sustained challenge in Virginia

1985In LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564 , 304 S.E.2d 644 (1983), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 744 , 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984), we found no abuse of discretion when the trial court sustained a challenge to a venireman because of ambivalent answers to Witherspoon questions, observing that we could neither see nor hear the venireman, and that the trial court might properly base its ruling on "factors beyond the printed record." Id. at 584, 304 S.E.2d at 655 .

1985In LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564 , 304 S.E.2d 644 (1983), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 744 , 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984), we found no abuse of discretion when the trial court sustained a challenge to a venireman because of ambivalent answers to Witherspoon questions, observing that we could neither see nor hear the venireman, and that the trial court might properly base its ruling on "factors beyond the printed record." Id. at 584, 304 S.E.2d at 655 .

1985In LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564 , 304 S.E.2d 644 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984), we found no abuse of Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 464-65 , 248 S.E.2d 135, 141 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). discretion when the trial court sustained a challenge to a venireman because of ambivalent answers to Witherspoon questions, observing that we could neither see nor hear the venireman, and that the trial court might properly base its ruling on “factors beyond the printed record.” Id. at 584, 304 S.E.2d at 655 .

1985In LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564 , 304 S.E.2d 644 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984), we found no abuse of Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 464-65 , 248 S.E.2d 135, 141 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). discretion when the trial court sustained a challenge to a venireman because of ambivalent answers to Witherspoon questions, observing that we could neither see nor hear the venireman, and that the trial court might properly base its ruling on “factors beyond the printed record.” Id. at 584, 304 S.E.2d at 655 .

1985In LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564 , 304 S.E.2d 644 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984), we found no abuse of Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 464-65 , 248 S.E.2d 135, 141 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). discretion when the trial court sustained a challenge to a venireman because of ambivalent answers to Witherspoon questions, observing that we could neither see nor hear the venireman, and that the trial court might properly base its ruling on “factors beyond the printed record.” Id. at 584, 304 S.E.2d at 655 .

1936Rep. 670 , this court sustained a claim for exemptions, although contrary to the strict letter of the set-off statute, * # # .” In Cleveland v. McCanna, 7 N. D. 455 , 75 N. W. 908, 910 , 41 L.

1936Rep. 670 , this court sustained a claim for exemptions, although contrary to the strict letter of the set-off statute, * # # .” In Cleveland v. McCanna, 7 N. D. 455 , 75 N. W. 908, 910 , 41 L.

1928The court, after holding that the object of the child labor statute was to preserve the lives and limbs of children, also held that “the unlawful hiring constitutes the causal connection between the violation of the act and the injury complained of.” In Miller Manufacturing Co. v. Loving, 125 Va. 255 , 99 S. E. 591 , this court approves the doctrine laid down in Krutlies v. Bulls Head Coal Co., 249 Pa. 162 , 94 Atl. 459 , L.

1928The court, after holding that the object of the child labor statute was to preserve the lives and limbs of children, also held that “the unlawful hiring constitutes the causal connection between the violation of the act and the injury complained of.” In Miller Manufacturing Co. v. Loving, 125 Va. 255 , 99 S. E. 591 , this court approves the doctrine laid down in Krutlies v. Bulls Head Coal Co., 249 Pa. 162 , 94 Atl. 459 , L.

1928The court, after holding that the object of the child labor statute was to preserve the lives and limbs of children, also held that “the unlawful hiring constitutes the causal connection between the violation of the act and the injury complained of.” In Miller Manufacturing Co. v. Loving, 125 Va. 255 , 99 S. E. 591 , this court approves the doctrine laid down in Krutlies v. Bulls Head Coal Co., 249 Pa. 162 , 94 Atl. 459 , L.

1928The court, after holding that the object of the child labor statute was to preserve the lives and limbs of children, also held that “the unlawful hiring constitutes the causal connection between the violation of the act and the injury complained of.” In Miller Manufacturing Co. v. Loving, 125 Va. 255 , 99 S. E. 591 , this court approves the doctrine laid down in Krutlies v. Bulls Head Coal Co., 249 Pa. 162 , 94 Atl. 459 , L.

1928The trial court sustained the defense and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, saying: “It follows that the judgment of the court below must be affirmed; for we do not understand any claim to be made that, if Watson was in fact.placed and kept at employment dangerous to life and limb, there can be any recovery under the conditions of the policy.” It is manifest that the court regarded the provision in the policy excepting liability for injury to a person “employed by the insured contrary to law” as being equivalent to the language “employed in violation of law as to age.” In Sta

1928The trial court sustained the defense and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, saying: “It follows that the judgment of the court below must be affirmed; for we do not understand any claim to be made that, if Watson was in fact.placed and kept at employment dangerous to life and limb, there can be any recovery under the conditions of the policy.” It is manifest that the court regarded the provision in the policy excepting liability for injury to a person “employed by the insured contrary to law” as being equivalent to the language “employed in violation of law as to age.” In Sta

1912This principle is recognized in Litton’s Case, 101 Va. 833, 849 , 44 S. E. 923, 927 , where the court sustained an instruction which told the jury, “That when the Commonwealth has proved that the accused has committed a homicide, and it does not appear, from the circumstances given in evidence by the Commonwealth, that the killing was of a lower degree than murder in the second degree or in self-defense, then it is prima facie murder in the second degree, and the burden is cast upon the accused to prove that it was below murder in the second degree or in self-defense; and if the Commonwealth s

1912This principle is recognized in Litton’s Case, 101 Va. 833, 849 , 44 S. E. 923, 927 , where the court sustained an instruction which told the jury, “That when the Commonwealth has proved that the accused has committed a homicide, and it does not appear, from the circumstances given in evidence by the Commonwealth, that the killing was of a lower degree than murder in the second degree or in self-defense, then it is prima facie murder in the second degree, and the burden is cast upon the accused to prove that it was below murder in the second degree or in self-defense; and if the Commonwealth s

1908A. Sprinkel.” The court sustained this exception, the case was brought here on appeal, and a decree was rendered at the November term, 1904, in which the decree of the circuit court was reversed and annulled; — “and this court proceeding to pronounce such decree as the said circuit court ought to have pronounced, it further adjudged, ordered and decreed that the second exception filed by the complainants in said circuit court to the report of Commissioner Bryant, returned and filed in this cause on the 16th day of March, 1904, be overruled, and the said report be and the same is hereby confirm

1908A. Sprinkel.” The court sustained this exception, the case was brought here on appeal, and a decree was rendered at the November term, 1904, in which the decree of the circuit court was reversed and annulled; — “and this court proceeding to pronounce such decree as the said circuit court ought to have pronounced, it further adjudged, ordered and decreed that the second exception filed by the complainants in said circuit court to the report of Commissioner Bryant, returned and filed in this cause on the 16th day of March, 1904, be overruled, and the said report be and the same is hereby confirm