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18 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hardy v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Hardy v. State, 240 Ga. App. 115, 120 (6) ( 522 SE2d 704 ) (1999) (harmful effect of erroneous portion of impeachment charge was mitigated by the remainder of the charge). 2015See Hardy v. State, 240 Ga. App. 115, 120 (6) ( 522 SE2d 704 ) (1999) (harmful effect of erroneous portion of impeachment charge was mitigated by the remainder of the charge). | 3 | 3 |
Miller v. Stategreen2 sentences2015“The inapplicable portion of the impeachment charge was contained in a lengthy instruction detailing other permissible methods of impeachment and appears to be no more than a passing general reference.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Miller v. State, 281 Ga. App. 354, 355 (1) ( 636 SE2d 60 ) (2006). 2015“The inapplicable portion of the impeachment charge was contained in a lengthy instruction detailing other permissible methods of impeachment and appears to be no more than a passing general reference.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Miller v. State, 281 Ga. App. 354, 355 (1) ( 636 SE2d 60 ) (2006). | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2014After a lengthy hearing conducted outside the jury’s presence, the trial court ultimately held New, New’s mother, and the family friend in contempt of court for violating the rule of sequestration. 25 Further, insofar as New’s counsel made the decision not to call New’s mother as a witness, it is well established that “the decision as to which defense witnesses to call is a matter of trial strategy and tactics.”51 In this regard, tactical errors “will not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless those errors are unreasonable ones no competent attorney would have made under similar c 2014After a lengthy hearing conducted outside the jury’s presence, the trial court ultimately held New, New’s mother, and the family friend in contempt of court for violating the rule of sequestration. 25 Further, insofar as New’s counsel made the decision not to call New’s mother as a witness, it is well established that “the decision as to which defense witnesses to call is a matter of trial strategy and tactics.”51 In this regard, tactical errors “will not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless those errors are unreasonable ones no competent attorney would have made under similar c | 2 | 2 |
Young v. Stategreen2 sentences1984After a lengthy hearing involving testimony from six witnesses, the trial court ruled that Powell’s statements were knowing and voluntary. “ Tactual and credibility determinations made by a trial judge after a suppression hearing are accepted by appellate courts unless clearly erroneous.’ ” Cox v. State, 248 Ga. 713 (1) ( 285 SE2d 687 ) (1982), citing Young v. State, 243 Ga. 546, 548 ( 255 SE2d 20 ) (1979). 1984After a lengthy hearing involving testimony from six witnesses, the trial court ruled that Powell’s statements were knowing and voluntary. “ Tactual and credibility determinations made by a trial judge after a suppression hearing are accepted by appellate courts unless clearly erroneous.’ ” Cox v. State, 248 Ga. 713 (1) ( 285 SE2d 687 ) (1982), citing Young v. State, 243 Ga. 546, 548 ( 255 SE2d 20 ) (1979). | 2 | 2 |
Glover v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The Supreme Court of Georgia has held, however, that “[jjudicial construction is appropriate only when a statute is ambiguous, and when the statutory language is plain and unequivocal, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but forbidden.” Glover v. State, 272 Ga. 639, 640 ( 533 SE2d 374 ) (2000) (citation omitted). 2015The Supreme Court of Georgia has held, however, that “[jjudicial construction is appropriate only when a statute is ambiguous, and when the statutory language is plain and unequivocal, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but forbidden.” Glover v. State, 272 Ga. 639, 640 ( 533 SE2d 374 ) (2000) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Howard v. Stategreen2 sentences2014After a lengthy hearing conducted outside the jury’s presence, the trial court ultimately held New, New’s mother, and the family friend in contempt of court for violating the rule of sequestration. 25 Further, insofar as New’s counsel made the decision not to call New’s mother as a witness, it is well established that “the decision as to which defense witnesses to call is a matter of trial strategy and tactics.”51 In this regard, tactical errors “will not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless those errors are unreasonable ones no competent attorney would have made under similar c 2014After a lengthy hearing conducted outside the jury’s presence, the trial court ultimately held New, New’s mother, and the family friend in contempt of court for violating the rule of sequestration. 25 Further, insofar as New’s counsel made the decision not to call New’s mother as a witness, it is well established that “the decision as to which defense witnesses to call is a matter of trial strategy and tactics.”51 In this regard, tactical errors “will not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless those errors are unreasonable ones no competent attorney would have made under similar c | 1 | 1 |
Francis v. Stategreen2 sentences2006The inapplicable portion of the impeachment charge was contained in a lengthy instruction detailing other permissible methods of impeachment, and “appears to be no more than a passing general reference.” Francis, supra, 266 Ga. at 72 (3). 2006The inapplicable portion of the impeachment charge was contained in a lengthy instruction detailing other permissible methods of impeachment, and “appears to be no more than a passing general reference.” Francis, supra, 266 Ga. at 72 (3). | 1 | 1 |
