14 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1927–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Morrison v. Californiagreen2 sentences2012Finally, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that States may place the burden of proving an affirmative defense on a defendant, see Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235-236 (1987), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977); particularly where there exists a “disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge, as, for instance, where a general prohibition is applicable to every one who is unable to bring himself within the range of an exception.” Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 91 (1934). 1980“Such a shift may be proper if there is a ‘manifest disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge as, for instance, where a general prohibition is applicable to everyone who is unable to bring himself within the range of an exception’.” Commonwealth v. Jones, supra at 408 , quoting from Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 91 (1934). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Biancogreen2 sentences2002Cf. Commonwealth v. Bianco, 390 Mass. 254, 259 (1983) (a judge may consider a broad range of factors in making sentence determinations); Commonwealth v. Knight, 392 Mass. 192, 196-197 (1984). 1988Commonwealth v. Bianco, 390 Mass. 254, 259 (1983). | 2 | 2 |
Ardizoni v. Raymondgreen1 sentence2026See Ardizoni v. Raymond, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 734, 738 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sawyergreen1 sentence2024"In exercising our powers under . . . § 33E, we do not act as a second jury." Commonwealth v. Sawyer, 389 Mass. 686, 704 (1983). 30 In her request for relief under § 33E, the defendant raises many issues that were presented at trial and argued to the jury. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Berrygreen1 sentence2023"Our power under [§ 33E] directs us to consider a defendant's entire case, taking into account a broad range of factors, when determining whether a conviction of murder in the first degree was a miscarriage of justice that warrants a reduction in the degree of guilt." Concepcion, 487 Mass. at 94, quoting Commonwealth v. Berry, 466 Mass. 763, 770 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Collerangreen1 sentence2014See Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 430-431 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robert W. Unsergreen1 sentence2012See Patterson v. New York, supra; United States v. Deleveaux, supra; United States v. Unser, 165 F.3d 755, 765 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 809 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Ohiogreen1 sentence2012Finally, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that States may place the burden of proving an affirmative defense on a defendant, see Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235-236 (1987), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977); particularly where there exists a “disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge, as, for instance, where a general prohibition is applicable to every one who is unable to bring himself within the range of an exception.” Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 91 (1934). | 1 | 1 |
Linthicum v. Archambaultgreen1 sentence2011Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 388-89 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Knightgreen1 sentence2002Cf. Commonwealth v. Bianco, 390 Mass. 254, 259 (1983) (a judge may consider a broad range of factors in making sentence determinations); Commonwealth v. Knight, 392 Mass. 192, 196-197 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Carney v. City of Springfieldgreen2 sentences1996This is consistent with the statement in Carney v. Springfield, 403 Mass. 604, 610 (1988): “In Massachusetts, art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights requires transactional immunity to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination, even in the context of public employment.” See id. at 611 , stating that Baker v. Lawrence, 379 Mass. 322 (1979), Silverio v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 355 Mass. 623 , cert, denied, 396 U.S. 878 (1969), and Patch v. Mayor of Revere, 397 Mass. 454 (1986), are all inapposite as no claim was made in those cases under art. 12. 1996This is consistent with the statement in Carney v. Springfield, 403 Mass. 604, 610 (1988): “In Massachusetts, art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights requires transactional immunity to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination, even in the context of public employment.” See id. at 611 , stating that Baker v. Lawrence, 379 Mass. 322 (1979), Silverio v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 355 Mass. 623 , cert, denied, 396 U.S. 878 (1969), and Patch v. Mayor of Revere, 397 Mass. 454 (1986), are all inapposite as no claim was made in those cases under art. 12. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sparegreen1 sentence1985During cross-examina-tian the prosecutor asked questions clearly indicating that the defendant had been in jail on occasions prior to his arrest for these crimes. 7 Cross-examination is not limited to a narrow range of inquiry, Hathaway v. Crocker, 7 Met. 262 , 266 (1843), but the introduction of prejudicial material is not permitted, see Commonwealth v. Spare, 353 Mass. 263, 267 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Corcorangreen1 sentence1966See Commonwealth v. Corcoran, 252 Mass. 465, 486 . 8. | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Lyonsgreen1 sentence1927See Wright v. Lyons, 224 Mass. 167, 169 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Deleveaux
