evidence introduced hearing in California

2023(People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 723 (Johnson).) If, as here, the defendant was held to answer at the preliminary hearing, the defendant may renew his motion to 2 Under the attenuation doctrine, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’ ” (Utah v. Strieff (2016) 579 U.S. 232, 238 .) 10 suppress or “make the moti

2023(People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 723 (Johnson).) If, as here, the defendant was held to answer at the preliminary hearing, the defendant may renew his motion to 2 Under the attenuation doctrine, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’ ” (Utah v. Strieff (2016) 579 U.S. 232, 238 .) 10 suppress or “make the moti

2017Code, § 1538.5, subd. (f)(1).) If the magistrate denies the motion, the defendant may either renew the motion before the trial court or file a motion to dismiss under Penal Code section 995 raising the suppression issue. ( People v. Superior Court (Cooper) 114 Cal.App.4th 713 , 717, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 862 ; see Pen.

2017Code, § 1538.5, subd. (f)(1).) If the magistrate denies the motion, the defendant may either renew the motion before the trial court or file a motion to dismiss under Penal Code section 995 raising the suppression issue. ( People v. Superior Court (Cooper) 114 Cal.App.4th 713 , 717, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 862 ; see Pen.

2015(In re William F. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 255 [“the presentation of an argument by counsel based upon the evidence introduced at the hearing is an integral part of the right of a juvenile to be represented by counsel at a jurisdictional hearing, and . . . the denial of that right unless waived is a denial of due process of law”]; Herring v. New York (1975) 422 U.S. 853, 856-857 .) At the same time, however, the trial court has discretion to set appropriate limits on the time provided for such arguments: “It is within a trial court’s discretion . . . to determine when such right has been fully as

2014(People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Cal.2d 768, 775 , disapproved on another point in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12 ; People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 747-748 ; People v. Yeats (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 874, 879 .) Here, in view of the evidence introduced and the defense presented, the trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to instruct on simple assault.

2014(People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Cal.2d 768, 775 , disapproved on another point in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12 ; People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 747-748 ; People v. Yeats (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 874, 879 .) Here, in view of the evidence introduced and the defense presented, the trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to instruct on simple assault.

2014(People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Cal.2d 768, 775 , disapproved on another point in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12 ; People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 747-748 ; People v. Yeats (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 874, 879 .) Here, in view of the evidence introduced and the defense presented, the trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to instruct on simple assault.

2013App. Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627, 637 ; County of Kern, at pp. 516-517.) The evidence introduced at the hearing was sufficient to support the Board's finding as to the reasonable value of Findlay's epidural injections.

2002(Pe ople v. Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1247-1248 .) 4.

2000In any event, we decide the issue on other grounds. [11] We note that those cases limiting the ability of police officers to search containers belonging to passengers of vehicles not owned by the passenger, in the absence of valid consent by the passenger, may require reexamination after the high court's recent decision in Wyoming v. Houghton (1999) 526 U.S. 295 , 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 , which holds that police officers with probable cause to search a vehicle ordinarily may search the belongings of passengers, when such belongings reasonably may be believed to contain the object of

2000In any event, we decide the issue on other grounds. [11] We note that those cases limiting the ability of police officers to search containers belonging to passengers of vehicles not owned by the passenger, in the absence of valid consent by the passenger, may require reexamination after the high court's recent decision in Wyoming v. Houghton (1999) 526 U.S. 295 , 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 , which holds that police officers with probable cause to search a vehicle ordinarily may search the belongings of passengers, when such belongings reasonably may be believed to contain the object of

1994On appeal, the court found that because the prosecution “presented no psychiatric testimony to rebut the evidence introduced by the defense” ( 65 Cal.2d at p. 55 ), the evidence was insufficient to support the premeditation requisite to a conviction of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder.

