duress defense in Connecticut

2015At the outset, we note that the defendant concedes that he did not request an instruction on the defense of duress at any point during trial.10 Nevertheless, he contends that he was ‘‘entitled’’ to one, relying on State v. Helmedach, 306 Conn. 61 , 48 A.3d 664 (2012), and State v. Heinemann, 282 Conn. 281 , 920 A.2d 278 (2007), for the proposition that there is a ‘‘right to a duress instruction whenever the evidence could support a claim of duress when viewed most favorably to [a] defendant.’’ In response, the state, rely- ing on, inter alia, cases such as State v. Santiago, 305 Conn. 101 , 49

2015At the outset, we note that the defendant concedes that he did not request an instruction on the defense of duress at any point during trial.10 Nevertheless, he contends that he was ‘‘entitled’’ to one, relying on State v. Helmedach, 306 Conn. 61 , 48 A.3d 664 (2012), and State v. Heinemann, 282 Conn. 281 , 920 A.2d 278 (2007), for the proposition that there is a ‘‘right to a duress instruction whenever the evidence could support a claim of duress when viewed most favorably to [a] defendant.’’ In response, the state, rely- ing on, inter alia, cases such as State v. Santiago, 305 Conn. 101 , 49

2015At the outset, we note that the defendant concedes that he did not request an instruction on the defense of duress at any point during trial.10 Nevertheless, he contends that he was ‘‘entitled’’ to one, relying on State v. Helmedach, 306 Conn. 61 , 48 A.3d 664 (2012), and State v. Heinemann, 282 Conn. 281 , 920 A.2d 278 (2007), for the proposition that there is a ‘‘right to a duress instruction whenever the evidence could support a claim of duress when viewed most favorably to [a] defendant.’’ In response, the state, rely- ing on, inter alia, cases such as State v. Santiago, 305 Conn. 101 , 49

2015At the outset, we note that the defendant concedes that he did not request an instruction on the defense of duress at any point during trial.10 Nevertheless, he contends that he was ‘‘entitled’’ to one, relying on State v. Helmedach, 306 Conn. 61 , 48 A.3d 664 (2012), and State v. Heinemann, 282 Conn. 281 , 920 A.2d 278 (2007), for the proposition that there is a ‘‘right to a duress instruction whenever the evidence could support a claim of duress when viewed most favorably to [a] defendant.’’ In response, the state, rely- ing on, inter alia, cases such as State v. Santiago, 305 Conn. 101 , 49

2015At the outset, we note that the defendant concedes that he did not request an instruction on the defense of duress at any point during trial.10 Nevertheless, he contends that he was ‘‘entitled’’ to one, relying on State v. Helmedach, 306 Conn. 61 , 48 A.3d 664 (2012), and State v. Heinemann, 282 Conn. 281 , 920 A.2d 278 (2007), for the proposition that there is a ‘‘right to a duress instruction whenever the evidence could support a claim of duress when viewed most favorably to [a] defendant.’’ In response, the state, rely- ing on, inter alia, cases such as State v. Santiago, 305 Conn. 101 , 49

2015At the outset, we note that the defendant concedes that he did not request an instruction on the defense of duress at any point during trial.10 Nevertheless, he contends that he was ‘‘entitled’’ to one, relying on State v. Helmedach, 306 Conn. 61 , 48 A.3d 664 (2012), and State v. Heinemann, 282 Conn. 281 , 920 A.2d 278 (2007), for the proposition that there is a ‘‘right to a duress instruction whenever the evidence could support a claim of duress when viewed most favorably to [a] defendant.’’ In response, the state, rely- ing on, inter alia, cases such as State v. Santiago, 305 Conn. 101 , 49

2007Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court’s analytical emphasis in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, supra, 546 U.S. 440 , on attacks on the entire contract, as opposed to challenges solely to the arbitration clause, that legal development has rendered somewhat outmoded this court’s analysis of the duress defense in International Brotherhood of Teamsters , which focused on the entire collective bargaining agreement and not just the arbitration clause. 25 By October, 2003, Ganim’s criminal trial had ended and the city had the opportunity to conduct prison depositions of Pinto and Grimaldi.

