duress defense in California

2020But I also brought up the fact that, if I had an argument about duress, that I could do that, just so long as I didn’t try to insinuate or state that it’s a legal duress.” The trial court then stated: “All right, okay. [¶] Having reviewed that instruction and discussing it with counsel, the Court did not feel that it was appropriate to give the duress instruction; that the evidence did not support that. [¶] And looking at what was required here under this instruction, it just didn’t seem appropriate, so the Court declined to give that.” 10 essential component of this defense is that the defend

2020Hey you, stop.’ ” (See People v. Steele (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 703, 707 [substantial evidence did not support essential element of duress defense where “[t]here is no indication that those making the threats requested, demanded or desired that [prison inmate] escape”].) Defendant asks us to relax the duress defense’s requirement of a demand that defendant commit a crime, arguing that “[at] least in a case that simply involves running away and thereby allegedly omitting to undertake a legal duty, a defendant should not be required to prove that someone demanded that he abstain from his duty in o

2018(People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 93 ; People v. Anderson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 780 .) Nevertheless, it "can, in effect, provide a defense to murder on a felony-murder theory by negating the underlying felony." (Anderson, at p. 784.) "A trial court is required to instruct sua sponte on a duress defense 3 At sentencing, the court ordered Webb to pay $5,000 in restitution to the Victim Compensation Board pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(2).

2013With respect to the charge of murder, “duress is not a defense to any form of murder.” (People v. Anderson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 780 .)4 With respect to the charge of felony hit and run driving, the duress defense is inapplicable because “[a]n essential component of this defense is that the defendant be faced with a direct or implied demand that he or she commit the charged crime.” (People v. Saavedra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 561, 567 .) In this case, even if defendant‟s fear of the threat posed by the occupants of the white car was reasonable, there is no evidence that he faced a direct or imp

2018A “phantasmagoria of future harm” such as a threat of death to be carried out at some undefined time, will not diminish criminal culpability.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1460 ; accord, People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 844 .) For example, in People v. McKinney (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 583 , the defendant, a prison inmate, hit a fellow inmate in the head with a hammer during metal shop class.

2018A “phantasmagoria of future harm” such as a threat of death to be carried out at some undefined time, will not diminish criminal culpability.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1460 ; accord, People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 844 .) For example, in People v. McKinney (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 583 , the defendant, a prison inmate, hit a fellow inmate in the head with a hammer during metal shop class.

2018A “phantasmagoria of future harm” such as a threat of death to be carried out at some undefined time, will not diminish criminal culpability.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1460 ; accord, People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 844 .) For example, in People v. McKinney (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 583 , the defendant, a prison inmate, hit a fellow inmate in the head with a hammer during metal shop class.

2018A “phantasmagoria of future harm” such as a threat of death to be carried out at some undefined time, will not diminish criminal culpability.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1460 ; accord, People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 844 .) For example, in People v. McKinney (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 583 , the defendant, a prison inmate, hit a fellow inmate in the head with a hammer during metal shop class.

2015(Id. at p. 784.) “‘The common characteristic of all the decisions upholding [a duress defense] lies in the immediacy and imminency of the threatened action: each represents the situation of a present and active aggressor threatening immediate danger.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Vieira, supra, at p. 290 ; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 100 [“defense of duress requires a reasonable belief that threats to the defendant’s life . . . are both imminent and immediate at the time the crime is committed” and “threats of future danger are inadequate” for the defense].) Although Resendez

2015Six.) “An essential component of this defense is that the defendant be faced with a direct or implied demand that he or she commit the charged crime.” (People v. Saavedra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 561, 567 .) “ ‘The common characteristic of all the decisions upholding [a duress defense] lies in the immediacy and imminency of the threatened action: each represents the situation of a present and active aggressor threatening immediate danger; none depict a phantasmagoria of future harm.’ ” (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 290 (Vieira).) As defendant’s proposed instruction (CALCRIM No. 3402)

