prejudicial error in Virginia

2024“Such a proffer allows us to 4 The jury acquitted Meadows of malicious wounding and use of a firearm in the course of malicious wounding. -4- examine both the ‘admissibility of the proposed testimony,’ and whether, even if admissible, its exclusion ‘prejudiced’ the proffering party.” Id. (quoting Molina v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 338, 368 (2006)). “[E]ven when ‘we are not totally in the dark concerning the nature of the evidence,’ we still must ‘know enough about the specifics’ to be able to ‘say with assurance’ that the lower court committed prejudicial error.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Hylton,

2024Meadows’ mere assertion that Jones provided prior inconsistent statements is not sufficiently specific to allow us to “‘say with assurance that the lower court committed prejudicial error.’” Tynes, 49 Va. App. at 21 (quoting Hylton, 14 Va. App. at 358 ).

2024Meadows’ mere assertion that Jones provided prior inconsistent statements is not sufficiently specific to allow us to “‘say with assurance that the lower court committed prejudicial error.’” Tynes, 49 Va. App. at 21 (quoting Hylton, 14 Va. App. at 358 ).

2013“To be sure, even when ‘we are not totally in the dark concerning the nature of the evidence,’ we still must ‘know enough about the specifics’ to be able to ‘say with assurance’ that the lower court committed prejudicial error.” Tynes, 49 Va. App. at 22 , 635 S.E.2d at 690 (quoting Smith v. Hylton, 14 Va. App. 354, 358 , 416 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1992)).

2013Ray v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 647, 649-50 , 688 S.E.2d 879, 880-81 (2010).

2013Ray v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 647, 649-50 , 688 S.E.2d 879, 880-81 (2010).

2009Comm’r v. Target Corp., 274 Va. 341, 348 , 650 S.E.2d 92, 96 (2007).

2009Comm’r v. Target Corp., 274 Va. 341, 348 , 650 S.E.2d 92, 96 (2007).

2024“Such a proffer allows us to 4 The jury acquitted Meadows of malicious wounding and use of a firearm in the course of malicious wounding. -4- examine both the ‘admissibility of the proposed testimony,’ and whether, even if admissible, its exclusion ‘prejudiced’ the proffering party.” Id. (quoting Molina v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 338, 368 (2006)). “[E]ven when ‘we are not totally in the dark concerning the nature of the evidence,’ we still must ‘know enough about the specifics’ to be able to ‘say with assurance’ that the lower court committed prejudicial error.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Hylton,

2024“Such a proffer allows us to 4 The jury acquitted Meadows of malicious wounding and use of a firearm in the course of malicious wounding. -4- examine both the ‘admissibility of the proposed testimony,’ and whether, even if admissible, its exclusion ‘prejudiced’ the proffering party.” Id. (quoting Molina v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 338, 368 (2006)). “[E]ven when ‘we are not totally in the dark concerning the nature of the evidence,’ we still must ‘know enough about the specifics’ to be able to ‘say with assurance’ that the lower court committed prejudicial error.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Hylton,

2024Meadows relies on Edwards v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 568, 570-71 (1995), where we held that the trial court erred by requiring the defendant to provide a transcript documenting the witness’ prior inconsistent statement before allowing cross-examination about that statement.

2012It is undeniable that “even when ‘we are not totally in the dark concerning the nature of the evidence,’ we still must ‘know enough about the specifics’ to be able to ‘say with assurance’ that the lower court committed prejudicial error.” Tynes, 49 Va. App. at 21-22 , 635 S.E.2d at 690 (quoting Smith v. Hylton, 14 Va. App. 354, 358 , 416 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1992)); see also Mostyn v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 920, 924 , 420 S.E.2d 519, 521 (1992) (concluding that without a proffer as to a potential witness’ testimony concerning the victim’s reputation for truth and veracity, we were unable to con

2012It is undeniable that “even when ‘we are not totally in the dark concerning the nature of the evidence,’ we still must ‘know enough about the specifics’ to be able to ‘say with assurance’ that the lower court committed prejudicial error.” Tynes, 49 Va. App. at 21-22 , 635 S.E.2d at 690 (quoting Smith v. Hylton, 14 Va. App. 354, 358 , 416 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1992)); see also Mostyn v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 920, 924 , 420 S.E.2d 519, 521 (1992) (concluding that without a proffer as to a potential witness’ testimony concerning the victim’s reputation for truth and veracity, we were unable to con

