duress defense in Texas

2024“The duress defense is based on compulsion by threat, and focuses on the conduct of the person making the threats.” Montgomery v. State, 588 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. Crim.

2018“The duress defense is based on compulsion by threat and focuses on the conduct of the person making the threats.” Montgomery v. State, 588 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Cameron, 952 S.W.2d at 250 (finding defendant’s testimony that he was generally afraid of co-defendant’s temper insufficient to support submission of a duress instruction); Bernal v. State, 647 S.W.2d 699, 706 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982, no pet.) -5- 04-18-00883-CR (defendant’s testimony that he feared co-defendant “might get violent” found insufficient to support duress instruction).

2018See Cameron, 952 S.W.2d at 250 (finding defendant’s testimony that he was generally afraid of co-defendant’s temper insufficient to support submission of a duress instruction); Bernal v. State, 647 S.W.2d 699, 706 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982, no pet.) (defendant’s testimony that he feared co-defendant “might get violent” found insufficient to support duress instruction).

2011See Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 182 (distinguishing *624 Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)). 18 Therefore, it appears that Rodriguez-Flores’s questions satisfy the third prong of the Standefer test because he sought to elicit any automatic bias that the panelists might have had against the duress defense if the victim was a child, and the only fact included in the question was the victim’s status as a child.

2011See Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 182 ; Vann v. State, 216 S.W.3d 881, 886 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); Tijerina v. State, 202 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref'd); Lydia v. State, 117 S.W.3d 902, 905-06 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. refd).

2011See Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 182 ; Vann v. State, 216 S.W.3d 881, 886 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); Tijerina v. State, 202 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref'd); Lydia v. State, 117 S.W.3d 902, 905-06 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. refd).

2011See Standefer , 59 S.W.3d at 182 ; Vann v. State , 216 S.W.3d 881, 886 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); Tijerina v. State , 202 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref'd); Lydia v. State , 117 S.W.3d 902, 905-06 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd).

2011See Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 182 ; Vann v. State, 216 S.W.3d 881, 886 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); Tijerina v. State, 202 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref'd); Lydia v. State, 117 S.W.3d 902, 905-06 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. refd).

2011See Standefer , 59 S.W.3d at 182 ; Vann v. State , 216 S.W.3d 881, 886 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); Tijerina v. State , 202 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref'd); Lydia v. State , 117 S.W.3d 902, 905-06 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd).

2011See Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 182 ; Vann v. State, 216 S.W.3d 881, 886 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); Tijerina v. State, 202 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref'd); Lydia v. State, 117 S.W.3d 902, 905-06 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. refd).

2011See Standefer , 59 S.W.3d at 182 ; Vann v. State , 216 S.W.3d 881, 886 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); Tijerina v. State , 202 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref'd); Lydia v. State , 117 S.W.3d 902, 905-06 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd).

2011See id. at 119-20 (holding no reasonable likelihood that inadmissible portion of testimony containing additional incriminating information moved jury to state of persuasion on issue of future dangerousness when jury possessed details about defendant’s “killing spree that left five people dead” and his solicitation of further murders).

2011See Wes-brook, 29 S.W.3d at 119 .

2024See Cameron, 952 S.W.2d at 250 (finding defendant’s testimony that he was generally afraid of co-defendant’s temper insufficient to support submission of a duress instruction); Bernal v. State, 647 S.W.2d 699, 706 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982, no pet.) -5- 04-18-00883-CR (defendant’s testimony that he feared co-defendant “might get violent” found insufficient to support duress instruction).

2018See Cameron, 952 S.W.2d at 250 (finding defendant’s testimony that he was generally afraid of co-defendant’s temper insufficient to support submission of a duress instruction); Bernal v. State, 647 S.W.2d 699, 706 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982, no pet.) (defendant’s testimony that he feared co-defendant “might get violent” found insufficient to support duress instruction).

2009See Young v. State, 991 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). -5- pet.), citing Blott v. State, 588 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979).

2009See Young v. State , 991 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999).

2009See id. at 186 (charge of economic duress must be based on acts or conduct of opposite party, not merely on necessities of purported victim); see also Brown v. Cain Chem., Inc., 837 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (duress must derive from acts or conduct of the party accused of duress). 26 We sustain NCTC’s first issue and conclude that, as a matter of law, JNP and Texas Colorado produced no evidence of duress.16 See Deer Creek Ltd., 792 S.W.2d at 200; see also Windham v. Alexander, Weston & Poehner, P.C., 887 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, writ de

2009See id. at 186 (charge of economic duress must be based on acts or conduct of opposite party, not merely on necessities of purported victim); see also Brown v. Cain Chem., Inc. , 837 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (duress must derive from acts or conduct of the party accused of duress).

