prejudicial error in California

2026Additionally, Public Guardian contends any error should be analyzed under 9 Because we find J.S. validly waived her right to a jury trial, we need not address her contention that “[i]f, as here, a person is not informed of her right to a jury trial and no waiver of a jury trial is taken from her, she has not been afforded the due process to which she is entitled before being deprived of her right to a jury trial.” (See C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 914 [“we do not agree that a trial court’s failure to obtain a personal waiver on the record of the proposed conservatee’s right to a jury tria

2024(People v. Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 13–14; People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244 , 1251–1252; People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 50, 54–55; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90 , 99; People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924 , 935; People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 , 599.) Lewis announced a prejudicial error standard under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , that if the trial court failed to appoint counsel or violated the petitioner’s statutory rights under section 1172.6, the petitioner must “ ‘demonstrate there is a reasonable probability th

2026Denied.” 3 DISCUSSION Section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) authorizes a person no longer in criminal custody to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence that is “legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging [their] ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.” “A successful section 1473.7 motion requires a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, of a prejudicial error that affected the defendant’s ability to meaningfully understand the actual or potential immigration

2025A finding of legal invalidity may, but need not, include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” 4 (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) “Prejudicial error may result from ‘the moving party’s own mistake of law or inability to understand the potential adverse immigration consequences of the plea.’ [Citations.] At the heart of the prejudicial error analysis ‘is the mindset of the defendant and what he or she understood—or didn’t understand—at the time the plea was taken.’” (People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698 , 713–714 (Lopez).) Our Supreme Court has held that “showing prejudi

2026Where the prejudicial error goes only to the degree of the offense for which the defendant was convicted, the appellate court may reduce the conviction to a lesser degree and affirm the judgment as modified, thereby obviating the necessity for a retrial.’ ” (People v. Edwards (1985) 39 Cal.3d 107, 118 ; see § 1260.) Our review of the record shows that Brim’s second degree murder conviction is supported by substantial evidence, and Brim does not contend otherwise.

2023Where the prejudicial error goes only to the degree of the offense for which the defendant was convicted, the appellate court may reduce the conviction to a lesser degree and affirm the judgment as modified, thereby obviating the necessity for a retrial.’ ” (People v. Edwards (1985) 39 Cal.3d 107, 118 (Edwards).) Harris does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s implicit finding that he harbored the intent to kill the victim, and concedes the People are entitled to retry him on that charge should they so choose.

2026Prejudicial error Relief pursuant to section 1473.7 requires that the defendant show “prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) Because Kashlakeva’s conviction of theft with a one-year sentence constituted an aggravated felony, she was “subject to mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States” and was also “ ‘ineligible for cancellation of removal, a form of discretionary relief allowi

2023(Stats. 2016, ch. 739, § 1.) As it existed at the time of the proceedings in the present case, section 1473.7 provided, in pertinent part: “(a) A person no longer imprisoned or restrained may prosecute a motion to vacate a conviction . . . for . . . the following reason[]: [¶] (1) The conviction . . . is legally invalid due to a prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature added the

2024Standards of Review “A request for an award of attorney fees is entrusted to the trial court’s discretion and will not be overturned in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]” (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 577 .) A party appealing from an order denying attorney fees “has an ‘uphill battle’ and must overcome both the ‘sufficiency of evidence’ rule and the ‘abuse of discretion’ rule.” (FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrish (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1270, 127

2021Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488 .) “ ‘The “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong” ’—meaning that it abused its discretion.” (PLCM, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095 ; see Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 577 [fee award “will not be overturned in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by

2024(People v. Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 13–14; People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244 , 1251–1252; People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 50, 54–55; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90 , 99; People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924 , 935; People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 , 599.) Lewis announced a prejudicial error standard under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , that if the trial court failed to appoint counsel or violated the petitioner’s statutory rights under section 1172.6, the petitioner must “ ‘demonstrate there is a reasonable probability th

2023(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 966 (Lewis).) Lewis announced a prejudicial error standard under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , that if the court failed to appoint counsel or violated the petitioner’s 4 “If such evidence may not be considered at an evidentiary hearing to determine a petitioner’s ultimate eligibility for resentencing, we fail to see how such evidence could establish, as a matter of law, a petitioner’s ineligibility for resentencing” in determining whether he made a prima facie case for relief.

2024Instead, in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , which the Supreme Court used when deciding whether a judgment should be reversed for the improper denial of an interpreter at trial (see People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1005, 1010 ); the prejudicial error standard, which the Supreme Court has used when deciding whether the denial of a pre- trial defendant’s substantial right at the preliminary examination affects the legality of his or her commitment (see, e.g., People v. Konow (2004) 32 Cal.4th 995, 1024 ; People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858, 882 ); or some other standard?” We f

2023We have found no published case addressing whether the standard of prejudicial error set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman), or People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson), should be applied here.

2021To overturn that determination on appeal, the objecting party must demonstrate ‘a clear abuse of discretion.’ ” (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 894 .) The ruling “ ‘will not be overturned in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) C.