2007The language requiring that the defendant in fact believed that his life was endangered is part of the duress defense to ensure that the defense “is not available to a defendant who did not in fact believe that his life was endangered even though a reasonable man might have thought so.” State v. Starks, 122 Ariz. 531, 533 , 596 P.2d 366 (1979).

2007The language requiring that the defendant in fact believed that his life was endangered is part of the duress defense to ensure that the defense “is not available to a defendant who did not in fact believe that his life was endangered even though a reasonable man might have thought so.” State v. Starks, 122 Ariz. 531, 533 , 596 P.2d 366 (1979).

1996"Common law or classical duress was narrowly construed and required acts that were sufficient to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness." Jenks v. Jenks, 34 Conn. App. 462 , 466 , 642 A.2d 31 (1994), rev'd in part, 232 Conn. 750 , 657 A.2d 1107 , on remand, 39 Conn. App. 139 , 663 A.2d 1123 (1995). "`[U]nder the modern doctrine of duress, the pressure applied does not have to be such as to overcome the will . . . of a [person] of ordinary firmness but is sufficient if it in fact overcomes the will of the person against whom it is applied.

1996"Common law or classical duress was narrowly construed and required acts that were sufficient to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness." Jenks v. Jenks, 34 Conn. App. 462 , 466 , 642 A.2d 31 (1994), rev'd in part, 232 Conn. 750 , 657 A.2d 1107 , on remand, 39 Conn. App. 139 , 663 A.2d 1123 (1995). "`[U]nder the modern doctrine of duress, the pressure applied does not have to be such as to overcome the will . . . of a [person] of ordinary firmness but is sufficient if it in fact overcomes the will of the person against whom it is applied.

1996"Common law or classical duress was narrowly construed and required acts that were sufficient to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness." Jenks v. Jenks, 34 Conn. App. 462 , 466 , 642 A.2d 31 (1994), rev'd in part, 232 Conn. 750 , 657 A.2d 1107 , on remand, 39 Conn. App. 139 , 663 A.2d 1123 (1995). "`[U]nder the modern doctrine of duress, the pressure applied does not have to be such as to overcome the will . . . of a [person] of ordinary firmness but is sufficient if it in fact overcomes the will of the person against whom it is applied.

1996"Common law or classical duress was narrowly construed and required acts that were sufficient to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness." Jenks v. Jenks, 34 Conn. App. 462 , 466 , 642 A.2d 31 (1994), rev'd in part, 232 Conn. 750 , 657 A.2d 1107 , on remand, 39 Conn. App. 139 , 663 A.2d 1123 (1995). "`[U]nder the modern doctrine of duress, the pressure applied does not have to be such as to overcome the will . . . of a [person] of ordinary firmness but is sufficient if it in fact overcomes the will of the person against whom it is applied.

1996"Common law or classical duress was narrowly construed and required acts that were sufficient to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness." Jenks v. Jenks, 34 Conn. App. 462 , 466 , 642 A.2d 31 (1994), rev'd in part, 232 Conn. 750 , 657 A.2d 1107 , on remand, 39 Conn. App. 139 , 663 A.2d 1123 (1995). "`[U]nder the modern doctrine of duress, the pressure applied does not have to be such as to overcome the will . . . of a [person] of ordinary firmness but is sufficient if it in fact overcomes the will of the person against whom it is applied.

1996"Common law or classical duress was narrowly construed and required acts that were sufficient to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness." Jenks v. Jenks, 34 Conn. App. 462 , 466 , 642 A.2d 31 (1994), rev'd in part, 232 Conn. 750 , 657 A.2d 1107 , on remand, 39 Conn. App. 139 , 663 A.2d 1123 (1995). "`[U]nder the modern doctrine of duress, the pressure applied does not have to be such as to overcome the will . . . of a [person] of ordinary firmness but is sufficient if it in fact overcomes the will of the person against whom it is applied.

1994Quinn , admittedly cryptically, notes that "here there was no fraud, no attempt to plunder the defendant by color of legal process" id. at page 82.

