24 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Crossgreen2 sentences2026Additionally, “[t]he force used to compel the defendant’s conduct must remain constant, controlling the will of the otherwise unwilling actor during the entire time he commits the act, and must be of such a nature that the [actor] cannot safely withdraw.” Id., citing State v. Good, 110 Ohio App. 415, 419 (10th Dist. 1960). {¶ 55} To successfully assert a duress defense, a defendant must have a subjective belief that he is in danger of imminent death or grave bodily injury, and that subjective belief must be objectively reasonable based upon the evidence presented. 2020“One of the essential features of * * * a duress defense is the sense of present, imminent, immediate and impending death, or serious bodily injury.” State v. Cross, 58 Ohio St.2d 482, 487 , 391 N.E.2d 319 (1979). | 3 | 8 |
State v. Woodsgreen2 sentences1998The question remains whether a duress instruction should apply to the remaining count of aggravated murder based on prior calculation and design. {¶ 110} In Woods, 48 Ohio St.2d at 135 , 2 O.O.3d at 293 , 357 N.E.2d at 1065, fn. 3 , this court stated: “There is strong precedent for holding that duress is not a defense to murder, but that question has not been decided in Ohio. 1998The question remains whether a duress instruction should apply to the remaining count of aggravated murder based on prior calculation and design. {¶ 110} In Woods, 48 Ohio St.2d at 135 , 2 O.O.3d at 293 , 357 N.E.2d at 1065, fn. 3 , this court stated: “There is strong precedent for holding that duress is not a defense to murder, but that question has not been decided in Ohio. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Simesgreen2 sentences2021Cuyahoga No. 103672, 2016-Ohio-7300, ¶ 40 (“Fear of future harm is not sufficient to prove the affirmative defense of duress. * * * Appellant's fear that Towns would ‘make good’ on his threat at some undetermined time in the future is insufficient to support a duress instruction.”). 2019Cuyahoga No. 103672, 2016-Ohio-7300, ¶ 40 (“Fear of future harm is not sufficient to prove the affirmative defense of duress. * * * Appellant’s fear that Towns would ‘make good’ on his threat at some undetermined time in the future is insufficient to -8- support a duress instruction.”). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Goodgreen2 sentences2026Aug. 15, 1990), citing State v. Good, 110 Ohio App. 415, 419 (10th Dist. 1960); see also State v. Simes, 2016-Ohio- 7300, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.) (Fear of future harm is not sufficient to prove the affirmative defense of duress). {¶ 30} Appellant's fear that Parker would ‘make good’ on some perceived threat at some undetermined time in the future is insufficient to support a duress defense. 2026Additionally, “[t]he force used to compel the defendant’s conduct must remain constant, controlling the will of the otherwise unwilling actor during the entire time he commits the act, and must be of such a nature that the [actor] cannot safely withdraw.” Id., citing State v. Good, 110 Ohio App. 415, 419 (10th Dist. 1960). {¶ 55} To successfully assert a duress defense, a defendant must have a subjective belief that he is in danger of imminent death or grave bodily injury, and that subjective belief must be objectively reasonable based upon the evidence presented. | 2 | 5 |
State v. Getsygreen2 sentences2020See Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d at 197-198 , 702 N.E.2d 866 . {¶24} Finally, while the trial court was unwilling to extend a duress analysis beyond the first confrontation with Vega and White, this incident was not at issue— White was not charged for the first accident involving Vega. 2020See Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d at 197-198 , 702 N.E.2d 866 . {¶24} Finally, while the trial court was unwilling to extend a duress analysis beyond the first confrontation with Vega and White, this incident was not at issue— White was not charged for the first accident involving Vega. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Zhanggreen2 sentences2026State v. Zhang, 2016-Ohio-975, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Cross, 58 Ohio St.2d 482, 488 (1979). * State v. Jones, 2019-Ohio-239, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.); See also State v. Hayes, 2019- Ohio-1629, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.). {¶ 31} At trial, Sherburne testified he subjectively believed that he was being threatened with imminent serious bodily harm or even death if he did not commit the crimes. 2019Wood No. WD-15-018, 2016-Ohio-975, ¶ 19 , quoting State v. Cross, 58 Ohio St.2d 482, 488 , 391 N.E.2d 319, 323 (1979). {¶ 13} With the foregoing standards in mind, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to give a duress instruction. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Getsygreen1 sentence2026See Getsy, 1998-Ohio-533, at ¶ 111 (holding “duress cannot be asserted as a defense to aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01(A)” committed with prior calculation and design, but declining to address whether duress is an available defense to felony murder); Grinnell, 112 Ohio App.3d at 144 (10th Dist. 1996), quoting State v. Woods, 48 Ohio St.2d 127, 135, fn. 3 (1976) (the question of whether duress is a defense to murder “ ‘has not been decided in Ohio’ ”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Burnell Chipmangreen2 sentences2026Compare McKnight at ¶ 220 (even though the jury saw the defendant handcuffed on one occasion as jurors were leaving the courtroom, it was brief and inadvertent, and “the trial court’s curative instruction removed any prejudice”), and United States v. Chipman, 513 F.2d 1262, 1263 (6th Cir. 1975) (“[i]n view of the remedial actions taken by the District Judge and the nature of the brief encounter with the jurors . . . the record shows no prejudice depriving [the] defendant of a fair trial”). 2026Compare McKnight at ¶ 220 (even though the jury saw the defendant handcuffed on one occasion as jurors were leaving the courtroom, it was brief and inadvertent, and “the trial court’s curative instruction removed any prejudice”), and United States v. Chipman, 513 F.2d 1262, 1263 (6th Cir. 1975) (“[i]n view of the remedial actions taken by the District Judge and the nature of the brief encounter with the jurors . . . the record shows no prejudice depriving [the] defendant of a fair trial”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2026State v. Zhang, 2016-Ohio-975, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Cross, 58 Ohio St.2d 482, 488 (1979). * State v. Jones, 2019-Ohio-239, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.); See also State v. Hayes, 2019- Ohio-1629, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.). {¶ 31} At trial, Sherburne testified he subjectively believed that he was being threatened with imminent serious bodily harm or even death if he did not commit the crimes. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Grinnellgreen1 sentence2026See Getsy, 1998-Ohio-533, at ¶ 111 (holding “duress cannot be asserted as a defense to aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01(A)” committed with prior calculation and design, but declining to address whether duress is an available defense to felony murder); Grinnell, 112 Ohio App.3d at 144 (10th Dist. 1996), quoting State v. Woods, 48 Ohio St.2d 127, 135, fn. 3 (1976) (the question of whether duress is a defense to murder “ ‘has not been decided in Ohio’ ”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gordon
green
2 sentences1977State v. Gordon, supra; Crim. 1977State v. Gordon, supra; Crim. | 2 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Cooey
green
2 sentences2023Where a defendant cannot maintain an insanity defense, “he may not offer expert testimony in an effort to show that he lacked the mental capacity to form the specific Licking County, Case No. 22CA00034 11 mental state required for a particular crime.” Id. at ¶ 67, citing State v. Gooey, 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 26 , 544 N.E.2d 895 (1989). {¶35} Appellee also pointed out the flaw in the diminished-capacity argument, therefore in his Reply, appellant pivoted to assert evidence of PTSD could have established why he reacted by stabbing John Doe: he felt unable to escape the situation and could have prese 2023Where a defendant cannot maintain an insanity defense, “he may not offer expert testimony in an effort to show that he lacked the mental capacity to form the specific Licking County, Case No. 22CA00034 11 mental state required for a particular crime.” Id. at ¶ 67, citing State v. Gooey, 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 26 , 544 N.E.2d 895 (1989). {¶35} Appellee also pointed out the flaw in the diminished-capacity argument, therefore in his Reply, appellant pivoted to assert evidence of PTSD could have established why he reacted by stabbing John Doe: he felt unable to escape the situation and could have prese | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Longstreth
green
1 sentence2021Montgomery No. 24287, 2011-Ohio-1825, ¶ 12 . {¶49} The time frame for which a defendant may claim the experience of duress is limited: For a duress defense to be viable, “[t]he force and harm threatened must be in praesenti; fear of future harm is not a sound basis for the defense of duress.” State v. Hackley, 2d Dist. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Lucarell v. Nationwide
green
1 sentence2018Prevention of Performance {¶ 53} Although the court of appeals acknowledged that the trial court's duress instruction "may have been in error," 2015-Ohio-5286 , 44 N.E.3d 319 , at ¶ 80, it noted that the jury had also been instructed that Lucarell would be excused from performing under the contracts if Nationwide had prevented her performance. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Dixon v. United States
green
