range inquiry in Oklahoma

1969The state also recognizes the general rule, set forth in City of Tulsa v. Horowitz (1928), 131 Okl. 63 , 267 P. 852 , and Owens v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority (1954), Okl., 283 P.2d 827 , that, in condemnation proceedings, the extent of the range of inquiry to be permitted regarding the value of the property taken or damaged is largely in the discretion of the trial court and the action of the trial court in admitting or excluding evidence concerning value will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of such discretion, and also recognizes the general rule, set forth in City of Enid v.

1969The state also recognizes the general rule, set forth in City of Tulsa v. Horowitz (1928), 131 Okl. 63 , 267 P. 852 , and Owens v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority (1954), Okl., 283 P.2d 827 , that, in condemnation proceedings, the extent of the range of inquiry to be permitted regarding the value of the property taken or damaged is largely in the discretion of the trial court and the action of the trial court in admitting or excluding evidence concerning value will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of such discretion, and also recognizes the general rule, set forth in City of Enid v.

1938In the case of Wimberly v. Winstock, 46 Okla. 645 , 149 P. 238 , this court held: “In such cases, it is often impossible to prove actual- fraud and collusion between the parties to the conveyance, when attacked by third persons, by direct and positive evidence; and the attacking party is often compelled, through the inherent necessities of the situation, to rely upon presumptive evidence growing out of indicia and badges of fraud, developed by circumstances attending the transaction; and, therefore, the range of inquiry in such cases must necessarily be very extensive and bring within its scop

1938In the case of Wimberly v. Winstock, 46 Okla. 645 , 149 P. 238 , this court held: “In such cases, it is often impossible to prove actual- fraud and collusion between the parties to the conveyance, when attacked by third persons, by direct and positive evidence; and the attacking party is often compelled, through the inherent necessities of the situation, to rely upon presumptive evidence growing out of indicia and badges of fraud, developed by circumstances attending the transaction; and, therefore, the range of inquiry in such cases must necessarily be very extensive and bring within its scop

2020Dep't of Transp. v. Little , 2004 OK 74, ¶ 11 , 100 P.3d 707 (footnote omitted).

2020Dep't of Transp. v. Little , 2004 OK 74, ¶ 11 , 100 P.3d 707 (footnote omitted).

1969The state also recognizes the general rule, set forth in City of Tulsa v. Horowitz (1928), 131 Okl. 63 , 267 P. 852 , and Owens v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority (1954), Okl., 283 P.2d 827 , that, in condemnation proceedings, the extent of the range of inquiry to be permitted regarding the value of the property taken or damaged is largely in the discretion of the trial court and the action of the trial court in admitting or excluding evidence concerning value will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of such discretion, and also recognizes the general rule, set forth in City of Enid v.

1967Owens v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, Okl., 283 P.2d 827 , appeal dismissed 350 U.S. 893 , 76 S.Ct. 155 , 100 L.Ed. 785 ; City of Tulsa v. Horwitz, 131 Okl. 63 , 267 P. 852 .

1998In describing the range of the privilege in judicial proceedings, the court observes that "[u]nder this statute and its predecessor ... attorneys, parties and witnesses are immune from defamation suits where those suits are based upon communications made during or preliminary to judicial proceedings as long as the communication is in some way relevant to the proceeding." Id. at 1099 (citing Kirschstein v. Haynes, 1990 OK 8 , 788 P.2d 941, 948 , Hammett v. Hunter, 189 Okl. 455 , 117 P.2d 511 (1941)).(b) Wright, supra note 25 at 990 (the republication of statements made at a district attorney's

1998In describing the range of the privilege in judicial proceedings, the court observes that "[ujnder this statute and its predecessor ... attorneys, parties and witnesses are immune from defamation suits where those suits are based upon communications made during or preliminary to judicial proceedings as long as the communication is in some way relevant to the proceeding." Id. at 1099 (citing Kirschstein v. Haynes, 1990 OK 8 , 788 P.2d 941, 948 , Hammett v. Hunter, 189 Okl. 455 , 117 P.2d 511 (1941)).(b) Wright, supra note 25 at 990 (the republication of statements made at a district attorney's

1998In describing the range of the privilege in judicial proceedings, the court observes that "[u]nder this statute and its predecessor ... attorneys, parties and witnesses are immune from defamation suits where those suits are based upon communications made during or preliminary to judicial proceedings as long as the communication is in some way relevant to the proceeding." Id. at 1099 (citing Kirschstein v. Haynes, 1990 OK 8 , 788 P.2d 941, 948 , Hammett v. Hunter, 189 Okl. 455 , 117 P.2d 511 (1941)).(b) Wright, supra note 25 at 990 (the republication of statements made at a district attorney's

1998For cases dealing with the statutory privilege of fair comment and criticism, see Price v. Walters, 1996 OK 63 , 918 P.2d 1370 ; Hennessee v. Mathis, 1987 OK CIV 35, 737 P.2d 958 . .