1994On appeal, the court found that because the prosecution "presented no psychiatric testimony to rebut the evidence introduced by the defense" ( 65 Cal.2d at p. 55 ), the evidence was insufficient to support the premeditation requisite to a conviction of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder. ( Ibid. ) The court also held that the first degree murder conviction could not be upheld on the basis of the felony-murder rule because as a matter of law the robbery had terminated prior to the homicide. ( Id. at p. 56.) The court then concluded that because the kidnapping and the weapon offense wer

1976Proc.) That the court was well aware that attachment is not properly issuable where the defendant is not engaged in a trade or business is demonstrated by the denial of a writ of attachment as to another signatory of the indemnification agreement, with respect to whom the court said “The evidence presented is insufficient to show he is engaged in a trade or business.” In Advance Transformer Co. v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.App.3d 127 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 350 ], husband and wife, president and secretary respectively (as well as directors, with their son) of a closed corporation wholly owned by them, si

1976Proc.) That the court was well aware that attachment is not properly issuable where the defendant is not engaged in a trade or business is demonstrated by the denial of a writ of attachment as to another signatory of the indemnification agreement, with respect to whom the court said “The evidence presented is insufficient to show he is engaged in a trade or business.” In Advance Transformer Co. v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.App.3d 127 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 350 ], husband and wife, president and secretary respectively (as well as directors, with their son) of a closed corporation wholly owned by them, si

1956(People v. Farrara, 46 Cal.2d 265 [ 294 P.2d 21 ].) Regardless of the conclusions here reached the trial court fully considered the evidence on this subject and specifically found that none of the evidence introduced at the hearing or at the trial was obtained in violation of any constitutional right of the petitioner; that applying for and receiving a license to carry on the business at that address implied a consent to allow the investigator to make a reasonable inspection of the premises, which was done, and he accordingly waived his right to object under the circumstances related; that pet

1956(People v. Farrara, 46 Cal.2d 265 [ 294 P.2d 21 ].) Regardless of the conclusions here reached the trial court fully considered the evidence on this subject and specifically found that none of the evidence introduced at the hearing or at the trial was obtained in violation of any constitutional right of the petitioner; that applying for and receiving a license to carry on the business at that address implied a consent to allow the investigator to make a reasonable inspection of the premises, which was done, and he accordingly waived his right to object under the circumstances related; that pet

1954Proc., §§ 714, 715.) As said in Tucker v. Fontes, 70 Cal.App.2d 768 [ 161 P.2d 697 ], “. . . it is well settled that if after hearing the evidence introduced at the hearing of the supplemental proceeding the court concludes that the situation calls for the appointment of a receiver', it is authorized to make such appointment.” (P. 771.) The court stated further (p. 772), quoting from Pacific Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520 [ 40 Am.Rep. 120 ], “ . . if there be property which cannot be reached by execution, and which the judgment debtor refuses to apply to the satisfaction of the judgment, he may

1954Proc., §§ 714, 715.) As said in Tucker v. Fontes, 70 Cal.App.2d 768 [ 161 P.2d 697 ], “. . . it is well settled that if after hearing the evidence introduced at the hearing of the supplemental proceeding the court concludes that the situation calls for the appointment of a receiver', it is authorized to make such appointment.” (P. 771.) The court stated further (p. 772), quoting from Pacific Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520 [ 40 Am.Rep. 120 ], “ . . if there be property which cannot be reached by execution, and which the judgment debtor refuses to apply to the satisfaction of the judgment, he may

1954Proc., §§ 714, 715.) As said in Tucker v. Fontes, 70 Cal.App.2d 768 [ 161 P.2d 697 ], “. . . it is well settled that if after hearing the evidence introduced at the hearing of the supplemental proceeding the court concludes that the situation calls for the appointment of a receiver', it is authorized to make such appointment.” (P. 771.) The court stated further (p. 772), quoting from Pacific Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520 [ 40 Am.Rep. 120 ], “ . . if there be property which cannot be reached by execution, and which the judgment debtor refuses to apply to the satisfaction of the judgment, he may