prejudicial error in New Jersey

1976We conclude that, under these circumstances, the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting the Government to withhold the identity of its undercover employee in the face of repeated demands by the accused for his disclosure. [ 353 U. S. at 63-65 , 77 S. Ct. at 630 , 1 L.

1976We conclude that, under these circumstances, the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting the Government to withhold the identity of its undercover employee in the face of repeated demands by the accused for his disclosure. [ 353 U. S. at 63-65 , 77 S. Ct. at 630 , 1 L.

2021Ibid.

2016Accordingly, the prejudicial error in denying plaintiff's motion in limine, and thus allowing defendants' experts to offer trial testimony which was legally inadequate and legally incorrect, "necessitate[s] a new trial on the issue of just 26 A-3802-12T4 compensation." 66 East Allendale, supra, 216 N.J. at 119 .

2015Because the majority is not mandating that the next jury be instructed not to draw an inference that these earlier events constituted unlawful drug transactions, then, frankly, we may as well affirm because the prejudicial error we have identified will likely be repeated, only in a different way, the next time.4 4 In a footnote, my colleagues mention that evidence which provides "'necessary background'" is admissible pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b), see ante at __ n.6 (slip op. at 21 n.6) (quoting Rose, supra, 206 N.J. at 181 ), but they do not hold – and, indeed, the State has not argued – that,

2015Because the majority is not mandating that the next jury be instructed not to draw an inference that these earlier events constituted unlawful drug transactions, then, frankly, we may as well affirm because the prejudicial error we have identified will likely be repeated, only in a different way, the next time.4 4 In a footnote, my colleagues mention that evidence which provides "'necessary background'" is admissible pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b), see ante at __ n.6 (slip op. at 21 n.6) (quoting Rose, supra, 206 N.J. at 181 ), but they do not hold – and, indeed, the State has not argued – that,

2009Id. at 478-80 , 901 A. 2d 941 .

2009Id. at 478-80 , 901 A. 2d 941 .

1994Super. 481 , 342 A. 2d 209 (App.Div.), aff'd, 67 N.J. 585 , 342 A. 2d 172 (1975) (when reasonable men could not differ as to the facts, the conclusion is a matter of law for the judge and may be withdrawn from the jury). *98 We turn next to Carteret's argument that the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing plaintiffs to question its former employee, Veronica Errico, about her knowledge of and compliance with HUD regulations pertaining to FHA mortgages, and by telling the jury that those FHA regulations imposed a duty on Carteret toward the Cromarties.

1994Super. 481 , 342 A. 2d 209 (App.Div.), aff'd, 67 N.J. 585 , 342 A. 2d 172 (1975) (when reasonable men could not differ as to the facts, the conclusion is a matter of law for the judge and may be withdrawn from the jury). *98 We turn next to Carteret's argument that the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing plaintiffs to question its former employee, Veronica Errico, about her knowledge of and compliance with HUD regulations pertaining to FHA mortgages, and by telling the jury that those FHA regulations imposed a duty on Carteret toward the Cromarties.

1994Super. 481 , 342 A. 2d 209 (App.Div.), aff'd, 67 N.J. 585 , 342 A. 2d 172 (1975) (when reasonable men could not differ as to the facts, the conclusion is a matter of law for the judge and may be withdrawn from the jury). *98 We turn next to Carteret's argument that the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing plaintiffs to question its former employee, Veronica Errico, about her knowledge of and compliance with HUD regulations pertaining to FHA mortgages, and by telling the jury that those FHA regulations imposed a duty on Carteret toward the Cromarties.

1990The Appellate Division, which ruled that such statements were expressions of fear exeludible under State v. Machado, 111 N.J. 480 , 545 A.2d 174 (1988), reversed defendant’s murder conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial.

1990The Appellate Division, which ruled that such statements were expressions of fear exeludible under State v. Machado, 111 N.J. 480 , 545 A.2d 174 (1988), reversed defendant’s murder conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial.

1985Initially, there was a Sands hearing, State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127 (1978), after which the judge permitted three prior convictions—one in 1972 for receiving stolen property, a second in 1975 for larceny and breaking and entering, and a third in 1976 for receiving stolen property—to be used on the issue of credibility alone.

1984State v. Jennings, 126 N.J.

1977The prejudicial error inherent in the admission of such testimony was referred to in United States v. Toner, 173 F. 2d 140 (3 Cir. 1949): From the common sense point of view a plea of guilty by an alleged fellow conspirator is highly relevant upon the question of the guilt of another alleged conspirator.

1961Henderson v. Twin Falls County, 59 Idaho 97 , 80 P. 2 d 801, 802 ( Sup. Ct. 1938).

1961Kuczko v. Prudential Oil Co., 110 N.J.L. 111 ( E. & A. 1933).

1961In State v. Dolbow, 117 N.J.L. 560, 563 ( E. & A. 1937), appeal dismissed per curiam 301 U.S. 669 , 57 S.Ct. 943 , 81 L.Ed. 1334 (1937), statements and a confession were admitted into evidence over objections.

1961In State v. Dolbow, 117 N.J.L. 560, 563 ( E. & A. 1937), appeal dismissed per curiam 301 U.S. 669 , 57 S.Ct. 943 , 81 L.Ed. 1334 (1937), statements and a confession were admitted into evidence over objections.

1958Defendant next contends that the court committed prejudicial error in charging the jury as follows: "If you find that a witness swore falsely to a material fact, you will disregard that testimony." Defendant contends that (a) unless the court had good reason to believe that a witness testified falsely and willfully for the purpose of deceiving the jury the administration of justice would not require him to charge the doctrine falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, citing Hargrave v. Stockloss, 127 N.J.L. 262, 266 ( E. & A. 1941); (b) the charge invaded the province of the jury in that it gave the j

1954Misc. 117, 119 ( Sup. Ct. 1935), affirmed 115 N.J.L. 531 ( E. & A. 1935), the court found prejudicial error in the exclusion of questions on cross-examination of a witness' accomplice, relating to his arrest on a charge arising out of the same crime, for the reason that the questions went to the witness' credibility.

1952While no question was raised about that part of the charge in which the trial judge said "that is a matter that you may or may not take into consideration," see Hempstead v. Robinson, 1 N.J. 32 (1948). *88 Next, it is argued that the trial court committed prejudicial error in charging the jury as follows: "One making a left-hand turn across the path of oncoming traffic is under a duty to exercise great care and to select an opportune time.