2009See id. at 186 (charge of economic duress must be based on acts or conduct of opposite party, not merely on necessities of purported victim); see also Brown v. Cain Chem., Inc., 837 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (duress must derive from acts or conduct of the party accused of duress). 26 We sustain NCTC’s first issue and conclude that, as a matter of law, JNP and Texas Colorado produced no evidence of duress.16 See Deer Creek Ltd., 792 S.W.2d at 200; see also Windham v. Alexander, Weston & Poehner, P.C., 887 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, writ de

2009See id. at 186 (charge of economic duress must be based on acts or conduct of opposite party, not merely on necessities of purported victim); see also Brown v. Cain Chem., Inc. , 837 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (duress must derive from acts or conduct of the party accused of duress).

2008Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hernandez v. State , 988 S.W.2d 770, 771-72 (Tex. Crim.

2008Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 771-72 (Tex. Crim.

2008Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hernandez v. State , 988 S.W.2d 770, 771-72 (Tex. Crim.

2008Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 771-72 (Tex. Crim.

2005Cameron v. State , 925 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 1995, no pet.).

1998See Cameron v. State, 925 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1995, no pet.).

2023Cormier v. State, 540 S.W.3d 185 , 190–91 (Tex. App.— Farris v. State Page 3 Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (citing Anguish v. State, 991 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd)).

2014See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.05 (c); Anguish, 991 S.W.2d at 886 .

2026The duress requirement is “pivotal.” Id. “[D]uress is established where the unauthorized tax or fee is required, necessary, or shall be paid to avoid the government’s ability to charge penalties or halt a person from earning a livelihood or operating a business.” Bolton, 185 S.W.3d at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2024Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim.

2022Pleading guilty to avoid the possibility of a harsher punishment does not render a plea involuntary, see Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978), and Applicant fails to show that he would have rejected the plea agreement and insisted on a duress defense had counsel done anything differently, see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).

2020Gomez v. State, 380 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d).

2019We decide only that, on this record, appellant was harmed when the jury was not given the opportunity to hear testimony relevant to appellant’s defense and assess its credibility along with the other evidence in the case Miller, 42 S.W.3d at 347 (on remand from court of criminal appeals, holding that the defendant was harmed when the jury was not given an opportunity to hear testimony relevant to the defendant’s duress defense that she was assaulted shortly after she sold cocaine).

2019We decide only that, on this record, appellant was harmed when the jury was not given the opportunity to hear testimony relevant to appellant’s defense and assess its credibility along with the other evidence in the case Miller, 42 S.W.3d at 347 (on remand from court of criminal appeals, holding that the defendant was harmed when the jury was not given an opportunity to hear testimony relevant to the defendant’s duress defense that she was assaulted shortly after she sold cocaine).

2013See Rodriguez-Flores v. State, 351 S.W.3d 612 , 626–27 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref’d) (holding that trial court’s denial of defendant’s question regarding jurors’ ability to apply duress defense was harmless where defendant was still able to engage in extensive discussion with and questioning regarding “the duress defense”).

2011See Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 182 (distinguishing *624 Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)). 18 Therefore, it appears that Rodriguez-Flores’s questions satisfy the third prong of the Standefer test because he sought to elicit any automatic bias that the panelists might have had against the duress defense if the victim was a child, and the only fact included in the question was the victim’s status as a child.

2009See Young v. State, 991 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). -5- pet.), citing Blott v. State, 588 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979).

2009See id. at 186 (charge of economic duress must be based on acts or conduct of opposite party, not merely on necessities of purported victim); see also Brown v. Cain Chem., Inc., 837 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (duress must derive from acts or conduct of the party accused of duress). 26 We sustain NCTC’s first issue and conclude that, as a matter of law, JNP and Texas Colorado produced no evidence of duress.16 See Deer Creek Ltd., 792 S.W.2d at 200; see also Windham v. Alexander, Weston & Poehner, P.C., 887 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, writ de

2009See Smith v. State, 968 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1998, no 1 It was also reasonable for Appellant’s attorney to conclude that a duress defense was not raised by the evidence, and the instruction could be properly denied by the trial court.

2005See Spencer v. State , 666 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. ref’d) ( holding record did not show guilty plea involuntary when no evidence in record indicated that counsel misstated range of punishment to appellant and that appellant relied on counsel’s advice).