1998In describing the range of the privilege in judicial proceedings, the court observes that "[u]nder this statute and its predecessor ... attorneys, parties and witnesses are immune from defamation suits where those suits are based upon communications made during or preliminary to judicial proceedings as long as the communication is in some way relevant to the proceeding." Id. at 1099 (citing Kirschstein v. Haynes, 1990 OK 8 , 788 P.2d 941, 948 , Hammett v. Hunter, 189 Okl. 455 , 117 P.2d 511 (1941)).(b) Wright, supra note 25 at 990 (the republication of statements made at a district attorney's

1998In describing the range of the privilege in judicial proceedings, the court observes that "[u]nder this statute and its predecessor ... attorneys, parties and witnesses are immune from defamation suits where those suits are based upon communications made during or preliminary to judicial proceedings as long as the communication is in some way relevant to the proceeding." Id. at 1099 (citing Kirschstein v. Haynes, 1990 OK 8 , 788 P.2d 941, 948 , Hammett v. Hunter, 189 Okl. 455 , 117 P.2d 511 (1941)).(b) Wright, supra note 25 at 990 (the republication of statements made at a district attorney's

1998In describing the range of the privilege in judicial proceedings, the court observes that "[u]nder this statute and its predecessor ... attorneys, parties and witnesses are immune from defamation suits where those suits are based upon communications made during or preliminary to judicial proceedings as long as the communication is in some way relevant to the proceeding." Id. at 1099 (citing Kirschstein v. Haynes, 1990 OK 8 , 788 P.2d 941, 948 , Hammett v. Hunter, 189 Okl. 455 , 117 P.2d 511 (1941)).(b) Wright, supra note 25 at 990 (the republication of statements made at a district attorney's

1998In describing the range of the privilege in judicial proceedings, the court observes that "[u]nder this statute and its predecessor ... attorneys, parties and witnesses are immune from defamation suits where those suits are based upon communications made during or preliminary to judicial proceedings as long as the communication is in some way relevant to the proceeding." Id. at 1099 (citing Kirschstein v. Haynes, 1990 OK 8 , 788 P.2d 941, 948 , Hammett v. Hunter, 189 Okl. 455 , 117 P.2d 511 (1941)).(b) Wright, supra note 25 at 990 (the republication of statements made at a district attorney's

1998In describing the range of the privilege in judicial proceedings, the court observes that "[u]nder this statute and its predecessor ... attorneys, parties and witnesses are immune from defamation suits where those suits are based upon communications made during or preliminary to judicial proceedings as long as the communication is in some way relevant to the proceeding." Id. at 1099 (citing Kirschstein v. Haynes, 1990 OK 8 , 788 P.2d 941, 948 , Hammett v. Hunter, 189 Okl. 455 , 117 P.2d 511 (1941)).(b) Wright, supra note 25 at 990 (the republication of statements made at a district attorney's

1998In describing the range of the privilege in judicial proceedings, the court observes that "[u]nder this statute and its predecessor ... attorneys, parties and witnesses are immune from defamation suits where those suits are based upon communications made during or preliminary to judicial proceedings as long as the communication is in some way relevant to the proceeding." Id. at 1099 (citing Kirschstein v. Haynes, 1990 OK 8 , 788 P.2d 941, 948 , Hammett v. Hunter, 189 Okl. 455 , 117 P.2d 511 (1941)).(b) Wright, supra note 25 at 990 (the republication of statements made at a district attorney's

1973Department of Highways v. Robb (1969), Okl., 454 P.2d 313 , wherein it was stated, with authorities cited: “The state also recognizes the general rule, * * * (citations) * * * that, in condemnation proceedings the extent of the range of inquiry to be permitted regarding the value of the property taken or damaged is largely in the discretion of the trial court and the action of the trial court in admitting or excluding evidence concerning value will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion, and also recognizes the general rule, * * * (citation) * * *, that any competent evi

1972In Lloyd v. State, supra, we said that the range of inquiry regarding the fair market value of condemned property rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, whose action in admitting or excluding evidence as to value will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion.

