lengthy instruction in Connecticut

2019Despite the defendant’s request for review pursuant to Golding, ‘‘when the trial court provides counsel with a copy of the proposed jury instructions, allows a mean- ingful opportunity for their review, solicits comments from counsel regarding changes or modifications and counsel affirmatively accepts the instructions proposed or given, the defendant may be deemed to have knowl- edge of any potential flaws therein and to have waived implicitly the constitutional right to challenge the instructions on direct appeal.’’ State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447 , 482–83, 10 A.3d 942 (2011).

2019Despite the defendant’s request for review pursuant to Golding, ‘‘when the trial court provides counsel with a copy of the proposed jury instructions, allows a mean- ingful opportunity for their review, solicits comments from counsel regarding changes or modifications and counsel affirmatively accepts the instructions proposed or given, the defendant may be deemed to have knowl- edge of any potential flaws therein and to have waived implicitly the constitutional right to challenge the instructions on direct appeal.’’ State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447 , 482–83, 10 A.3d 942 (2011).

2019As a preliminary matter, we note that the defendant raises this claim for the first time on appeal, requesting review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).1 He did not request that the court instruct the jury regarding the inherent limitations or flaws in translated foreign language testi- mony, nor did he comment on or object to a lengthy instruction given by the court on how the jury should evaluate translated foreign language testimony.

2019As a preliminary matter, we note that the defendant raises this claim for the first time on appeal, requesting review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).1 He did not request that the court instruct the jury regarding the inherent limitations or flaws in translated foreign language testi- mony, nor did he comment on or object to a lengthy instruction given by the court on how the jury should evaluate translated foreign language testimony.

2013Although it may be true in general that supplemental charges enjoy “special prominence in the minds of the jurors because [they are] fresher in their minds when they resume deliberation”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Williams, 199 Conn. 30, 41 , 505 A.2d 699 (1986); in this case the supplemental charge occurred within minutes of a lengthy and uncontested instruction on self-defense.

2013Although it may be true in general that supplemental charges enjoy “special prominence in the minds of the jurors because [they are] fresher in their minds when they resume deliberation”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Williams, 199 Conn. 30, 41 , 505 A.2d 699 (1986); in this case the supplemental charge occurred within minutes of a lengthy and uncontested instruction on self-defense.

2008The court therefore instructs you that, as a matter of law, Konover had a nondelegable duty concerning safety, that it could not assign it to someone else and that such duty extended to all workers on the site including the [plaintiff].” 7 Konover had requested a charge on superseding cause in its request to charge, but the court declined to give it, explaining that, “[although] it is correct that other types of employers have duties under OSHA, given the [case of Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 222 Conn. 775 , 610 A.2d 1277 (1992)], if I were to give such an instruction, I would then h

2008The court therefore instructs you that, as a matter of law, Konover had a nondelegable duty concerning safety, that it could not assign it to someone else and that such duty extended to all workers on the site including the [plaintiff].” 7 Konover had requested a charge on superseding cause in its request to charge, but the court declined to give it, explaining that, “[although] it is correct that other types of employers have duties under OSHA, given the [case of Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 222 Conn. 775 , 610 A.2d 1277 (1992)], if I were to give such an instruction, I would then h

2008It was for that reason that the court determined not to specifically instruct as to the obligations of the plaintiffs . . . direct employer, Soneco.” 8 The trial court explained that it did not give the requested charge because this court had abrogated the doctrine of superseding cause in Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 441-42 , 820 A.2d 258 (2003), and because Soneco “was not a party at the time of the trial and, under the relevant statutory scheme, was not an entity from which [Konover] could seek to apportion any damages awarded.” 9 General Statutes § 52-572h provides

2008It was for that reason that the court determined not to specifically instruct as to the obligations of the plaintiffs . . . direct employer, Soneco.” 8 The trial court explained that it did not give the requested charge because this court had abrogated the doctrine of superseding cause in Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 441-42 , 820 A.2d 258 (2003), and because Soneco “was not a party at the time of the trial and, under the relevant statutory scheme, was not an entity from which [Konover] could seek to apportion any damages awarded.” 9 General Statutes § 52-572h provides

2005As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will not view the instructions as improper.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jacobs v. General Electric Co., 275 Conn. 395, 400 , 880 A.2d 151 (2005).

2005As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will not view the instructions as improper.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jacobs v. General Electric Co., 275 Conn. 395, 400 , 880 A.2d 151 (2005).

2004He contends that reconsideration is appropriate because Marino was decided prior to State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 685 , 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), in which we identified with specificity, for the first time, the analytical tools to be used in construing the contours of our state constitution. 22 It is true, of course, that Marino predated Geisler , and it also is true that we did not undertake a lengthy analysis of the state constitutional claim in Marino .

2004He contends that reconsideration is appropriate because Marino was decided prior to State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 685 , 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), in which we identified with specificity, for the first time, the analytical tools to be used in construing the contours of our state constitution. 22 It is true, of course, that Marino predated Geisler , and it also is true that we did not undertake a lengthy analysis of the state constitutional claim in Marino .

1997Id., 96 .

1995These charges closely track those found to be adequate in Esaw v. Friedman, 217 Conn. 553 , 556-57 (1991).