lengthy analysis in Alabama

2014Rather, when he is a presumed father of a child under § 26-17-204, a man may persist in maintaining his status as the father of the child even with the certain knowledge that he is not actually the child’s biological father.” Id. ' In D.F.H., this court relied heavily on our supreme court’s analysis in Ex parte C.A.P., 683 So.2d 1010 (Ala.1996), an opinion with comparable facts to the case at bar.

2010In Simmons , this Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), in determining whether nonscientific expert testimony regarding crime-scene analysis and victimol-ogy was admissible under Rule 702.

2010In Simmons , this Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), in determining whether nonscientific expert testimony regarding crime-scene analysis and victimol-ogy was admissible under Rule 702.

2010In Simmons , this Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), in determining whether nonscientific expert testimony regarding crime-scene analysis and victimol-ogy was admissible under Rule 702.

2010In Simmons , this Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), in determining whether nonscientific expert testimony regarding crime-scene analysis and victimol-ogy was admissible under Rule 702.

2010Subsequently, in Bruce v. Cole, 854 So.2d 47 (Ala.2003), discussed in DeFriece , above, in an opinion authored by Justice Johnstone, this Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of an oral agreement to transfer stock.

2010Subsequently, in Bruce v. Cole, 854 So.2d 47 (Ala.2003), discussed in DeFriece , above, in an opinion authored by Justice Johnstone, this Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of an oral agreement to transfer stock.

1993On May 29, 1992, this court, at the direction of the Alabama Supreme Court, see Ex parte Archer, 643 So.2d 601 (Ala.1992), remanded this cause to the circuit court with instructions that a hearing be conducted “at which the appellant will be afforded the opportunity to testify, as well as to present any other evidence, as to any prejudice he may have suffered as a result of the delay in bringing him to trial.” After a lengthy hearing, the circuit court made the following findings of fact regarding the prejudice allegedly suffered by the appellant as a result of the delay in bringing him to tri

1991This court held that the defendant in that case failed to preserve the issue for review, but went on to say: ". . . because a lengthy hearing was held on the admissibility of the out-of-court statements before they were offered, because it appears that defense counsel was sufficiently prepared to oppose the admission of the statements, and because counsel did, in fact, file a written motion to suppress the statements before they were introduced into evidence, we find the defendant had notice adequate to allow him 'a fair opportunity to prepare a response to the statement[s].' " Fortner , 582 S

1987This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court denying this appellant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis, after a lengthy hearing thereon before the trial judge who presided at a jury trial of Wy-singer and whose judgment and sentence of imprisonment for life had been affirmed by this Court in Wysinger v. State, 448 So.2d 435 (Ala.Cr.App.1983).

1982In Bradler v. Craig , 79 Cal.Rptr. 401 , 274 Cal.App.2d 466 (1969), the Court of Appeal, in affirming a summary judgment for defendant contractor and defendant money lender, engaged in a lengthy analysis of Connor and quoted with approval that portion of the Connor majority opinion dealing with the "privity of contract" issue and the standard to be applied in determining whether the requisite duty exists.

1982In Bradler v. Craig , 79 Cal.Rptr. 401 , 274 Cal.App.2d 466 (1969), the Court of Appeal, in affirming a summary judgment for defendant contractor and defendant money lender, engaged in a lengthy analysis of Connor and quoted with approval that portion of the Connor majority opinion dealing with the "privity of contract" issue and the standard to be applied in determining whether the requisite duty exists.

1979Hardin v. State, supra; Myhand v. State, 259 Ala. 415 , 66 So.2d 544 ; Humphrey v. State, 54 Ala.App. 62 , 304 So.2d 617 .

1979Hardin v. State, supra; Myhand v. State, 259 Ala. 415 , 66 So.2d 544 ; Humphrey v. State, 54 Ala.App. 62 , 304 So.2d 617 .

1979Hardin v. State, supra; Myhand v. State, 259 Ala. 415 , 66 So.2d 544 ; Humphrey v. State, 54 Ala.App. 62 , 304 So.2d 617 .

1979Hardin v. State, supra; Myhand v. State, 259 Ala. 415 , 66 So.2d 544 ; Humphrey v. State, 54 Ala.App. 62 , 304 So.2d 617 .

1979After a lengthy analysis of the Fletcher and Richardson cases, as well as a discussion of Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, Conn., 66 Cal.2d 425 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 426 P.2d 173 (1967) (a third-party refusal to settle within policy limits case), the California Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for the alleged breach, by the defendant insurer, of the duty to deal fairly and in good faith in the payment of a policy claim, and that such an action sounded in tort.

1979After a lengthy analysis of the Fletcher and Richardson cases, as well as a discussion of Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, Conn., 66 Cal.2d 425 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 426 P.2d 173 (1967) (a third-party refusal to settle within policy limits case), the California Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for the alleged breach, by the defendant insurer, of the duty to deal fairly and in good faith in the payment of a policy claim, and that such an action sounded in tort.