2010“To be sure, even when ‘we are not totally in the dark concerning the nature of the evidence,’ we still must ‘know enough about the specifics’ to be able to ‘say with assurance’ that the lower court committed prejudicial error.” Id. at 22, 635 S.E.2d at 690 (citation omitted); see Owens v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 624, 630 , 136 S.E. 765, 767 (1927). 1 On appeal, Ray acknowledges these principles but argues the trial court committed structural error—thereby sidelining the traditional harmless error analysis and rendering inapplicable the proffer requirement.

2010“To be sure, even when ‘we are not totally in the dark concerning the nature of the evidence,’ we still must ‘know enough about the specifics’ to be able to ‘say with assurance’ that the lower court committed prejudicial error.” Id. at 22, 635 S.E.2d at 690 (citation omitted); see Owens v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 624, 630 , 136 S.E. 765, 767 (1927). 1 On appeal, Ray acknowledges these principles but argues the trial court committed structural error—thereby sidelining the traditional harmless error analysis and rendering inapplicable the proffer requirement.

2009“In order to avail oneself of the exception, a defendant must affirmatively show a miscarriage of justice has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have occurred.” Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 221 , 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997) (citing Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 436 , 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987)).

2009“In order to avail oneself of the exception, a defendant must affirmatively show a miscarriage of justice has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have occurred.” Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 221 , 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997) (citing Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 436 , 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987)).

2009Rule 5A:18 states that “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, except for 2 Both courts also terminated mother’s parental rights. -3- good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.” In Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308 , 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998), this Court held that it “will not consider an argument on appeal which was not presented to the trial court.” Father argues that the ends of justice exception should apply b

2009Rule 5A:18 states that “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, except for 2 Both courts also terminated mother’s parental rights. -3- good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.” In Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308 , 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998), this Court held that it “will not consider an argument on appeal which was not presented to the trial court.” Father argues that the ends of justice exception should apply b

2009“In order to avail oneself of the exception, a defendant must affirmatively show a miscarriage of justice has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have occurred.” Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 221 , 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997) (citing Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 436 , 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987)).

2009“In order to avail oneself of the exception, a defendant must affirmatively show a miscarriage of justice has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have occurred.” Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 221 , 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997) (citing Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 436 , 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987)).

2006In this case, Tynes argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by disallowing two questions he wanted to ask Scott during cross-examination. 2 Because we cannot “speculate what the answer might have been to these questions,” O’Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 697 , 364 S.E.2d 491, 505 (1988), we look solely to the proffers made by Tynes in the trial court. (a) The Disallowed “Back and Forth” Question The first disallowed question asked Scott whether he and Matthews talked “back and forth” about their plans. *23 Counsel never proffered what Scott’s likely response to this questio

2006In this case, Tynes argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by disallowing two questions he wanted to ask Scott during cross-examination. 2 Because we cannot “speculate what the answer might have been to these questions,” O’Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 697 , 364 S.E.2d 491, 505 (1988), we look solely to the proffers made by Tynes in the trial court. (a) The Disallowed “Back and Forth” Question The first disallowed question asked Scott whether he and Matthews talked “back and forth” about their plans. *23 Counsel never proffered what Scott’s likely response to this questio

1997To allow the trial judge to commit error by refusing to sever the cases for trial and, thereby, force the defendant to consider whether to forgo a critical defense at trial in order to protect his appeal of the error, “ ‘savors of judicial whim.’ ” Brooks, 406 U.S. at 608 , 92 S.Ct. at 1893 (citation omitted).

1997To allow the trial judge to commit error by refusing to sever the cases for trial and, thereby, force the defendant to consider whether to forgo a critical defense at trial in order to protect his appeal of the error, “ ‘savors of judicial whim.’ ” Brooks, 406 U.S. at 608 , 92 S.Ct. at 1893 (citation omitted).

1986Because Henshaw was denied the right to a fair and impartial trial, see Spear v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 599, 601 , 194 S.E.2d 751, 753 (1973), we hold that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.

1986Because Henshaw was denied the right to a fair and impartial trial, see Spear v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 599, 601 , 194 S.E.2d 751, 753 (1973), we hold that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.