, 255 ( 419 SE2d 43 ) (1992) (objection to offer irrelevant expert testimony properly sustained); Barnes v. Wall, 201 Ga. App. 228 ( 411 SE2d 270 ) (1991) (trial court erred by admitting irrelevant expert testimony). [2] The trial judge did not rule the officer was not qualified as an expert in narcotics investigations, rather the court sustained the defense objection that the Sta | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Wisdom v. State
green
2 sentences1983As to the state’s impeachment of its own witnesses, the Supreme Court of Georgia held in Wisdom v. State, 234 Ga. 650 ( 217 SE2d 244 ) (1975), that to meet the requirement of establishing entrapment under OCGA § 24-9-81 (Code Ann. § 38-1801) before one might impeach his own witness, a showing of prejudice was no longer necessary. 1983As to the state’s impeachment of its own witnesses, the Supreme Court of Georgia held in Wisdom v. State, 234 Ga. 650 ( 217 SE2d 244 ) (1975), that to meet the requirement of establishing entrapment under OCGA § 24-9-81 (Code Ann. § 38-1801) before one might impeach his own witness, a showing of prejudice was no longer necessary. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.