2018“The defense of duress is available to defendants who commit crimes, except murder, ‘under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused.’ [Citations.] Although ‘duress is not a defense to any form of murder,’ [citation] ‘duress can, in effect, provide a defense to murder on a felony-murder theory by negating the underlying felony. [Citations.] If one is not guilty of the underlying felony due to duress, one cannot be guilty of felony murder based on that felony.’ [Citation.] A trial court is required to

2018“The defense of duress is available to defendants who commit crimes, except murder, ‘under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused.’ [Citations.] Although ‘duress is not a defense to any form of murder,’ [citation] ‘duress can, in effect, provide a defense to murder on a felony-murder theory by negating the underlying felony. [Citations.] If one is not guilty of the underlying felony due to duress, one cannot be guilty of felony murder based on that felony.’ [Citation.] A trial court is required to

2015The court's response to Question No. 4 simply echoed the jury instruction: "The duress must exist at the time the crime is committed." This is a correct statement of the law. " 'Duress is an effective defense only when the actor responds to an immediate and imminent danger.' " (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1460 (Hamlin), quoting People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 900 .) " 'A "phantasmagoria of future harm" such as a threat of death to be carried out at some undefined time, will not diminish criminal culpability.' " ( Hamlin, supra, at p. 1460 , quoting People v. Petzni

2014(People v. Petznick (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 663, 676 .) Here, the court properly denied the defendants’ request for a duress instruction because there was no evidence that either of them was acting under the threat of immediate death or great bodily harm when they murdered Romero.

2014(Cf. People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 125 [defendant’s claim that the “Columbian Mafia” threatened to kill him and his family if he did not kill two others did not warrant a duress instruction because there was no “substantial evidence of immediacy of the threatened harm”].) II.

2005Even assuming he is correct, the trial court committed no error, because the facts did not support a duress instruction. ( People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685 , 160 Cal.Rptr. 84 , 603 P.2d 1 [trial court obliged to instruct on a defense theory only when there is substantial evidence to support].) "The common characteristic of all the decisions upholding [a duress defense] lies in the immediacy and imminency of the threatened action: each represents the situation of a present and active aggressor threatening immediate danger; none depict a phantasmagoria of future harm." ( People v.

2020(Ibid.) Defendant argues that even though defense counsel withdrew his request for the duress instruction following the conference in chambers, this did not relieve the court from its sua sponte duty to provide the instruction because it was not “ ‘clear from the record that defense counsel made an express objection to the relevant instructions’ and that ‘counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or mistake.’ ” (People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 330 , disapproved on other grounds by People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 .) Of course, here defense counsel did no

2000Under such circumstances an instruction such as given here is proper." (Id. at p. 248, 56 P.2d 984 .) [10] In People v. Pena, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14 , 197 Cal.Rptr. 264 , the court observed that "it appears settled that the duress defense is available to a defendant charged with any crime except one which involves the taking of the life of an innocent person. [Citations.] Typical case authority for this proposition is represented by holdings such as the following: `It is established by the great weight of authority that although coercion does not excuse taking the life of an innocent p

2005Even assuming he is correct, the trial court committed no error, because the facts did not support a duress instruction. ( People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685 , 160 Cal.Rptr. 84 , 603 P.2d 1 [trial court obliged to instruct on a defense theory only when there is substantial evidence to support].) "The common characteristic of all the decisions upholding [a duress defense] lies in the immediacy and imminency of the threatened action: each represents the situation of a present and active aggressor threatening immediate danger; none depict a phantasmagoria of future harm." ( People v.

2005Even assuming he is correct, the trial court committed no error, because the facts did not support a duress instruction. ( People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685 , 160 Cal.Rptr. 84 , 603 P.2d 1 [trial court obliged to instruct on a defense theory only when there is substantial evidence to support].) "The common characteristic of all the decisions upholding [a duress defense] lies in the immediacy and imminency of the threatened action: each represents the situation of a present and active aggressor threatening immediate danger; none depict a phantasmagoria of future harm." ( People v.