2 sentences2017Cognizant of the United States Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 , 126 S.Ct. 2437 , 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006), which involved a duress defense, the Court stated that-“the overall principle that emerges from the High Court’s decisional law is that federal due process permits States to place a burden on the defendant to prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, so long as the defendant is not thereby required to negate an element of the offense.” Mouzon, supra at 743 (emphasis added). 2017Cognizant of the United States Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 , 126 S.Ct. 2437 , 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006), which involved a duress defense, the Court stated that-“the overall principle that emerges from the High Court’s decisional law is that federal due process permits States to place a burden on the defendant to prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, so long as the defendant is not thereby required to negate an element of the offense.” Mouzon, supra at 743 (emphasis added). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Martin v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2017The Mouzon Court clarified that overlap between an element of the crime and the affirmative defense is permissible, “in the sense that evidence to prove the latter will tend to negate the former.” Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 , 107 S.Ct. 1098 , 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987). 2017The Mouzon Court clarified that overlap between an element of the crime and the affirmative defense is permissible, “in the sense that evidence to prove the latter will tend to negate the former.” Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 , 107 S.Ct. 1098 , 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Post v. Procare Automotive Serv. Solutions, 87646 (5-3-2007)
green
2 sentences2008I don't think the duress claim is applicable with respect to the execution of the original contract which contained an arbitration provision and to the extent that any terms of the addendum are not inconsistent with those in the original contract, the terms of the original contract control." (Tr. at 16.) *Page 14 {¶ 29} A review of the record herein reveals that Thomas failed to demonstrate at the scheduled hearing the existence of a genuine issue as to whether, what he refers to as "Contract 2," Exhibit A-2 "Agreed On Additional Cost," is anything other than an addendum to the original contra 2008I don't think the duress claim is applicable with respect to the execution of the original contract which contained an arbitration provision and to the extent that any terms of the addendum are not inconsistent with those in the original contract, the terms of the original contract control." (Tr. at 16.) *Page 14 {¶ 29} A review of the record herein reveals that Thomas failed to demonstrate at the scheduled hearing the existence of a genuine issue as to whether, what he refers to as "Contract 2," Exhibit A-2 "Agreed On Additional Cost," is anything other than an addendum to the original contra | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Foster
green
1 sentence2006As such, appellant's first assignment of error is not well-taken. {¶ 35} Appellant's second and third assignments of error challenge the consecutive sentence he received, and are impacted by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Anthony John Romanello, Victor Antonio Mendez and Gerald Thomas Vertucci
green
1 sentence2005However, we do find such a factual scenario in a case decided by the Federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. {¶ 48} It held, "severance may be required if only one defendant accuses the other, and the other denies any involvement." Romanello, 726 F.2d at 177 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Robinson
green
1 sentence2000Thus, pursuant to State v. Cross , 58 Ohio St.2d at 488 and State v. Procter , 51 Ohio App.2d at 159 , appellant did not comply with the duress defense requirement to surrender himself to authorities as soon as he avoided the threatened harm. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Procter
green
1 sentence2000Thus, pursuant to State v. Cross , 58 Ohio St.2d at 488 and State v. Procter , 51 Ohio App.2d at 159 , appellant did not comply with the duress defense requirement to surrender himself to authorities as soon as he avoided the threatened harm. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Brady
green
1 sentence1998R.C. 2945.11 ; State v. Brady (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 41 , 42 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Blodgett v. Blodgett
green
1 sentence1998In order to successfully avoid a contract through duress, a party must demonstrate "(1) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another; (2) that circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) that said circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite party." Blodgett v. Blodgett (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 243 , 246 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Ferguson
neutral
1 sentence1977The evident purpose of this section is to negate such decisions as State v. Ferguson (1955), 100 Ohio App. 191 , which holds, in substance, that a prisoner has a right to escape if his confinement is unlawful. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.