lengthy analysis in California

2025(See People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38 , review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283169.) But in the meantime, we agree with the majority view in this state and hold “that section 1172.75 should be interpreted to apply whenever a prison prior was imposed, whether punishment was executed, stayed, or struck.” (See, e.g., People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188 , 193, italics added (Espino), review granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987.) Here, defendant Manuel Yohonathan Terrazas petitioned for section 1172.75 relief.

2025(See People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38 , review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283169.) But in the meantime, we agree with the majority view in this state and hold “that section 1172.75 should be interpreted to apply whenever a prison prior was imposed, whether punishment was executed, stayed, or struck.” (See, e.g., People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188 , 193, italics added (Espino), review granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987.) Here, defendant Omar Humberto Rivera petitioned for relief under section 1172.75.

2025(See People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38 , review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283169.) But in the meantime, we agree with the majority view in this state and hold “that section 1172.75 should be interpreted to apply whenever a prison prior was imposed, whether punishment was executed, stayed, or struck.” (See, e.g., People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188 , 193, italics added (Espino), review granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987.) Here, defendant Manuel Yohonathan Terrazas petitioned for section 1172.75 relief.

2025(See People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38 , review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283169.) But in the meantime, we agree with the majority view in this state and hold “that section 1172.75 should be interpreted to apply whenever a prison prior was imposed, whether punishment was executed, stayed, or struck.” (See, e.g., People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188 , 193, italics added (Espino), review granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987.) Here, defendant Omar Humberto Rivera petitioned for relief under section 1172.75.

1995(People v. Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 984-988.)” (Id. at p. 452.) As Justice Ortega observed, “We agree with People v. McElroy (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1415 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 853 ] which, after a lengthy analysis of the Louis dicta and Hovey clarification (id. at pp. 1425-1426), concluded that ‘the most recent Supreme Court guidance on this issue both reaffirmed the vitality of prior cases applying the “ ‘abuse of discretion’ ” standard, and cautioned that any contrary analysis or suggestions in People v. Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d 969 were dicta.

1995(People v. Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 984-988.)” (Id. at p. 452.) As Justice Ortega observed, “We agree with People v. McElroy (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1415 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 853 ] which, after a lengthy analysis of the Louis dicta and Hovey clarification (id. at pp. 1425-1426), concluded that ‘the most recent Supreme Court guidance on this issue both reaffirmed the vitality of prior cases applying the “ ‘abuse of discretion’ ” standard, and cautioned that any contrary analysis or suggestions in People v. Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d 969 were dicta.

1995The reference to a due diligence review standard in Watson entirely consists of the following sentence: "In reviewing the trial court's determination of the unavailability of a witness, the appellate court exercises its independent judgment. ( People v. Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 984-988.)" ( Id. at p. 452.) As Justice Ortega observed, "We agree with People v. McElroy (1989) 208 Cal. App.3d 1415 [ 256 Cal. Rptr. 853 ] which, after a lengthy analysis of *1236 the Louis dicta and Hovey clarification ( id. at pp. 1425-1426), concluded that `the most recent Supreme Court guidance on this issue

1995(People v. Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 984-988.)” (Id. at p. 452.) As Justice Ortega observed, “We agree with People v. McElroy (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1415 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 853 ] which, after a lengthy analysis of the Louis dicta and Hovey clarification (id. at pp. 1425-1426), concluded that ‘the most recent Supreme Court guidance on this issue both reaffirmed the vitality of prior cases applying the “ ‘abuse of discretion’ ” standard, and cautioned that any contrary analysis or suggestions in People v. Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d 969 were dicta.

2024Co. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1436 , 1447-1461, engaged in a lengthy analysis of the histories of section 1646 and the governmental interest test for choice of law problems.

2023Co. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1436 , 1447-1461, engaged in a lengthy analysis of the histories of section 1646 and the governmental interest test for choice of law problems.

2019The court in Isidora M. conducted a lengthy analysis of the language of former section 6305 and concluded that it precluded issuance of a mutual restraining order unless both parties had filed written requests for such an order. ( Isidora M. , supra , 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 19 , 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 502 .) The appellant in Isidora M. sought a restraining order in 2014 against her husband based on allegations that he had threatened to kill her. *688 ( Id. at p. 15, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 502 .) The husband responded to appellant's request, presenting evidence that appellant was already restrained due to a c

2019The court in Isidora M. conducted a lengthy analysis of the language of former section 6305 and concluded that it precluded issuance of a mutual restraining order unless both parties had filed written requests for such an order. ( Isidora M. , supra , 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 19 , 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 502 .) The appellant in Isidora M. sought a restraining order in 2014 against her husband based on allegations that he had threatened to kill her. *688 ( Id. at p. 15, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 502 .) The husband responded to appellant's request, presenting evidence that appellant was already restrained due to a c

2014Further, the court instructed the jurors as to the factors they could consider when weighing the credibility of eyewitness testimony." (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Contreras argues "that a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court [Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 ] supports his contention that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification violated his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity 6 to present a complete defense . . . ." (People v. Goodwillie, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 727 .) After a l

2014Further, the court instructed the jurors as to the factors they could consider when weighing the credibility of eyewitness testimony." (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Contreras argues "that a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court [Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 ] supports his contention that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification violated his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity 6 to present a complete defense . . . ." (People v. Goodwillie, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 727 .) After a l

2014Further, the court instructed the jurors as to the factors they could consider when weighing the credibility of eyewitness testimony." (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Contreras argues "that a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court [Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 ] supports his contention that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification violated his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity 6 to present a complete defense . . . ." (People v. Goodwillie, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 727 .) After a l

2014Further, the court instructed the jurors as to the factors they could consider when weighing the credibility of eyewitness testimony." (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Contreras argues "that a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court [Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 ] supports his contention that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification violated his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity 6 to present a complete defense . . . ." (People v. Goodwillie, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 727 .) After a l

2004Thus, the statement referring to experience within five years of trial is pure dictum. "`Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in ... light of the facts and the issue ... before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.' [Citation.]" ( FNB Mortgage Corp. v. Pacific General Group, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 .) The same is true for a similar statement in Zavala v. Board of Trustees, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th 1755 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 768 , on which defendants also rely.