green
1 sentence2012See Patterson v. New York, supra; United States v. Deleveaux, supra; United States v. Unser, 165 F.3d 755, 765 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 809 (1999). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Albertson's, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers International Union
green
1 sentence2012See Patterson v. New York, supra; United States v. Deleveaux, supra; United States v. Unser, 165 F.3d 755, 765 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 809 (1999). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Patterson v. New York
green
1 sentence2012Finally, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that States may place the burden of proving an affirmative defense on a defendant, see Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235-236 (1987), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977); particularly where there exists a “disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge, as, for instance, where a general prohibition is applicable to every one who is unable to bring himself within the range of an exception.” Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 91 (1934). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Baker v. City of Lawrence
green
1 sentence1996This is consistent with the statement in Carney v. Springfield, 403 Mass. 604, 610 (1988): “In Massachusetts, art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights requires transactional immunity to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination, even in the context of public employment.” See id. at 611 , stating that Baker v. Lawrence, 379 Mass. 322 (1979), Silverio v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 355 Mass. 623 , cert, denied, 396 U.S. 878 (1969), and Patch v. Mayor of Revere, 397 Mass. 454 (1986), are all inapposite as no claim was made in those cases under art. 12. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Baglioni v. Chief of Police
green
1 sentence1996“Unless the district attorney had authority to grant the full range of immunity to which the plaintiff officers were entitled, the government may not oblige them to make statements at the risk that, if they do not do so, they might lose their jobs.” Id. at 232 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Silverio v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston
green
1 sentence1996This is consistent with the statement in Carney v. Springfield, 403 Mass. 604, 610 (1988): “In Massachusetts, art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights requires transactional immunity to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination, even in the context of public employment.” See id. at 611 , stating that Baker v. Lawrence, 379 Mass. 322 (1979), Silverio v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 355 Mass. 623 , cert, denied, 396 U.S. 878 (1969), and Patch v. Mayor of Revere, 397 Mass. 454 (1986), are all inapposite as no claim was made in those cases under art. 12. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Silverio v. Municipal Court of Boston
green
1 sentence1996This is consistent with the statement in Carney v. Springfield, 403 Mass. 604, 610 (1988): “In Massachusetts, art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights requires transactional immunity to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination, even in the context of public employment.” See id. at 611 , stating that Baker v. Lawrence, 379 Mass. 322 (1979), Silverio v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 355 Mass. 623 , cert, denied, 396 U.S. 878 (1969), and Patch v. Mayor of Revere, 397 Mass. 454 (1986), are all inapposite as no claim was made in those cases under art. 12. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Patch v. Mayor of Revere
green
1 sentence1996This is consistent with the statement in Carney v. Springfield, 403 Mass. 604, 610 (1988): “In Massachusetts, art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights requires transactional immunity to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination, even in the context of public employment.” See id. at 611 , stating that Baker v. Lawrence, 379 Mass. 322 (1979), Silverio v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 355 Mass. 623 , cert, denied, 396 U.S. 878 (1969), and Patch v. Mayor of Revere, 397 Mass. 454 (1986), are all inapposite as no claim was made in those cases under art. 12. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Commonwealth v. Jones
green
1 sentence1980“Such a shift may be proper if there is a ‘manifest disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge as, for instance, where a general prohibition is applicable to everyone who is unable to bring himself within the range of an exception’.” Commonwealth v. Jones, supra at 408 , quoting from Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 91 (1934). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Finance Commission of Boston v. McGrath
green
1 sentence1965“Section 18 amply empowers the commission (as a continuing independent body charged with watching city operations constantly and reporting what it observes to ‘the mayor, the city council, the governor or the general court,’ as may be appropriate) to investigate at least those matters which, in its opinion entertained reasonably, have substantial relevance to the proper management of the city’s affairs and the appropriate conduct of city employees in relation to matters in which the city has an interest.” Finance Commn. of Boston v. McGrath, 343 Mass. 754, 760 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.