2018This determination is necessarily ad hoc and must be resolved on *311 the particular circumstances of each case." ( Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437 , 452, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 913 .) In exercising its discretion, the trial court may accordingly "consider all of the facts and the entire procedural history of the case in setting the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award." ( Ibid. ) A fee award " 'will not be overturned in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.

2020“A request for an award of attorney fees is entrusted to the trial court’s discretion and will not be overturned in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 577 ; see Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1018 , 1025–1026.) We must review the entire record, paying particular attention to the trial court’s stated reasons in denying or awarding attorney fees and whether it applied the proper standards of la

2020“A request for an award of attorney fees is entrusted to the trial court’s discretion and will not be overturned in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 577 ; see Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1018 , 1025–1026.) We must review the entire record, paying particular attention to the trial court’s stated reasons in denying or awarding attorney fees and whether it applied the proper standards of la

2025As the California Supreme Court has explained: “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] ‘This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.] ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of t

2025As the California Supreme Court has explained: “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] ‘This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.] ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of t

2018Thus, the jury impliedly found that there was an increase in the risk of harm because of the lengthy asportation that occurred in our case. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408 , 438, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 ["[A] trial court's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not prejudicial if, as here, the jury necessarily resolved the factual question adversely to the defendant under other instructions."]; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72 , 99, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 793 P.2d 23 ["By finding the firearm-use allegation to be true, the jury impliedly found that defendant w

2018Thus, the jury impliedly found that there was an increase in the risk of harm because of the lengthy asportation that occurred in our case. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408 , 438, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 ["[A] trial court's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not prejudicial if, as here, the jury necessarily resolved the factual question adversely to the defendant under other instructions."]; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72 , 99, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 793 P.2d 23 ["By finding the firearm-use allegation to be true, the jury impliedly found that defendant w

2018Thus, the jury impliedly found that there was an increase in the risk of harm because of the lengthy asportation that occurred in our case. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408 , 438, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 ["[A] trial court's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not prejudicial if, as here, the jury necessarily resolved the factual question adversely to the defendant under other instructions."]; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72 , 99, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 793 P.2d 23 ["By finding the firearm-use allegation to be true, the jury impliedly found that defendant w

2018Thus, the jury impliedly found that there was an increase in the risk of harm because of the lengthy asportation that occurred in our case. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408 , 438, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 ["[A] trial court's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not prejudicial if, as here, the jury necessarily resolved the factual question adversely to the defendant under other instructions."]; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72 , 99, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 793 P.2d 23 ["By finding the firearm-use allegation to be true, the jury impliedly found that defendant w

2024(See, e.g., D.D. v. Pitcher (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1047 , 1057 [appellant has burden to show prejudicial error]; Scheenstra v. California Dairies, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 370, 403 [same].) As we shall explain, she has not done so.

2015(See Hemphill v. Wright Family, LLC (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 911, 914 [ 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 326 ]; Scheenstra v. California Dairies, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 370, 389-390 [ 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 21 ].) 1 An attorney fees provision in a contract is interpreted under ordinary contract principles.

2026(Silver Creek, LLC v. BlackRock Realty Advisors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1538 (Silver Creek).) In so doing, a court “ ‘should respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be guided by “equitable considerations.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1539, quoting Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 877 (Hsu).) Moreover, trial courts exercise “wide discretion” in comparing the relief obtained and determining the prevailing party, and therefore appellate courts “will not disturb the trial court’s determination absent ‘a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary f

2016Standard of Review "The trial court exercises wide discretion in determining who, if anyone, is the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees." (Cussler v. Crusader Entertainment, LLC (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 356, 366 ; see Hsu v. Abbara, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 871 .) Accordingly, we review the trial court's ruling for a manifest abuse of discretion, which occurs when the trial court acts in an " 'arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice' " (Cussler, at p. 366), commits a prejudicial error of law, or makes necessary findings not supp

2025(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564, 566 [appellant has burden of affirmatively showing a prejudicial error occurred].) Without a reporter’s transcript or proper substitute, Husband cannot meet his burden because the applicable principles of appellate procedure require us to presume the family court acted properly.

2023This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 , first italics in the original, second italics added.) Plaintiff has not affirmatively shown any error, let alone a prejudicial error. 4 DISPOSITION The judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Noriko Hino is affirmed.

2022Prejudicial error may result from “the moving party’s own mistake of law or inability to understand the potential adverse immigration consequences of the plea.” (People v. Jung (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 842 , 856, overruled on other grounds in Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 526, fn. 4 ; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 1006; Perez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 828 .) At the heart of the prejudicial error analysis “is the mindset of the defendant and what he or she understood—or didn’t understand—at the time the plea was taken.” (Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 866 ; see Martinez,

2022Prejudicial error under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) is “not limited to the Strickland[2 ] test of prejudice, whether there was reasonable probability of a different 2 Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ]. 8 outcome in the original proceedings absent the error.” (People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1009 .) Instead, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of contemporaneous evidence that he would not have entered the plea and would have risked going to trial had he known about the adverse immigration consequences.

