14 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kellygreen2 sentences2005See Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. at 205 , 478 A.2d at 377 . 2005See Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. at 205 , 478 A.2d at 377 . | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Marenghigreen2 sentences2003See United States v. Marenghi, 893 F.Supp. 85 (D.Me.1995) (denying the Government’s in limine motion to exclude expert testimony regarding the role of battered woman’s syndrome to support a duress defense). 2003The two defenses are similar in that they require a defendant to demonstrate that she acted reasonably in response to a reasonable fear of death or bodily injury. fid at 95.] The judge concluded: “This Court cannot envision that such evidence should be excluded in a duress defense when it is admitted in an overwhelming majority of state courts in self-defense cases.” Id. at 96 . | 2 | 2 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2024Duress, [N.J.S.A.] 2C:2-9(a)." The Rule also requires defense counsel to disclose a defendant's duress defense "[n]o later than seven days before the Initial Case Disposition Conference that is scheduled pursuant to R[ule] 3:9- 1(e)." Ibid. 2024"If a party fails to comply with this Rule, the court may take such action as the interest of justice requires," including "refusing to allow the party in default to present witnesses in support or in opposition of that defense at trial." Ibid. | 1 | 2 |
Jenkins v. Fauvergreen1 sentence2025Under the Criminal Code, duress is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because [they were] coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against [them] . . . which a person of reasonable firmness in [their] situation would have been unable to resist. [N.J.S.A. 2C:2-9.] "Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due [to] a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Jenkins v. Fauver, 108 N.J. 239, 248-49 (1987) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, | 1 | 1 |
Wolff v. McDonnellgreen1 sentence2025Under the Criminal Code, duress is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because [they were] coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against [them] . . . which a person of reasonable firmness in [their] situation would have been unable to resist. [N.J.S.A. 2C:2-9.] "Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due [to] a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Jenkins v. Fauver, 108 N.J. 239, 248-49 (1987) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fritzgreen2 sentences2021The judge properly applied the well-settled two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), that a defendant must first show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment," Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ); and second, he must prove that he suffered prejudice due to counsel's deficient performance, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , A-1896-19 6 691-92. 2021The judge properly applied the well-settled two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), that a defendant must first show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment," Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ); and second, he must prove that he suffered prejudice due to counsel's deficient performance, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , A-1896-19 6 691-92. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Preciosegreen1 sentence2020Those facts establish a prima facie case, R. 3:22-10(b); State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992), requiring an evidentiary hearing to ascertain why counsel did not file notice of the defense, foreclosing defendant's testimony. | 1 | 1 |
Continental Bank v. Barclay Riding Academy, Inc.green1 sentence2019See Cont'l Bank of Pa. v. Barclay Riding Acad., 93 N.J. 153, 177 (1983); Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 20 N.J. 359, 366 (1956). | 1 | 1 |
Rubenstein v. Rubensteingreen1 sentence2019See Cont'l Bank of Pa. v. Barclay Riding Acad., 93 N.J. 153, 177 (1983); Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 20 N.J. 359, 366 (1956). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Van Dykegreen2 sentences2008See State v. Van Dyke, 361 N.J.Super. 403 , 825 A. 2d 1163 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 35 , 36, 834 A. 2d 407 (2003). 2008See State v. Van Dyke, 361 N.J.Super. 403 , 825 A. 2d 1163 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 35 , 36, 834 A. 2d 407 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Penagreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., State v. Pena, 178 N.J. 297, 308-12 , 839 A.2d 870, 876-79 (2004). [6] In respect of the "person of reasonable firmness" language in the MPC duress proposal, we note that the American Law Institute (ALI) studied the duress statutes from the twenty states that had codified the duress defense. 2005See, e.g., State v. Pena, 178 N.J. 297, 308-12 , 839 A.2d 870, 876-79 (2004). [6] In respect of the "person of reasonable firmness" language in the MPC duress proposal, we note that the American Law Institute (ALI) studied the duress statutes from the twenty states that had codified the duress defense. | 1 | 1 |
Cameron v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Cameron v. State, 925 S.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Tex.Ct.App.1995) (observing that duress defense must be objectively reasonable). [7] The ALI discussion of MPC duress mentions brainwashing as a condition possibly supporting a duress defense in cases when an individual's capacity to act of his own volition is so impaired that he will respond, upon mere suggestion, to his controller's wishes. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Zanabriagreen1 sentence1997See id. at 593 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Atlantic Employers v. Tots & Toddlers
green
2 sentences2008Tots and Toddlers, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 284 , 571 A. 2d 300 . [4] The record contains an addendum to the type of homeowner's policy involved which contains a definition of the word "accident," but the parties agree it was not in effect during the policy period involved or at the time of the "occurrence." [5] While it precluded coverage for the sexual abuse of Robert Knighton, one of the owners of Tots & Toddlers Day Care Center, it concluded that the entity and Robert's wife, Nancy, its co-owner, "may indeed have a right to coverage, irrespective of Robert's intentional acts" unless "they 2008Tots and Toddlers, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 284 , 571 A. 2d 300 . [4] The record contains an addendum to the type of homeowner's policy involved which contains a definition of the word "accident," but the parties agree it was not in effect during the policy period involved or at the time of the "occurrence." [5] While it precluded coverage for the sexual abuse of Robert Knighton, one of the owners of Tots & Toddlers Day Care Center, it concluded that the entity and Robert's wife, Nancy, its co-owner, "may indeed have a right to coverage, irrespective of Robert's intentional acts" unless "they | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. BH
neutral
2 sentences2005Relying on the Appellate Division’s decision in State v. B.H., 364 N.J.Super. 171 , 834 A.2d 1063 (2003), the trial court held that the expert witness testimony was admissible to support the duress defense, but barred its use in connection with a defense of necessity. 2005Relying on the Appellate Division’s decision in State v. B.H., 364 N.J.Super. 171 , 834 A.2d 1063 (2003), the trial court held that the expert witness testimony was admissible to support the duress defense, but barred its use in connection with a defense of necessity. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Cecil
green
2 sentences2003Thus, even though it may have been obvious to both defense counsel and the trial court in Cecil , that the duress defense which Cecil insisted upon presenting to the jury stood little chance of resulting in an acquittal, we nevertheless upheld the court's finding that "defendant was able to make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to assert the defense of insanity." 260 N.J.Super. at 490 , 616 A. 2d 1336 ; see also H. 2003Thus, even though it may have been obvious to both defense counsel and the trial court in Cecil , that the duress defense which Cecil insisted upon presenting to the jury stood little chance of resulting in an acquittal, we nevertheless upheld the court's finding that "defendant was able to make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to assert the defense of insanity." 260 N.J.Super. at 490 , 616 A. 2d 1336 ; see also H. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Toscano
green
2 sentences1988To support their motion, the defendants relied upon State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421 (1977), and Comment 5 to N.J.S.A. 2C:2-9. 1988State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. at 442 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Commonwealth v. Stanley
green
2 sentences1988Id. at 332 , 446 A. 2d at 589 . 1988Id. at 332 , 446 A. 2d at 589 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. Bailey
green
2 sentences1988United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 , 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62 L.Ed. 2d 575 (1980); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326 , 446 A. 2d 583 (Sup.Ct. 1982). 1988United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 , 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62 L.Ed. 2d 575 (1980); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326 , 446 A. 2d 583 (Sup.Ct. 1982). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.