Salisbury v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Compare Salisbury v. State, 221 Ga. 718 (5) ( 146 SE2d 776 ) (1966) and Spann v. State, 126 Ga. App. 370 (2) ( 190 SE2d 924 ) (1972) (the error was deemed harmful in the absence of any effort by the trial court to correct the injury the improper remark caused the defendant). 2004Compare Salisbury v. State, 221 Ga. 718 (5) ( 146 SE2d 776 ) (1966) and Spann v. State, 126 Ga. App. 370 (2) ( 190 SE2d 924 ) (1972) (the error was deemed harmful in the absence of any effort by the trial court to correct the injury the improper remark caused the defendant). | 1 | 1 |
Spann v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Compare Salisbury v. State, 221 Ga. 718 (5) ( 146 SE2d 776 ) (1966) and Spann v. State, 126 Ga. App. 370 (2) ( 190 SE2d 924 ) (1972) (the error was deemed harmful in the absence of any effort by the trial court to correct the injury the improper remark caused the defendant). 2004Compare Salisbury v. State, 221 Ga. 718 (5) ( 146 SE2d 776 ) (1966) and Spann v. State, 126 Ga. App. 370 (2) ( 190 SE2d 924 ) (1972) (the error was deemed harmful in the absence of any effort by the trial court to correct the injury the improper remark caused the defendant). | 1 | 1 |
Woodruff v. Stategreen2 sentences1987We have reviewed the evidence and the trial court’s ruling, and do not find the ruling to be clearly erroneous, Woodruff v. State, 233 Ga. 840, 844 (3) ( 213 SE2d 689 ) (1975); Williams v. State, 256 Ga. 609 ( 351 SE2d 454 ) (1987). 1987We have reviewed the evidence and the trial court’s ruling, and do not find the ruling to be clearly erroneous, Woodruff v. State, 233 Ga. 840, 844 (3) ( 213 SE2d 689 ) (1975); Williams v. State, 256 Ga. 609 ( 351 SE2d 454 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Mooney v. Stategreen2 sentences1981In Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 385 ( 254 SE2d 337 ) (1979), in a very lengthy analysis of pre-voir dire motions for change of venue, this court reiterated the holding set out in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794 (95 SC 2031, 44 LE2d 589) (1975) that a defendant is entitled to a panel of impartial jurors, but that this does not require that they be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. 1981In Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 385 ( 254 SE2d 337 ) (1979), in a very lengthy analysis of pre-voir dire motions for change of venue, this court reiterated the holding set out in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794 (95 SC 2031, 44 LE2d 589) (1975) that a defendant is entitled to a panel of impartial jurors, but that this does not require that they be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. | 1 | 1 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen1 sentence1974See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 444 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974) and Blair v. State, 230 Ga. 409 (3) ( 197 SE2d 362 ). | 1 | 1 |
Blair v. Stategreen2 sentences1974See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 444 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974) and Blair v. State, 230 Ga. 409 (3) ( 197 SE2d 362 ). 1974See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 444 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974) and Blair v. State, 230 Ga. 409 (3) ( 197 SE2d 362 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dees v. Logan
green
2 sentences2017Worker's Compensation law ..." 5 See Hudson v. Whited , 250 Ga. App. 451 , 452, 552 S.E.2d 447 (2001) (refusing to enforce limit of liability clause in UM policy, noting that "insurance provisions which reduce an insurer's liability by amounts payable from other insurance are contrary to the statute if they thwart the insured's ability to recover 'all sums' the insured is legally entitled to recover." (citations omitted)). 6 Georgia Farm Bureau devoted much of its brief before this Court to a lengthy analysis of the legislative history of the current language of OCGA § 33-7-11 (i) and the "non 2017Worker's Compensation law ..." 5 See Hudson v. Whited , 250 Ga. App. 451 , 452, 552 S.E.2d 447 (2001) (refusing to enforce limit of liability clause in UM policy, noting that "insurance provisions which reduce an insurer's liability by amounts payable from other insurance are contrary to the statute if they thwart the insured's ability to recover 'all sums' the insured is legally entitled to recover." (citations omitted)). 6 Georgia Farm Bureau devoted much of its brief before this Court to a lengthy analysis of the legislative history of the current language of OCGA § 33-7-11 (i) and the "non | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Hudson v. Whited
green
2 sentences2017Worker's Compensation law ..." 5 See Hudson v. Whited , 250 Ga. App. 451 , 452, 552 S.E.2d 447 (2001) (refusing to enforce limit of liability clause in UM policy, noting that "insurance provisions which reduce an insurer's liability by amounts payable from other insurance are contrary to the statute if they thwart the insured's ability to recover 'all sums' the insured is legally entitled to recover." (citations omitted)). 6 Georgia Farm Bureau devoted much of its brief before this Court to a lengthy analysis of the legislative history of the current language of OCGA § 33-7-11 (i) and the "non 2017Worker's Compensation law ..." 5 See Hudson v. Whited , 250 Ga. App. 451 , 452, 552 S.E.2d 447 (2001) (refusing to enforce limit of liability clause in UM policy, noting that "insurance provisions which reduce an insurer's liability by amounts payable from other insurance are contrary to the statute if they thwart the insured's ability to recover 'all sums' the insured is legally entitled to recover." (citations omitted)). 6 Georgia Farm Bureau devoted much of its brief before this Court to a lengthy analysis of the legislative history of the current language of OCGA § 33-7-11 (i) and the "non | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kesterson v. Jarrett
