9 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2021 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Larriveegreen2 sentences2021However, there was no evidence that Murray was “compelled to [commit the crimes] by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury” from Tony. 17-A M.R.S. § 103-A(1); see also Larrivee, 479 A.2d 347, 349-351 (Me. 1984) (holding that a threat from a dangerous and violent friend that the defendant would be “very sorry” if he did not commit robbery was insufficient to warrant a jury instruction on duress). [¶24] The trial court did not err in determining that the evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable to Murray, did not generate a duress instruction. 2021However, there was no evidence that Murray was “compelled to [commit the crimes] by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury” from Tony. 17-A M.R.S. § 103-A(1); see also Larrivee, 479 A.2d 347, 349-351 (Me. 1984) (holding that a threat from a dangerous and violent friend that the defendant would be “very sorry” if he did not commit robbery was insufficient to warrant a jury instruction on duress). [¶24] The trial court did not err in determining that the evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable to Murray, did not generate a duress instruction. | 6 | 6 |
State v. Gliddengreen2 sentences1999Duress exists only if, viewed objectively, “the force, threat or circumstances are such as would have prevented a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation from resisting the pressure.” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103-A(2); see State v. Glidden, 487 A.2d 642, 644-5 (Me.1985). [¶ 19] A threat that serves the basis of a duress defense must be real and specific, and the specific harm that is feared must be imminent. 1999Duress exists only if, viewed objectively, "the force, threat or circumstances are such as would have prevented a reasonable person in the defendant's situation from resisting the pressure." 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103-A(2); see State v. Glidden, 487 A.2d 642, 644-45 (Me.1985). [¶ 19] A threat that serves the basis of a duress defense must be real and specific, and the specific harm that is feared must be imminent. | 2 | 2 |
City of Portland v. Gemini Concerts, Inc.green1 sentence2021Gemini Concerts, Inc., 481 A.2d 180, 183 (Me. 1984). | 1 | 1 |
State of Maine v. Nicholas Sextongreen2 sentences2021See State v. Sexton, 2017 ME 65, ¶ 19 , 159 A.3d 335 . 5 Carrillo requested the duress instruction contained in Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 6-57 at 6-115 (2020-2021 ed. 2020), which states, Under certain circumstances, a person may be excused from criminal responsibility for acts committed under duress. 2021See State v. Sexton, 2017 ME 65, ¶ 19 , 159 A.3d 335 . 5 Carrillo requested the duress instruction contained in Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 6-57 at 6-115 (2020-2021 ed. 2020), which states, Under certain circumstances, a person may be excused from criminal responsibility for acts committed under duress. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Casegreen1 sentence1999See Case, 672 A.2d at 589 . [¶ 8] A duress instruction is appropriate when a defendant demonstrates that he was compelled to act by the threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury or by force. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hernandezgreen2 sentences1999See State v. Hernandez, 1998 ME 73, ¶ 7 , 708 A.2d 1022, 1025 ; State v. Sullivan, 1997 ME 71, ¶ 6 , 695 A.2d 115, 117 . 1999See State v. Hernandez, 1998 ME 73, ¶ 7 , 708 A.2d 1022, 1025 ; State v. Sullivan, 1997 ME 71, ¶ 6 , 695 A.2d 115, 117 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Daygreen2 sentences1999See Day, 1999 ME 29, ¶ 8 , 724 A.2d at 1247 (noting that instruc *368 tions that mislead or confuse the jury are erroneous). 1999See Day, 1999 ME 29, ¶ 8 , 724 A.2d at 1247 (noting that instruc *368 tions that mislead or confuse the jury are erroneous). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dyergreen1 sentence1993See State v. Larrivee, 479 A.2d 347, 350-51 (Me.1984); State v. Dyer, 371 A.2d 1086, 1090 (Me.1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State of Maine v. Sharon Carrillo
green
2 sentences2021“Given the absence of evidence of specific imminent harm or evidence of compulsion by force, the court properly declined to instruct the jury on the defense of duress.” State v. Carrillo, 2021 ME 18, ¶ 37 , 248 A.3d 193 . 2021“Given the absence of evidence of specific imminent harm or evidence of compulsion by force, the court properly declined to instruct the jury on the defense of duress.” State v. Carrillo, 2021 ME 18, ¶ 37 , 248 A.3d 193 . | 2 | 2021–2021 |
State of Maine v. Christal N. Gagnier
green
2 sentences2021We disagree. [¶35] We have made clear that “[w]hen the basis for a duress defense is a threat, that threat must be real and specific, and the specific harm that is feared must be imminent.” State v. Gagnier, 2015 ME 115, ¶ 16 , 123 A.3d 207 (quotation marks omitted). 2021We disagree. [¶35] We have made clear that “[w]hen the basis for a duress defense is a threat, that threat must be real and specific, and the specific harm that is feared must be imminent.” State v. Gagnier, 2015 ME 115, ¶ 16 , 123 A.3d 207 (quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2017–2021 |
State v. Anaya
green
1 sentence2015We held that in light of that evidence, the court erred by excluding expert testimony of “battered wife syndrome” to show that “abused women often continue to live with their abusers even though beatings continue, and that a certain substrata of abused women perceive suicide and/or homicide to be the only solutions to their problems.” Id. at 894 . [¶ 20] Gagnier argues here, as she did in the trial court, that the pattern of physical abuse inflicted on her by Michael created a context in which her apprehension of danger was heightened and that she felt compelled to comply with Michael’s instru | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Tomah
green
2 sentences2015In contrast, “[a] veiled threat of future unspecified harm is not. sufficient to raise the defense of duress.” Tomah, 1999 ME 109, ¶19 , 736 A.2d 1047 (quotation marks omitted). 2015In contrast, “[a] veiled threat of future unspecified harm is not. sufficient to raise the defense of duress.” Tomah, 1999 ME 109, ¶19 , 736 A.2d 1047 (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences1999See State v. Hernandez, 1998 ME 73, ¶ 7 , 708 A.2d 1022, 1025 ; State v. Sullivan, 1997 ME 71, ¶ 6 , 695 A.2d 115, 117 . 1999See State v. Hernandez, 1998 ME 73, ¶ 7 , 708 A.2d 1022, 1025 ; State v. Sullivan, 1997 ME 71, ¶ 6 , 695 A.2d 115, 117 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.