2005Even assuming he is correct, the trial court committed no error, because the facts did not support a duress instruction. ( People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685 , 160 Cal.Rptr. 84 , 603 P.2d 1 [trial court obliged to instruct on a defense theory only when there is substantial evidence to support].) "The common characteristic of all the decisions upholding [a duress defense] lies in the immediacy and imminency of the threatened action: each represents the situation of a present and active aggressor threatening immediate danger; none depict a phantasmagoria of future harm." ( People v.

2005Even assuming he is correct, the trial court committed no error, because the facts did not support a duress instruction. ( People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685 , 160 Cal.Rptr. 84 , 603 P.2d 1 [trial court obliged to instruct on a defense theory only when there is substantial evidence to support].) "The common characteristic of all the decisions upholding [a duress defense] lies in the immediacy and imminency of the threatened action: each represents the situation of a present and active aggressor threatening immediate danger; none depict a phantasmagoria of future harm." ( People v.

2004The unlawful acts of the person under duress are attributed to the coercing party who supplies the requisite mens rea and is liable for the crime. [Citation.]” (People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1012 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 515 ].) Decisions upholding the duress defense have uniformly involved “ ‘a present and active aggressor threatening immediate danger.’ ” (People v. Lo Cicero (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1186, 1191 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 913 , 459 P.2d 241 ].) A “phantasmagoria of future harm” such as a threat of death to be carried out at some undefined *677 time, will not diminish criminal culpability.

2004The unlawful acts of the person under duress are attributed to the coercing party who supplies the requisite mens rea and is liable for the crime. [Citation.]” (People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1012 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 515 ].) Decisions upholding the duress defense have uniformly involved “ ‘a present and active aggressor threatening immediate danger.’ ” (People v. Lo Cicero (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1186, 1191 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 913 , 459 P.2d 241 ].) A “phantasmagoria of future harm” such as a threat of death to be carried out at some undefined *677 time, will not diminish criminal culpability.

2000Under such circumstances an instruction such as given here is proper." (Id. at p. 248, 56 P.2d 984 .) [10] In People v. Pena, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14 , 197 Cal.Rptr. 264 , the court observed that "it appears settled that the duress defense is available to a defendant charged with any crime except one which involves the taking of the life of an innocent person. [Citations.] Typical case authority for this proposition is represented by holdings such as the following: `It is established by the great weight of authority that although coercion does not excuse taking the life of an innocent p

2000Under such circumstances an instruction such as given here is proper." (Id. at p. 248, 56 P.2d 984 .) [10] In People v. Pena, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14 , 197 Cal.Rptr. 264 , the court observed that "it appears settled that the duress defense is available to a defendant charged with any crime except one which involves the taking of the life of an innocent person. [Citations.] Typical case authority for this proposition is represented by holdings such as the following: `It is established by the great weight of authority that although coercion does not excuse taking the life of an innocent p

2015The court's response to Question No. 4 simply echoed the jury instruction: "The duress must exist at the time the crime is committed." This is a correct statement of the law. " 'Duress is an effective defense only when the actor responds to an immediate and imminent danger.' " (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1460 (Hamlin), quoting People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 900 .) " 'A "phantasmagoria of future harm" such as a threat of death to be carried out at some undefined time, will not diminish criminal culpability.' " ( Hamlin, supra, at p. 1460 , quoting People v. Petzni

2015The court's response to Question No. 4 simply echoed the jury instruction: "The duress must exist at the time the crime is committed." This is a correct statement of the law. " 'Duress is an effective defense only when the actor responds to an immediate and imminent danger.' " (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1460 (Hamlin), quoting People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 900 .) " 'A "phantasmagoria of future harm" such as a threat of death to be carried out at some undefined time, will not diminish criminal culpability.' " ( Hamlin, supra, at p. 1460 , quoting People v. Petzni