green
2 sentences2015And, the Court was correct to do so. *389 A. Right to be Present As the Court of Appeals properly noted, in Kesterson v. Jarrett, 291 Ga. 380 ( 728 SE2d 557 ) (2012), this Court steadfastly reaffirmed the right of a natural party to be present in the courtroom when the party’s case is being tried as such right, is deeply rooted in the law of this Nation and, if anything, even more embedded in the law of this State. 2015And, the Court was correct to do so. *389 A. Right to be Present As the Court of Appeals properly noted, in Kesterson v. Jarrett, 291 Ga. 380 ( 728 SE2d 557 ) (2012), this Court steadfastly reaffirmed the right of a natural party to be present in the courtroom when the party’s case is being tried as such right, is deeply rooted in the law of this Nation and, if anything, even more embedded in the law of this State. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
1 sentence2008Following a lengthy hearing, the trial court weighed the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and denied the motion to dismiss. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
North Carolina v. Alford
green
1 sentence2001After the trial court made a lengthy inquiry ensuring that Clark understood what rights she was waiving if she entered a guilty plea, the trial court once again asked Clark, ‘You still want to plead guilty, Ms. Clark?” Clark responded, ‘Yes, sir.” Further, during the guilty plea, a substantial amount of time was spent dealing with the fact that Clark was pleading guilty under North Carolina v. Alford, supra. In response to the trial court’s inquiry if she was admitting to participating in the burglary of the home of Mr. Krell on October 12, 1994, Clark denied participation. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Jackson v. Denno
green
1 sentence1997After conducting a lengthy hearing under Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964), the trial judge found that appellant’s custodial statement was freely and voluntarily made without hope or expectation of benefit. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
1 sentence1993The record shows that, after his appointment, trial counsel filed an omnibus motion for discovery, including Brady (v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 , 10 *57 LE2d 215, 83 SC 1194) (1963)) material; reviewed the State’s file; successfully moved for a continuance in order to study the transcript of the trial of the alleged accomplice; and conducted a lengthy hearing on a defense motion in limine. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences1987We have reviewed the evidence and the trial court’s ruling, and do not find the ruling to be clearly erroneous, Woodruff v. State, 233 Ga. 840, 844 (3) ( 213 SE2d 689 ) (1975); Williams v. State, 256 Ga. 609 ( 351 SE2d 454 ) (1987). 1987We have reviewed the evidence and the trial court’s ruling, and do not find the ruling to be clearly erroneous, Woodruff v. State, 233 Ga. 840, 844 (3) ( 213 SE2d 689 ) (1975); Williams v. State, 256 Ga. 609 ( 351 SE2d 454 ) (1987). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences1984Powell’s reliance upon Williams v. State, 238 Ga. 298 (1) ( 232 SE2d 535 ) (1977), is misplaced, as that case pertains to statements of juveniles. 1984Powell’s reliance upon Williams v. State, 238 Ga. 298 (1) ( 232 SE2d 535 ) (1977), is misplaced, as that case pertains to statements of juveniles. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Cox v. State
green
2 sentences1984After a lengthy hearing involving testimony from six witnesses, the trial court ruled that Powell’s statements were knowing and voluntary. “ Tactual and credibility determinations made by a trial judge after a suppression hearing are accepted by appellate courts unless clearly erroneous.’ ” Cox v. State, 248 Ga. 713 (1) ( 285 SE2d 687 ) (1982), citing Young v. State, 243 Ga. 546, 548 ( 255 SE2d 20 ) (1979). 1984After a lengthy hearing involving testimony from six witnesses, the trial court ruled that Powell’s statements were knowing and voluntary. “ Tactual and credibility determinations made by a trial judge after a suppression hearing are accepted by appellate courts unless clearly erroneous.’ ” Cox v. State, 248 Ga. 713 (1) ( 285 SE2d 687 ) (1982), citing Young v. State, 243 Ga. 546, 548 ( 255 SE2d 20 ) (1979). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences1982Johnson v. State, 233 Ga. 58 ( 209 SE2d 629 ) (1974).” Young v. State, 243 Ga. 546, 548 ( 255 SE2d 20 ) (1979). 1982Johnson v. State, 233 Ga. 58 ( 209 SE2d 629 ) (1974).” Young v. State, 243 Ga. 546, 548 ( 255 SE2d 20 ) (1979). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Murphy v. Florida
green
1 sentence1981In Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 385 ( 254 SE2d 337 ) (1979), in a very lengthy analysis of pre-voir dire motions for change of venue, this court reiterated the holding set out in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794 (95 SC 2031, 44 LE2d 589) (1975) that a defendant is entitled to a panel of impartial jurors, but that this does not require that they be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.