duress defense in Mississippi

2010Notwithstanding the acknowledgment that homicide is an exception to a duress defense, the Court analyzed the issue of duress and whether Ruffin proved a "present, imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury." Id. (citing West, 725 So.2d at 890 n. 7).

2010Banyard was not entitled to a duress instruction on the underlying felony of robbery, because he too failed to provide any evidence that supported "present, imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury." Ruffin, 992 So.2d at 1178 (citing West, 725 So.2d at 890 n. 7); Fuqua, 938 So.2d at 283 .

2008While not articulating the precise elements of a duress defense, this Court has adopted the general rule that "where a person reasonably believes that he is in danger of physical harm he may be excused for some conduct which ordinarily would be criminal." West v. State, 725 So.2d 872, 891 (Miss.1998) (citing Knight v. State, 601 So.2d 403, 405 (Miss.1992)).

2007While not articulating the precise elements of a duress defense, this Court has adopted the general rule that “where a person reasonably believes that he is in danger of physical harm he may be excused for some conduct which ordinarily would be criminal.” West v. State, 725 So. 2d 872, 891 (Miss. 1998) (citing Knight v. State, 601 So. 2d 403, 405 (Miss. 1992)).

2015On appeal, this Court found that the evidence supported both a duress instruction for the underlying robbery and a manslaughter instruction, reasoning, “[I]f the jury found that Banyard was indeed acting under duress, he could not be found guilty of the robbery of Ballard, one of the essential elements of the capital-murder charge.” Id. at 683 . ¶25.

2015On appeal, this Court found that the evidence supported both a duress instruction for the underlying robbery and a manslaughter instruction, reasoning, “[I]f the jury found that Banyard was indeed acting under duress, he could not be found guilty of the robbery of Ballard, one of the essential elements of the capital-murder charge.” Id. at 683 . ¶ 25.

1998United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir.1986). [8] Similarly, West contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it should consider West's subjective sense of fear, coercion, or duress in assessing whether he had specifically intended to commit the robbery.

1994United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1986). 8.

2017Compare Banyard, 47 So. 3d at 681–82 (reversing felony-capital-murder conviction where duress instruction was refused), with Sanders v. State, 942 So. 2d 156, 161 (Miss. 2006) (“[L]ongstanding Mississippi law holds that duress is not a legal defense to murder.”), and Wilson v. State, 390 So. 2d 575 , 576 n.1 (Miss. 1980) (“Homicide is an exception [to duress]”). 12 identification of Miss Williams as the person who was driving, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that she is the person who was driving at the time the Sheriff was hit, then you must find her not guilty.

1998Wilson v. State, 390 So.2d 575 , 576 n. 1 (Miss.1980). [7] This Court has not enunciated the precise elements of a duress defense, however the Fifth Circuit has prescribed the following components: (1) the defendant was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury; (2) that he had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in the situation; (3) that he had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law; (4) that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between

2017Compare Banyard, 47 So. 3d at 681–82 (reversing felony-capital-murder conviction where duress instruction was refused), with Sanders v. State, 942 So. 2d 156, 161 (Miss. 2006) (“[L]ongstanding Mississippi law holds that duress is not a legal defense to murder.”), and Wilson v. State, 390 So. 2d 575 , 576 n.1 (Miss. 1980) (“Homicide is an exception [to duress]”). 12 identification of Miss Williams as the person who was driving, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that she is the person who was driving at the time the Sheriff was hit, then you must find her not guilty.