sustained defense in Pennsylvania

2021Upon review, given Dr. Mirza’s concession that he is not an expert in corporate structures, we conclude the trial court’s ruling does not constitute a “manifest abuse of discretion.” Z.F.1, 244 A.3d at 498 .

2021Despite the fact that the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection to the admission of this evidence and ordered Ms. Weigand’s testimony regarding the formation of petechiae be stricken from the record, id. (citing N.T.

2014Despite stating that “the possibility that the victim would incriminate herself was ‘ridiculous[,]’ … the trial court sustained her claim of privilege[,] citing the statement of [her] counsel that [she] could incriminate herself.” - 12 - J-S74009-14 Id.

2014This Court ultimately overruled the trial court’s decision, emphasizing that “although the trial court did have an in camera discussion with counsel, … no one offered anything to substantiate the claim of privilege.” Id.

2002Id. at 152 . ¶ 5 Following this discussion, Appellant's counsel asked whether Dr. Osterholm had been involved with Post & Schell "over the years, in many matters" to which Dr. Osterholm replied "a few." Id. at 152-53 .

2002Id. at 152 . ¶ 5 Following this discussion, Appellant's counsel asked whether Dr. Osterholm had been involved with Post & Schell "over the years, in many matters" to which Dr. Osterholm replied "a few." Id. at 152-53 .

2002Therefore, we will not address the ineffectiveness claim. [13] 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(2). [14] 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(3). [15] 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(5). [16] See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(4). [1] The motion in limine and the trial court's ruling also applied to a second prosecution witness who did not participate in the murders, but who entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth in a separate case in exchange for his testimony against DeJesus. [2] The trial court also sustained defense counsel's objection to the following question asked of the second prosecution witness: "Did you tell the polic

2002The trial court also sustained defense counsel’s objection to the following question asked of the second prosecution witness: "Did you tell the police at the time the whole truth about what you knew?" DeJesus, 787 A.2d at 411 (quoting N.T., 7/28/99, at 44).

2000The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection and instructed the prosecutor to “give up the sympathy provoking argument and go on.” Id.

2000The trial court sustained defense counsel's objection and instructed the prosecutor to "give up the sympathy provoking argument and go on." Id.

1991See: Commonwealth v. Pyett, 372 Pa.Super. 291, 294 , 539 A.2d 444, 445 (1988); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 315 Pa.Super. 256 , 461 A.2d 1268 (1983) (en banc).

1991See: Commonwealth v. Pyett, 372 Pa.Super. 291, 294 , 539 A.2d 444, 445 (1988); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 315 Pa.Super. 256 , 461 A.2d 1268 (1983) (en banc).

1979In Commonwealth v. Kerr, 150 Pa.Super. 598 , 29 A.2d 340 (1942), the trial court sustained a defense demurrer to the evidence.

1979In Commonwealth v. Kerr, 150 Pa.Super. 598 , 29 A.2d 340 (1942), the trial court sustained a defense demurrer to the evidence.

1978Commonwealth v. Peterson, 453 Pa. 187 , 307 A.2d 264 (1973). 3 .

1978Commonwealth v. Peterson, 453 Pa. 187 , 307 A.2d 264 (1973). 3 .

1974In Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91 , 288 A.2d 727 , cert. denied, 409 U. S. 867 (1972), a mistrial had been declared over defendant’s objection, after the introduction of evidence in chief had been completed by both sides, on the basis of an Improper comment of the assistant district attorney.

1974In Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91 , 288 A.2d 727 , cert. denied, 409 U. S. 867 (1972), a mistrial had been declared over defendant’s objection, after the introduction of evidence in chief had been completed by both sides, on the basis of an Improper comment of the assistant district attorney.

1974This Court sustained the claim of double jeopardy, holding that “a trial judge’s convenience does not constitute ‘manifest necessity’ in the constitutional sense.” 453 Pa. at 122 , 306 A.2d at 895-96 .

1974This Court sustained the claim of double jeopardy, holding that “a trial judge’s convenience does not constitute ‘manifest necessity’ in the constitutional sense.” 453 Pa. at 122 , 306 A.2d at 895-96 .

1974In Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91 , 288 A.2d 727 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 867 (1972), a mistrial had been declared over defendant's objection, after the introduction of evidence in chief had been completed by both sides, on the basis of an improper comment of the assistant district attorney.

1974In Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91 , 288 A.2d 727 , cert. denied, 409 U. S. 867 (1972), a mistrial had been declared over defendant’s objection, after the introduction of evidence in chief had been completed by both sides, on the basis of an Improper comment of the assistant district attorney.

1973In Commonwealth v. D'Angelo, 437 Pa. 331 , 263 A. 2d 441 (1970), this Court sustained a challenge to a search warrant when it was later established that the police officer-affiant knowingly falsified a material statement in the affidavit supporting the warrant.

1973In Commonwealth v. D'Angelo, 437 Pa. 331 , 263 A. 2d 441 (1970), this Court sustained a challenge to a search warrant when it was later established that the police officer-affiant knowingly falsified a material statement in the affidavit supporting the warrant.

1958We agree with appellants that this claim is governed by the law of New Jersey, irrespective of whether it arises ont of a decree of the New Jersey Court of Chancery, which is entitled to full faith and credit under Article IY, §1 of the Constitution of the United States: Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 ; Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 ; or out of a contract executed in New Jersey by residents thereof ': Linn v. Employers Reinsurance.

1958We agree with appellants that this claim is governed by the law of New Jersey, irrespective of whether it arises ont of a decree of the New Jersey Court of Chancery, which is entitled to full faith and credit under Article IY, §1 of the Constitution of the United States: Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 ; Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 ; or out of a contract executed in New Jersey by residents thereof ': Linn v. Employers Reinsurance.

1958We agree with appellants that this claim is governed by the law of New Jersey, irrespective of whether it arises ont of a decree of the New Jersey Court of Chancery, which is entitled to full faith and credit under Article IY, §1 of the Constitution of the United States: Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 ; Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 ; or out of a contract executed in New Jersey by residents thereof ': Linn v. Employers Reinsurance.

1943In Hartman’s Estate (No. 2), 320 Pa. 331 , 182 A. 232 , a woman executed a deed conveying a part of her real estate to a certain grantee; the deed provided that possession of the property should be retained by her during her lifetime and should pass at her decease to the grantee.

1943In Hartman’s Estate (No. 2), 320 Pa. 331 , 182 A. 232 , a woman executed a deed conveying a part of her real estate to a certain grantee; the deed provided that possession of the property should be retained by her during her lifetime and should pass at her decease to the grantee.

1942Section 7 was next before the Court in Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. 258 (1879).

1914Thus applying the equitable doctrine that a creditor may avail himself of any security which his debtor holds from a third person for the payment of a debt: Kelly v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610 .

1914In this state, in Blood v. Crew, etc., Co., supra, the mortgagee proceeded against the grantee on the covenant in the deed; and from the authorities there cited this is sustained on the principle “that a party may sue on a promise made on sufficient consideration for his use and benefit, though it be made to another and not to himself:” Merriman v. Moore, 90 Pa. 78 .