1969The state also recognizes the general rule, set forth in City of Tulsa v. Horowitz (1928), 131 Okl. 63 , 267 P. 852 , and Owens v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority (1954), Okl., 283 P.2d 827 , that, in condemnation proceedings, the extent of the range of inquiry to be permitted regarding the value of the property taken or damaged is largely in the discretion of the trial court and the action of the trial court in admitting or excluding evidence concerning value will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of such discretion, and also recognizes the general rule, set forth in City of Enid v.

1969The state also recognizes the general rule, set forth in City of Tulsa v. Horowitz (1928), 131 Okl. 63 , 267 P. 852 , and Owens v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority (1954), Okl., 283 P.2d 827 , that, in condemnation proceedings, the extent of the range of inquiry to be permitted regarding the value of the property taken or damaged is largely in the discretion of the trial court and the action of the trial court in admitting or excluding evidence concerning value will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of such discretion, and also recognizes the general rule, set forth in City of Enid v.

1967Owens v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, Okl., 283 P.2d 827 , appeal dismissed 350 U.S. 893 , 76 S.Ct. 155 , 100 L.Ed. 785 ; City of Tulsa v. Horwitz, 131 Okl. 63 , 267 P. 852 .

1967Owens v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, Okl., 283 P.2d 827 , appeal dismissed 350 U.S. 893 , 76 S.Ct. 155 , 100 L.Ed. 785 ; City of Tulsa v. Horwitz, 131 Okl. 63 , 267 P. 852 .

1967Owens v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, Okl., 283 P.2d 827 , appeal dismissed 350 U.S. 893 , 76 S.Ct. 155 , 100 L.Ed. 785 ; City of Tulsa v. Horwitz, 131 Okl. 63 , 267 P. 852 .

1966Westerheide v. Shilling, 190 Okl. 305 , 123 P.2d 674 , wherein it was said: "A party may not refuse to testify by deposition * * * (3) because the party taking the deposition desires to use it in preparing his pleadings or in preparing for trial, * * *." We also notice that the scope of permissible inquiry by interrogatories is related to the range of inquiry permitted by deposition.

1966Westerheide v. Shilling, 190 Okl. 305 , 123 P.2d 674 , wherein it was said: "A party may not refuse to testify by deposition * * * (3) because the party taking the deposition desires to use it in preparing his pleadings or in preparing for trial, * * *." We also notice that the scope of permissible inquiry by interrogatories is related to the range of inquiry permitted by deposition.

1960Blackwood v. Blackwood, 204 Okl. 317 , 229 P.2d 602 ; Morgan v. Morgan, supra; Eby v. Eby, supra. Although the trial judge (who did not preside over prior hearings in this action) was at first inclined to treat the last order as interloctuory in nature and indicated that a showing of a change in circumstances might be dispensed with, neither party was in any manner limited as to the range of inquiry.

1960Blackwood v. Blackwood, 204 Okl. 317 , 229 P.2d 602 ; Morgan v. Morgan, supra; Eby v. Eby, supra. Although the trial judge (who did not preside over prior hearings in this action) was at first inclined to treat the last order as interloctuory in nature and indicated that a showing of a change in circumstances might be dispensed with, neither party was in any manner limited as to the range of inquiry.

1960Blackwood v. Blackwood, 204 Okl. 317 , 229 P.2d 602 ; Morgan v. Morgan, supra; Eby v. Eby, supra. Although the trial judge (who did not preside over prior hearings in this action) was at first inclined to treat the last order as interloctuory in nature and indicated that a showing of a change in circumstances might be dispensed with, neither party was in any manner limited as to the range of inquiry.

1960Blackwood v. Blackwood, 204 Okl. 317 , 229 P.2d 602 ; Morgan v. Morgan, supra; Eby v. Eby, supra. Although the trial judge (who did not preside over prior hearings in this action) was at first inclined to treat the last order as interloctuory in nature and indicated that a showing of a change in circumstances might be dispensed with, neither party was in any manner limited as to the range of inquiry.