2004Thus, the statement referring to experience within five years of trial is pure dictum. “ ‘Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in . . . light of the facts and the issue . . . before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.’ [Citation.]” (FNB Mortgage Corp v. Pacific General Group, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132 .) The same is true for a similar statement in Zavala v. Board of Trustees, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th 1755 , on which defendants also rely.

2004Thus, the statement referring to experience within five years of trial is pure dictum. "`Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in ... light of the facts and the issue ... before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.' [Citation.]" ( FNB Mortgage Corp. v. Pacific General Group, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 .) The same is true for a similar statement in Zavala v. Board of Trustees, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th 1755 , 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 768 , on which defendants also rely.

2004Thus, the statement referring to experience within five years of trial is pure dictum. “ ‘Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in . . . light of the facts and the issue . . . before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.’ [Citation.]” (FNB Mortgage Corp v. Pacific General Group, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132 .) The same is true for a similar statement in Zavala v. Board of Trustees, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th 1755 , on which defendants also rely.

1995We adhere to the Supreme Court's guidance, and therefore apply the abuse of discretion standard to this case.' ( Id. at p. 1426.) Even were we free to endorse either rule, we would on policy grounds adopt the abuse of discretion standard for review of such rulings." ( People v. Turner, supra, 219 Cal. App.3d 1207, 1214 .) For these same reasons, we apply the abuse of discretion review standard. [3] b.

1995We adhere to the Supreme Court’s guidance, and therefore apply the abuse of discretion standard to this case.’ (Id. at p. 1426.) Even were we free to endorse either rule, we would on policy grounds adopt the abuse of discretion standard for review of such rulings.” (People v. Turner, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d 1207, 1214 .) For these same reasons, we apply the abuse of discretion review standard. 3 b.

1969Thus, it has been said (Estate of Smith (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 544 at page 549 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 681 ]) : “ [4] Whenever there is in a will a devise in qualified terms but followed by a direction for the devisee to leave the property to a third person, it creates a life estate in the devisee, with remainder over to the third person. ... [5] Where the instrument as a whole provides a limitation over, a life estate may be created even if it is not expressly declared. ” Reviewing the language of the will it is clear enough that if during her lifetime Bessie Cooper had attempted to transfer the proper

1969Thus, it has been said (Estate of Smith (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 544 at page 549 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 681 ]) : “ [4] Whenever there is in a will a devise in qualified terms but followed by a direction for the devisee to leave the property to a third person, it creates a life estate in the devisee, with remainder over to the third person. ... [5] Where the instrument as a whole provides a limitation over, a life estate may be created even if it is not expressly declared. ” Reviewing the language of the will it is clear enough that if during her lifetime Bessie Cooper had attempted to transfer the proper

2026Pending any guidance from the California Supreme Court, we conclude, as did Thompson and Baldwin, that the limitation of section 1170(d)(1)(A) to juvenile LWOP offenders survives rational basis review. “[T]he legislative history of [the legislation enacting the procedure] indicates that while Graham [v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 ] violations and cruel or disproportionate sentences imposed on juveniles were the Legislature’s general considerations in enacting section 1170[, subdivision ](d), it was expressly concerned about juveniles being sentenced to die in prison.” 7 (Thompson, supra, 112 C

2026Thus, the ALJ engaged in “a lengthy analysis, including [a] review of federal tax law,” and, on the basis of this analysis, concluded: (1) that a per diem payment is “reasonable” and thus satisfies the first requirement “ ‘if it comports with common sense, is not lavish or extravagant, and is not made for the purpose of circumventing per diem regulations’ ”; and (2) that, for such a payment to satisfy the second requirement, the “employer must provide records proving that each employee receiving per diem reimbursement worked at a location that required the employee to incur ‘additional duplica

2025(See People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985 , 991 (Hodge) [order declining to exercise discretion to recall sentence was not appealable].) The People’s responsive brief advances a lengthy challenge to our appellate jurisdiction, focusing squarely on the appealability of the order.

2024(Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 810 .) The remedy of administrative mandamus applies to determinations by private organizations “made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer.” (§ 1094.5, subd. (a); see Pomona College v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1716, 1729, 1730 [applying § 1094.5 to administrative proceeding at a private university].) Generally, the exhaustion of administrative rem

2023In particular, Diaz faults the trial court for using CALCRIM No. 315 without taking account of the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644 , 661– 669 (Lemcke).

2023It was reworked after Canizales found it “should be revised to better describe the contours and limits of the kill zone theory as we have laid them out.” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 609 .) It now addresses Canizales’s concerns that the prior version failed to define “ ‘kill zone’ ” beyond “ ‘particular zone of harm’ ” and failed to “direct the jury to consider evidence regarding the circumstances of defendants’ attack.” (Id. at p. 613.) But the instruction, which today’s opinion characterizes as providing “more guidance” to a jury (maj. opn., ante, at p. 43), still contains language tha

2023DLSE is undoubtedly correct on this point. “[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” (AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 648 [ 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418 , 89 L.Ed.2d 648 , ___]; Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 323 .) DLSE contends the savings clause “contemplates control under state law because it says so” and that, once triggered, “the [savings clause] controls and takes the [arbitration