prejudicial error in West Virginia

1969In Walker v. Robertson, 141 W.Va. 563 , 91 S.E.2d 468 , this Court found no prejudicial error in the giving of defendant's instruction No. 2 which as offered read as follows: "The Court instructs you that contributory negligence is the doing of a negligent act by a plaintiff which approximately contributes to causing the damages of which she complains.

1969In Walker v. Robertson, 141 W.Va. 563 , 91 S.E.2d 468 , this Court found no prejudicial error in the giving of defendant's instruction No. 2 which as offered read as follows: "The Court instructs you that contributory negligence is the doing of a negligent act by a plaintiff which approximately contributes to causing the damages of which she complains.

1954In State v. Kittle, 85 W.Va. 116 , pt. 1 syl., 101 S.E. 70 , a case involving a prosecutrix who was a prostitute and had received the embraces of other men promiscuously, this Court held: "In a prosecution for rape where the defendant admits having illicit connection with the prosecutrix, but swears she consented, evidence of her previous character for unchastity is material upon the principal issue." In Niblack's Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th ed., Section 676, it is stated: "Though evidence of adulterous acts with other men is not generally admissible, evidence of other acts indicating t

1954In State v. Kittle, 85 W.Va. 116 , pt. 1 syl., 101 S.E. 70 , a case involving a prosecutrix who was a prostitute and had received the embraces of other men promiscuously, this Court held: "In a prosecution for rape where the defendant admits having illicit connection with the prosecutrix, but swears she consented, evidence of her previous character for unchastity is material upon the principal issue." In Niblack's Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th ed., Section 676, it is stated: "Though evidence of adulterous acts with other men is not generally admissible, evidence of other acts indicating t

2017McKinley, 234 W.Va. at 151 , 764 S.E.2d at 311 (citing W.Va.

2017McKinley, 234 W.Va. at 151 , 764 S.E.2d at 311 (citing W.Va.

2003In Smith , this Court found prejudicial error where the jury was instructed that the right of self-defense was lost by merely using "indecent language that would disturb the tranquility enjoyed by the citizenry of the community." 170 W.Va. at 657 , 295 S.E.2d at 822 .

2003In Smith , this Court found prejudicial error where the jury was instructed that the right of self-defense was lost by merely using "indecent language that would disturb the tranquility enjoyed by the citizenry of the community." 170 W.Va. at 657 , 295 S.E.2d at 822 .

2003In Wykle , this Court determined that the defendant could not claim self-defense for stabbing the unarmed victim nine times with a knife after the victim slapped the defendant's face during an argument. 208 W.Va. at 374 , 540 S.E.2d at 591 .

2003In Wykle , this Court determined that the defendant could not claim self-defense for stabbing the unarmed victim nine times with a knife after the victim slapped the defendant's face during an argument. 208 W.Va. at 374 , 540 S.E.2d at 591 .

1976Va. 278 , 103 S.E. 106 (1920); Cobb v. Dunlevie, supra. Inasmuch as defendants’ Instruction No. 11 misstates the law and conflicts with a proper statement *344 of the law in plaintiffs’ Instruction No. 12, we are of the opinion that the trial court committed prejudicial error in the giving of defendants’, Maust and Summersville, Instruction No. 11.

1972Instead of according evanescent lip service to the general rule and then departing from it, and instead of creating an unsupported anomaly with respect to the proof of the market value of land improved with buildings, the majority should have followed the holding in The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Johnson, 134 W.Va. 619 , 60 S.E.2d 203 , which is exactly in point, is indistinguishable from and is controlling of the decision in this proceeding, and should have held the evidence of the separate value of the buildings inadmissible, and because of the prejudicial error in admitting such

1972Instead of according evanescent lip service to the general rule and then departing from it, and instead of creating an unsupported anomaly with respect to the proof of the market value of land improved with buildings, the majority should have followed the holding in The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Johnson, 134 W.Va. 619 , 60 S.E.2d 203 , which is exactly in point, is indistinguishable from and is controlling of the decision in this proceeding, and should have held the evidence of the separate value of the buildings inadmissible, and because of the prejudicial error in admitting such

1964Mason v. City of Bluefield, 105 W.

1964In defining the question presented for decision, the Court stated ( 128 W.

1964Va. 183 , 43 S. E. 2d 802 , a judgment of the trial court upon a jury verdict of guilty of assault and battery was reversed only because of the giving of a prejudicial instruction.

1958Va. 772 , 98 S. E. 2d 712 , this Court held in point 1 of the syllabus that “In an action of trespass on the case arising out of a collision between two automobiles, the admission of improbable testimony as to the speed of one of the automobiles involved is not reversible error, where there is sufficient evidence of other acts of negligence to sustain the verdict of the jury.” Examination and careful consideration of the instructions offered by the various parties do not disclose reversible error in the action of the trial court in giving certain instructions offered by the plaintiff and in gi

1947This was prejudicial error.” For other cases discussing this principle, see State v. Staley, 45 W.

1947Va. 792, 804 , 32 S. E. 198 ; State v. Edgell, 94 W.

1947Va. 792, 804 , 32 S. E. 198 ; State v. Edgell, 94 W.

1944State v. Dorton, 125 W.

1936“In the trial of a criminal case * * * the court should be extremely cautious not to intimate in any manner, by word, tone, or demeanor, his opinion upon any fact in issue.” State v. Austin, 93 W.

1921Jackson v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 107 .