8 Oklahoma opinions name it 2 courts 1931–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tully v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Lumpkin dissenting)("the defense of duress is not applicable to first degree malice aforethought murder."); Tully v. State, 1986 OK CR 185 , 730 P.2d 1206, 1210 (discussing how the common law's, and hence Oklahoma's, rationale for denial of the duress defense to intentional killing "is premised on the theory that one should risk or sacrifice one's own life rather than take the life of an innocent person.") [8] I continue to disagree, however, for the reasons stated in my dissent in Spunaugle . [9] See 21 O.S.1991, § 152(7); 21 O.S.1991, § 155. [10] See Shrum v. State, 1999 OK CR 41 , 991 P.2d 2002Lumpkin dissenting)("the defense of duress is not applicable to first degree malice aforethought murder."); Tully v. State, 1986 OK CR 185 , 730 P.2d 1206, 1210 (discussing how the common law's, and hence Oklahoma's, rationale for denial of the duress defense to intentional killing "is premised on the theory that one should risk or sacrifice one's own life rather than take the life of an innocent person.") [8] I continue to disagree, however, for the reasons stated in my dissent in Spunaugle . [9] See 21 O.S.1991, § 152(7); 21 O.S.1991, § 155. [10] See Shrum v. State, 1999 OK CR 41 , 991 P.2d | 1 | 2 |
Spunaugle v. Stategreen2 sentences1999Therefore, I find the issue of denial of notice under Burks 1 has been waived. ¶ 3 Based on my analysis of the duress defense in Spunaugle v. State, 946 P.2d 246, 253-55 (Okl.Cr.1997) (Lumpkin, J., dissenting) I find Marvin Matheson could have been indicted for the crimes committed and therefore was an accomplice. 1999Therefore, I find the issue of denial of notice under Burks [1] has been waived. ¶ 3 Based on my analysis of the duress defense in Spunaugle v. State, 946 P.2d 246, 253-55 (Okl.Cr.1997) (Lumpkin, J., dissenting) I find Marvin Matheson could have been indicted for the crimes committed and therefore was an accomplice. | 1 | 1 |
Grider v. Stategreen2 sentences1988In the most recent case cited by the majority, this Court expressly held that “although a duress instruction might be appropriate in a proper fact situation, the facts of the instant case did not merit one.” Grider v. State, 737 P.2d 1227, 1228 (Okla.Crim.App.1987). 1988In the most recent case cited by the majority, this Court expressly held that "although a duress instruction might be appropriate in a proper fact situation, the facts of the instant case did not merit one." Grider v. State, 737 P.2d 1227, 1228 (Okla. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence1986Accordingly, the duress defense was simply not available, and any language in the opinion regarding duress as it relates to the offense of murder was mere dicta. [4] See 21 O.S. 1981 , § 2. [1] Davis v. State, 709 P.2d 207, 210 (Okl.Cr. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Simmons v. South Carolina
green
2 sentences2002Lumpkin dissenting)("the defense of duress is not applicable to first degree malice aforethought murder."); Tully v. State, 1986 OK CR 185 , 730 P.2d 1206, 1210 (discussing how the common law's, and hence Oklahoma's, rationale for denial of the duress defense to intentional killing "is premised on the theory that one should risk or sacrifice one's own life rather than take the life of an innocent person.") [8] I continue to disagree, however, for the reasons stated in my dissent in Spunaugle . [9] See 21 O.S.1991, § 152(7); 21 O.S.1991, § 155. [10] See Shrum v. State, 1999 OK CR 41 , 991 P.2d 2002Lumpkin dissenting)("the defense of duress is not applicable to first degree malice aforethought murder."); Tully v. State, 1986 OK CR 185 , 730 P.2d 1206, 1210 (discussing how the common law's, and hence Oklahoma's, rationale for denial of the duress defense to intentional killing "is premised on the theory that one should risk or sacrifice one's own life rather than take the life of an innocent person.") [8] I continue to disagree, however, for the reasons stated in my dissent in Spunaugle . [9] See 21 O.S.1991, § 152(7); 21 O.S.1991, § 155. [10] See Shrum v. State, 1999 OK CR 41 , 991 P.2d | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Shrum v. State
green
2 sentences2002Lumpkin dissenting)("the defense of duress is not applicable to first degree malice aforethought murder."); Tully v. State, 1986 OK CR 185 , 730 P.2d 1206, 1210 (discussing how the common law's, and hence Oklahoma's, rationale for denial of the duress defense to intentional killing "is premised on the theory that one should risk or sacrifice one's own life rather than take the life of an innocent person.") [8] I continue to disagree, however, for the reasons stated in my dissent in Spunaugle . [9] See 21 O.S.1991, § 152(7); 21 O.S.1991, § 155. [10] See Shrum v. State, 1999 OK CR 41 , 991 P.2d 2002Lumpkin dissenting)("the defense of duress is not applicable to first degree malice aforethought murder."); Tully v. State, 1986 OK CR 185 , 730 P.2d 1206, 1210 (discussing how the common law's, and hence Oklahoma's, rationale for denial of the duress defense to intentional killing "is premised on the theory that one should risk or sacrifice one's own life rather than take the life of an innocent person.") [8] I continue to disagree, however, for the reasons stated in my dissent in Spunaugle . [9] See 21 O.S.1991, § 152(7); 21 O.S.1991, § 155. [10] See Shrum v. State, 1999 OK CR 41 , 991 P.2d | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences1999However, sufficient evidence was presented to corroborate his testimony and there is no plain error. ¶ 4 Further, it should be noted the criteria set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), for evaluating effectiveness of counsel has been further explained in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 , 113 S.Ct. 838 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). 1999However, sufficient evidence was presented to corroborate his testimony and there is no plain error. ¶ 4 Further, it should be noted the criteria set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), for evaluating effectiveness of counsel has been further explained in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 , 113 S.Ct. 838 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Lockhart v. Fretwell
green
2 sentences1999However, sufficient evidence was presented to corroborate his testimony and there is no plain error. ¶ 4 Further, it should be noted the criteria set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), for evaluating effectiveness of counsel has been further explained in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 , 113 S.Ct. 838 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). 1999However, sufficient evidence was presented to corroborate his testimony and there is no plain error. ¶ 4 Further, it should be noted the criteria set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), for evaluating effectiveness of counsel has been further explained in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 , 113 S.Ct. 838 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Traxler v. State
green
2 sentences1986It is true, as Judge Bussey states, that our statute on duress “does not state against whom the threat of harm must exist”, and that “[i]n such an instance, the common law should be consulted in to construe that statute. 22 O.S. 1981 , § 9; Traxler v. State, 96 Okl.Cr. 231 , 251 P.2d 815 (1953).” Supra at 98. 1986It is true, as Judge Bussey states, that our statute on duress “does not state against whom the threat of harm must exist”, and that “[i]n such an instance, the common law should be consulted in to construe that statute. 22 O.S. 1981 , § 9; Traxler v. State, 96 Okl.Cr. 231 , 251 P.2d 815 (1953).” Supra at 98. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Stratton v. State
neutral
1 sentence1985Stratton v. State, 643 P.2d 645 (Okl.Cr.1982). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Callendar Savings Bank v. Loos
green
1 sentence1931Bank v. Loos (Iowa), 120 N. W. 317 . | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.