lengthy analysis in Florida

1991The trial court conducted a lengthy inquiry into the alleged discovery violations and therefore satisfied the requirements of Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971).

1978The trial judge concluded that there was no prejudice to Cooper's defense, and that the increased workload was in part the result of a tactical decision by the defense rather than the state's breach of the rules." ( 336 So.2d at page 1137 and 1138) (emphasis supplied) A second violation of Rule 3.220(f) occurred in Cooper when the state announced a ballistics expert had been inadvertently left off the list of witnesses and in regard to that alleged error the Supreme Court stated: "* * * In accordance with our holding in Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971), the trial judge held a len

2005A. Applicable Law As we most recently stated in State v. Duncan, 894 So.2d 817 (Fla.2004): Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)], this Court held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be considered meritorious, must include two general components.

2005A. Applicable Law As we most recently stated in State v. Duncan, 894 So.2d 817 (Fla.2004): Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)], this Court held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be considered meritorious, must include two general components.

2005A. Applicable Law As we most recently stated in State v. Duncan, 894 So.2d 817 (Fla.2004): Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)], this Court held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be considered meritorious, must include two general components.

2005A. Applicable Law As we most recently stated in State v. Duncan, 894 So.2d 817 (Fla.2004): Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)], this Court held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be considered meritorious, must include two general components.

1988The first district in Felts v. State, 13 F.L.W. 205 (Fla. 1st DCA Jan. 14, 1988), engaged in a lengthy analysis of amended section 921.001(5) and held, relying on language in Miller v. Florida, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2446 , 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), to the effect that the ex post facto prohibition does not restrict legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance, even when the law acts to the defendant’s detriment, that there was no ex post facto problem because the effect of the changes in section 921.001(5) was procedural in nature.

1988The first district in Felts v. State, 13 F.L.W. 205 (Fla. 1st DCA Jan. 14, 1988), engaged in a lengthy analysis of amended section 921.001(5) and held, relying on language in Miller v. Florida, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2446 , 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), to the effect that the ex post facto prohibition does not restrict legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance, even when the law acts to the defendant’s detriment, that there was no ex post facto problem because the effect of the changes in section 921.001(5) was procedural in nature.

2020In Hopkins, after a lengthy hearing on the matter, the trial court orally denied Hopkins’ motion to suppress, and the trial immediately began. 632 So. 2d at 1376 .

2015Brooks II, 918 So.2d at 209 .

2015In determining the amount of fees to be awarded, the trial court applied the factors set forth in Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1985) 2 and the factors from Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(b)(A).

2011As illustrated by the facts in Dusseau v. Metropolitan Dade County Board of County Commissioners, 794 So.2d at 1270 , the Board of County Commissioners conducted a lengthy hearing on the Torberts’ application for zoning determination.

1999In a lengthy analysis of the issue, the Supreme Court observed that "every action recognized in 1791 for the recovery of possession of property carried with it the right to jury trial." Id. at 376 , 94 S.Ct. 1723 .

1999In a lengthy analysis of the issue, the Supreme Court observed that "every action recognized in 1791 for the recovery of possession of property carried with it the right to jury trial." Id. at 376 , 94 S.Ct. 1723 .

1997However, the Court then conducted a lengthy analysis wherein it concluded that on the one hand, the major purpose of section 455.241(2) was to restrict a physician from disclosing patient information except where a health care provider "is or reasonably expects to be named as a defendant" in a medical negligence action, and that on the other hand, "common sense dictates that a defendant health care provider should be able to discuss patient information to defend herself in a medical negligence action brought by the patient." Acosta, 671 So.2d at 156 .

1997Consequently, the Court held "that section 455.241(2), Florida Statutes (1993), creates a physician-patient privilege of confidentiality for the patient's personal medical information, and a limited exception to the privilege for a defendant-health care provider that reasonably expects to be named as a defendant in a medical negligence action." Acosta, 671 So.2d at 156-57 .

1995As for the Frye test itself, the Washington Supreme Court undertook a lengthy analysis and determined that "expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome is not a scientifically reliable means of proving lack of consent in a rape case." Black, 745 P.2d at 18 .

1992Dunkerley v. Hogan, 579 F.2d 141 (2 Cir. [1978] 1987), it can not [sic] be held that Judge Grossman, *312 having presided over the trial and having scrupulously and patiently conducted a lengthy hearing on March 9, 1990, abused his discretion by granting a mistrial.

1991See State v. Hall, 509 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 1987); State v. Lewis, 543 So.2d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 549 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 1989); Smith v. State, 499 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Johnson v. State, 461 So.2d 1385 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 472 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1984); Baker v. State, 438 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 447 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1984).

1991See State v. Hall, 509 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 1987); State v. Lewis, 543 So.2d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 549 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 1989); Smith v. State, 499 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Johnson v. State, 461 So.2d 1385 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 472 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1984); Baker v. State, 438 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 447 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1984).

1991See State v. Hall, 509 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 1987); State v. Lewis, 543 So.2d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 549 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 1989); Smith v. State, 499 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Johnson v. State, 461 So.2d 1385 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 472 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1984); Baker v. State, 438 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 447 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1984).

1991See State v. Hall, 509 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 1987); State v. Lewis, 543 So.2d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 549 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 1989); Smith v. State, 499 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Johnson v. State, 461 So.2d 1385 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 472 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1984); Baker v. State, 438 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 447 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1984).

1983Preliminarily, without going into the exact phraseology used in the lengthy rule challenge petition, we observe that it adequately alleges that the rule would cause prospective economic injury to physicians (particularly ophthalmologists) licensed under Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, by allowing optometrists to provide treatment, involving the use and prescription of "legend drugs," [2] to patients who otherwise would be required to obtain such treatment from physicians. [3] Although these allegations apparently *1114 met the "injury in fact" test to the satisfaction of the hearing officer, he

1983Preliminarily, without going into the exact phraseology used in the lengthy rule challenge petition, we observe that it adequately alleges that the rule would cause prospective economic injury to physicians (particularly ophthalmologists) licensed under Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, by allowing optometrists to provide treatment, involving the use and prescription of "legend drugs," [2] to patients who otherwise would be required to obtain such treatment from physicians. [3] Although these allegations apparently *1114 met the "injury in fact" test to the satisfaction of the hearing officer, he

1981On the facts of this case we find a lengthy analysis unwarranted and affirm the detention and search on authority of Sections 856.021 and 901.21, Florida Statutes (1979); State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, sub nom., Bell v. Florida, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 S.Ct. 455 , 46 L.Ed.2d 391 (1975); State v. Washington, 376 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Dixon v. State, 343 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

1981On the facts of this case we find a lengthy analysis unwarranted and affirm the detention and search on authority of Sections 856.021 and 901.21, Florida Statutes (1979); State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, sub nom., Bell v. Florida, 423 U.S. 1019 , 96 S.Ct. 455 , 46 L.Ed.2d 391 (1975); State v. Washington, 376 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Dixon v. State, 343 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).