1992Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S. Ct. 1920 , 18 L.

1992Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S. Ct. 1920 , 18 L.

1987It asserts that there is no merit to that claim because the trial court charged the jury at least four times that it must find the defendant not guilty if it found the state had not proven each essential element of each crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge considered as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.” State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275 , 348 A.2d 645 [1974]; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515 , 325 A.2d 277 [1973].’ State v. Roy, 173 Conn. 35, 40 , 376 A.2d 391 (1977).”

1987It asserts that there is no merit to that claim because the trial court charged the jury at least four times that it must find the defendant not guilty if it found the state had not proven each essential element of each crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge considered as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.” State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275 , 348 A.2d 645 [1974]; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515 , 325 A.2d 277 [1973].’ State v. Roy, 173 Conn. 35, 40 , 376 A.2d 391 (1977).”

1987It asserts that there is no merit to that claim because the trial court charged the jury at least four times that it must find the defendant not guilty if it found the state had not proven each essential element of each crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge considered as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.” State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275 , 348 A.2d 645 [1974]; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515 , 325 A.2d 277 [1973].’ State v. Roy, 173 Conn. 35, 40 , 376 A.2d 391 (1977).”

1987It asserts that there is no merit to that claim because the trial court charged the jury at least four times that it must find the defendant not guilty if it found the state had not proven each essential element of each crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge considered as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.” State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275 , 348 A.2d 645 [1974]; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515 , 325 A.2d 277 [1973].’ State v. Roy, 173 Conn. 35, 40 , 376 A.2d 391 (1977).”

1987It asserts that there is no merit to that claim because the trial court charged the jury at least four times that it must find the defendant not guilty if it found the state had not proven each essential element of each crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge considered as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.” State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275 , 348 A.2d 645 [1974]; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515 , 325 A.2d 277 [1973].’ State v. Roy, 173 Conn. 35, 40 , 376 A.2d 391 (1977).”

1987It asserts that there is no merit to that claim because the trial court charged the jury at least four times that it must find the defendant not guilty if it found the state had not proven each essential element of each crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge considered as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.” State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275 , 348 A.2d 645 [1974]; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515 , 325 A.2d 277 [1973].’ State v. Roy, 173 Conn. 35, 40 , 376 A.2d 391 (1977).”

1987It asserts that there is no merit to that claim because the trial court charged the jury at least four times that it must find the defendant not guilty if it found the state had not proven each essential element of each crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge considered as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.” State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275 , 348 A.2d 645 [1974]; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515 , 325 A.2d 277 [1973].’ State v. Roy, 173 Conn. 35, 40 , 376 A.2d 391 (1977).”

1987It asserts that there is no merit to that claim because the trial court charged the jury at least four times that it must find the defendant not guilty if it found the state had not proven each essential element of each crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge considered as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.” State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275 , 348 A.2d 645 [1974]; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515 , 325 A.2d 277 [1973].’ State v. Roy, 173 Conn. 35, 40 , 376 A.2d 391 (1977).”

1987It asserts that there is no merit to that claim because the trial court charged the jury at least four times that it must find the defendant not guilty if it found the state had not proven each essential element of each crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge considered as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.” State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275 , 348 A.2d 645 [1974]; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515 , 325 A.2d 277 [1973].’ State v. Roy, 173 Conn. 35, 40 , 376 A.2d 391 (1977).”

1987It asserts that there is no merit to that claim because the trial court charged the jury at least four times that it must find the defendant not guilty if it found the state had not proven each essential element of each crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge considered as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.” State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275 , 348 A.2d 645 [1974]; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515 , 325 A.2d 277 [1973].’ State v. Roy, 173 Conn. 35, 40 , 376 A.2d 391 (1977).”

1987It asserts that there is no merit to that claim because the trial court charged the jury at least four times that it must find the defendant not guilty if it found the state had not proven each essential element of each crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge considered as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.” State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275 , 348 A.2d 645 [1974]; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515 , 325 A.2d 277 [1973].’ State v. Roy, 173 Conn. 35, 40 , 376 A.2d 391 (1977).”