2013(People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892 , 899- 901.) “The unlawful acts of the person under duress are attributed to the coercing party who supplies the requisite mens rea and is liable for the crime. [Citation.]” (People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1012 .) Section 26 contains an important exception: the duress defense does not apply when the defendant is charged with a crime that is “punishable with death.” (§ 26, subd. (6).) The California Supreme Court has concluded that this language “excludes all murder from the duress defense[,]” regardless of whether the People seek the deat

2013(People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892 , 899- 901.) “The unlawful acts of the person under duress are attributed to the coercing party who supplies the requisite mens rea and is liable for the crime. [Citation.]” (People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1012 .) Section 26 contains an important exception: the duress defense does not apply when the defendant is charged with a crime that is “punishable with death.” (§ 26, subd. (6).) The California Supreme Court has concluded that this language “excludes all murder from the duress defense[,]” regardless of whether the People seek the deat

2015Six.) “An essential component of this defense is that the defendant be faced with a direct or implied demand that he or she commit the charged crime.” (People v. Saavedra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 561, 567 .) “ ‘The common characteristic of all the decisions upholding [a duress defense] lies in the immediacy and imminency of the threatened action: each represents the situation of a present and active aggressor threatening immediate danger; none depict a phantasmagoria of future harm.’ ” (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 290 (Vieira).) As defendant’s proposed instruction (CALCRIM No. 3402)

2013With respect to the charge of murder, “duress is not a defense to any form of murder.” (People v. Anderson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 780 .)4 With respect to the charge of felony hit and run driving, the duress defense is inapplicable because “[a]n essential component of this defense is that the defendant be faced with a direct or implied demand that he or she commit the charged crime.” (People v. Saavedra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 561, 567 .) In this case, even if defendant‟s fear of the threat posed by the occupants of the white car was reasonable, there is no evidence that he faced a direct or imp

2004(People v. Patrick (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952, 960 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 276 ]; People v. Condley, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1011-1013.) As respondent rightly points out, “[i]t is not acceptable for a defendant to decide that it is necessary to kill an innocent person in order that he [or she] may live, particularly where, as here, Coffman’s alleged fear related to some future danger.” Our observations in People v. Anderson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pages 777-778, although referring specifically to the duress defense in the context of gang-related killings, are pertinent here.

2004(People v. Patrick (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952, 960 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 276 ]; People v. Condley, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1011-1013.) As respondent rightly points out, “[i]t is not acceptable for a defendant to decide that it is necessary to kill an innocent person in order that he [or she] may live, particularly where, as here, Coffman’s alleged fear related to some future danger.” Our observations in People v. Anderson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pages 777-778, although referring specifically to the duress defense in the context of gang-related killings, are pertinent here.

1987(See People v. Graham (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 238, 240 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 31 ].) They argue it should have been given in this case because the necessity and duress defenses are similar and there are no authorities holding such an instruction is not appropriate in the context of a necessity defense.

1987(See People v. Graham (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 238, 240 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 31 ].) They argue it should have been given in this case because the necessity and duress defenses are similar and there are no authorities holding such an instruction is not appropriate in the context of a necessity defense.

2021(People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 529 ; People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982-983 .) We review de novo a trial court’s failure to instruct on a defense.

2018Analysis The duress defense is available where "the act was done under such threats or menaces that [the defendant] had (1) an actual belief his life was threatened and (2) reasonable cause for such belief." (People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 900 (Heath); see CALCRIM No. 3402 ["defendant's belief that [his] life was in immediate 7 danger must have been reasonable" considering "what a reasonable person in the same position as the defendant would have believed"].) "The duress defense, through its immediacy requirement, negates an element of the crime - the intent to commit the act." (He

2020In criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court has a sua sponte obligation to instruct on “ ‘ “principles [of law] closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” ’ ” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 .) The court’s duty to instruct extends to defenses “if it appears the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendants’ theory of the case.” (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10

2005(See People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ].) Defendant claims there was substantial evidence of duress as a defense to the robbery charge (§ 211), the underlying offense of felony murder, and the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)).