1945While the range of inquiry as to such value rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the action of the trial court in admitting or excluding evidence as to value will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of such discretion (State v. Winters, 195 Okla. 243 , 156 P. 2d 798 ), the general rule is that “any competent evidence of matters, not merely speculative, which would be considered by a prospective vendor or purchaser, or which tend to enhance or depreciate the value of the property, is admissible,” 31 C.

1945While the range of inquiry as to such value rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the action of the trial court in admitting or excluding evidence as to value will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of such discretion (State v. Winters, 195 Okla. 243 , 156 P. 2d 798 ), the general rule is that “any competent evidence of matters, not merely speculative, which would be considered by a prospective vendor or purchaser, or which tend to enhance or depreciate the value of the property, is admissible,” 31 C.

1938Beam v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank, 121 Okla. 164 , 249 P. 325 .

1938Beam v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank, 121 Okla. 164 , 249 P. 325 .

1936Commercial Drilling Co. v. Kennedy. 172 Okla. 475 . 45 P. (2d) 534 ; Devonian Oil Co. v. Smith, 124 Okla. 71 , 254 P. 14 .

1936Commercial Drilling Co. v. Kennedy. 172 Okla. 475 . 45 P. (2d) 534 ; Devonian Oil Co. v. Smith, 124 Okla. 71 , 254 P. 14 .

1936Commercial Drilling Co. v. Kennedy. 172 Okla. 475 . 45 P. (2d) 534 ; Devonian Oil Co. v. Smith, 124 Okla. 71 , 254 P. 14 .

1936Commercial Drilling Co. v. Kennedy. 172 Okla. 475 . 45 P. (2d) 534 ; Devonian Oil Co. v. Smith, 124 Okla. 71 , 254 P. 14 .

1926In the case of Crisp v. Gillespey, supra, in the 2nd paragraph of the syllabus, it is said: “In such cases, it is often impossible to prove actual fraud and collusion between the parties, when attacked ¡by third persons, by direct and positive evidence; and the attacking party is often- compelled, through the inherent necessities of the situation, to rely upon presumptive evidence, growing out of indicia and badges of fraud, developed by the circumstances attending the transaction ; and therefore the range of inquiry in such cases must necessarily be very extensive, and bring within its scope

1926In the case of Crisp v. Gillespey, supra, in the 2nd paragraph of the syllabus, it is said: “In such cases, it is often impossible to prove actual fraud and collusion between the parties, when attacked ¡by third persons, by direct and positive evidence; and the attacking party is often- compelled, through the inherent necessities of the situation, to rely upon presumptive evidence, growing out of indicia and badges of fraud, developed by the circumstances attending the transaction ; and therefore the range of inquiry in such cases must necessarily be very extensive, and bring within its scope

1926A single one may stamp the transaction as fraudulent, and, when several are found in combination, strong and clear evidence on the part of the upholder of the transaction will be required to repel the conclusion of fraud.” This court, in the case of Armstrong v. Wasson, 93 Okla. 262 , 220 Pac. 643 , held: “Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise' and are resorted to by one individual to get an advantage over another.

1926A single one may stamp the transaction as fraudulent, and, when several are found in combination, strong and clear evidence on the part of the upholder of the transaction will be required to repel the conclusion of fraud.” This court, in the case of Armstrong v. Wasson, 93 Okla. 262 , 220 Pac. 643 , held: “Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise' and are resorted to by one individual to get an advantage over another.

1915While no one fact is proven which, taken by itself, would necessarily show fraud, yet we cannot divest ourselves of the impression that a fraudulent result was intended, when we look at the case as a whole.” Note the expression in King v. Moon, supra: “Fraud may be presumed in equity, but must be proved at law,” The court and counsel were trying this case as a law case, and the error as to the nature of the case is very probably the reason for the error as to the probative effect of the evidence, and therefore, of the instruction to find for defendants.

1915The range of inquiry in the investigation must necessarily be *650 very extensive, and bring within its scope all the circumstances bearing upon the question/ “In the case of McDaniels v. Perkins, 64 Iowa, 174 , 19 N. W. 902 , the court says: ‘The members of this court have all read the evidence separately, and have reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs allegations are sustained.

1915The range of inquiry in the investigation must necessarily be *650 very extensive, and bring within its scope all the circumstances bearing upon the question/ “In the case of McDaniels v. Perkins, 64 Iowa, 174 , 19 N. W. 902 , the court says: ‘The members of this court have all read the evidence separately, and have reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs allegations are sustained.