2022Prejudicial error may result from “the moving party’s own mistake of law or inability to understand the potential adverse immigration consequences of the plea.” (People v. Jung (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 842 , 856, overruled on other grounds in Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 526, fn. 4 ; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 1006; Perez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 828 .) At the heart of the prejudicial error analysis “is the mindset of the defendant and what he or she understood—or didn’t understand—at the time the plea was taken.” (Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 866 ; see Martinez,

2018Olvera must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction is "invalid due to a prejudicial error" that damaged his "ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences" of the plea. (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) To establish "prejudicial error," he must meet the Strickland criteria. ( In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230 , 248, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 431 , 19 P.3d 1171 , abrogated in part on other grounds in Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356 , 370, 130 S.Ct. 1473 , 176 L.Ed.2d 284 ( Padilla ).) We indepe

2016(Id. at p. 965.) "Prejudicial error does not occur simply because the defendant 'was seen in shackles for only a brief period either inside or outside the courtroom by one or more jurors or veniremen.'" (People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 584 .) Our Supreme Court has long held that a defendant may be restrained in transit between the jail and the courtroom without a particularized showing of need.

2016(People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 740 ; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 584 [“Prejudicial error does not occur simply because the defendant ‘was seen in shackles for only a brief period either inside or outside the courtroom by one or more jurors . . . .’”].) Defendant’s handcuffing was brief; it occurred only when he was being escorted out of the courtroom.

2025O’Hill Capital contends the court erred both in its calculation of the hourly rate and the number of hours reasonably spent. “‘California courts have long held that trial courts have broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award.’” (Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 147, 167 .) “A fee award ‘“will not be overturned in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.’”” (Ibid.) “The abuse of discretion standard includes a substantial evi

2022Governing Bd. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1064 (Garcia).) A fee award “ ‘ “will not be overturned in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ” (Pasadena Police Officers 8 Assn. v. City of Pasadena (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 147, 167 (Pasadena Police Officers Assn.).) Nevertheless, a failure to exercise discretion is an abuse of discretion.

2026As the California Supreme Court has explained: “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] ‘This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.] ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of t

2025(See Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609 .) Similarly, we reject Tung’s contentions the court committed prejudicial error by refusing instructions he submitted concerning “the court’s trial-within-a-trial duties” and equitable factors.

2026(Silver Creek, LLC v. BlackRock Realty Advisors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1538 (Silver Creek).) In so doing, a court “ ‘should respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be guided by “equitable considerations.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1539, quoting Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 877 (Hsu).) Moreover, trial courts exercise “wide discretion” in comparing the relief obtained and determining the prevailing party, and therefore appellate courts “will not disturb the trial court’s determination absent ‘a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary f

2024Barnhart).) “[W]e will not disturb the trial court’s determination absent ‘a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Silver Creek, LLC v. BlackRock Realty Advisors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1539 .) This presents mixed questions of law and fact, which 19 “concern the application of the rule to the facts and the consequent determination whether the rule is satisfied.” (Crocker National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 888 .) 2.

1957There were therefore no grounds for a new trial." In Popejoy v. Hannon, 37 Cal.2d 159, 168 [ 231 P.2d 484 ], we said that: "Prejudicial error does not necessarily result from the giving of an instruction which, subjected to meticulous analysis, might be given a 'possible construction' making it subject to 'criticism.' " In Sparks v. Redinger, supra, 44 Cal.2d 121, 123 , Mr. Justice Spence, there, as here, speaking for the majority, observed that "... the trial court, no less than the appellate court, is expressly enjoined by article VI, section 4 1/2, of our Constitution from granting a new tr

1957There were therefore no grounds for a new trial." In Popejoy v. Hannon, 37 Cal.2d 159, 168 [ 231 P.2d 484 ], we said that: "Prejudicial error does not necessarily result from the giving of an instruction which, subjected to meticulous analysis, might be given a 'possible construction' making it subject to 'criticism.' " In Sparks v. Redinger, supra, 44 Cal.2d 121, 123 , Mr. Justice Spence, there, as here, speaking for the majority, observed that "... the trial court, no less than the appellate court, is expressly enjoined by article VI, section 4 1/2, of our Constitution from granting a new tr

2022Prejudicial error under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) is “not limited to the Strickland[2 ] test of prejudice, whether there was reasonable probability of a different 2 Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ]. 8 outcome in the original proceedings absent the error.” (People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1009 .) Instead, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of contemporaneous evidence that he would not have entered the plea and would have risked going to trial had he known about the adverse immigration consequences.

2022Prejudicial error under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) is “not limited to the Strickland[2 ] test of prejudice, whether there was reasonable probability of a different 2 Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ]. 8 outcome in the original proceedings absent the error.” (People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1009 .) Instead, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of contemporaneous evidence that he would not have entered the plea and would have risked going to trial had he known about the adverse immigration consequences.