range factors in California

2022(Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1140, 1148 ; see Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1126 [“The chief practical distinction between interference with contract and interference with prospective economic advantage is that a broader range of privilege to interfere is recognized when the relationship or economic advantage interfered with is only prospective”].) 8 Similarly, there are five essential elements to prove for the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage: (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third

2022Independently Wrongful or Unlawful Act (Eighth, Ninth and 12th Causes of Action) A. Intentional and Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action) “The tort of interference with prospective economic advantage protects the same interest in stable economic relationships as does the tort of interference with contract, though interference with prospective advantage does not require proof of a legally binding contract. [Citation.] The chief practical distinction between interference with contract and interference with prospective economic advantage is

2023(Id. at pp. 477-480 [“‘“rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption”’”]; Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1379 .) The Court discussed a range of factors relevant to a sentencing court’s determination whether a defendant is a “‘rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’” ( Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 479-480; Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190, 208 [LWOP unconstitutional for juvenile homicide offender “whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth”].) In Gutierrez, our Supreme Court interpreted Miller to require sentencing

2021The Eighth Amendment Claim Saterfield contends that in light of section 3051, judicial “prohibition of mandatory LWOP” to all defendants over 18 and younger than 26 “would be consistent with” the analysis in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 , wherein the United States Supreme Court, building upon earlier cases, outlined a range of factors a sentencing court should consider before ordering a juvenile to serve an LWOP term, consistent with the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.

2022Given the serious potential consequences on both sides of the scale, the range of factors the court may consider in assessing and weighing the risks should be broad.” (Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390 .) The necessary individualized assessment requires a determination, based on the totality of the circumstances, that a defendant presently intends to engage in nonconforming courtroom behavior, i.e., conduct that “ ‘would disrupt the judicial process if 17 PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. unrestrained.’ ” (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 651 (Cox), disapproved on

2014(See People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 651 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 692 , 809 P.2d 351 ] [a manifest need for restraints may be based on “ ‘[e]vidence of any nonconforming conduct . . . which . . . would disrupt the judicial process if unrestrained’ ”]; see also State v. Stewart (Minn. 1979) 276 N.W.2d 51, 62 ; State v. Tolley (1976) 290 N.C. 349 [ 226 S.E.2d 353, 368 ].) As we have also explained, “the stringent showing required for physical restraints like shackles is the exception, not the rule.

2016The tort of interference with prospective economic advantage imposes liability for “improper methods of disrupting or diverting the business relationship of another which fall outside the boundaries of fair competition.” (Settimo Associates v. Environ Systems, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 842, 845 .) The tort “protects the same interest in stable economic relationships as does the tort of interference with contract, though interference with prospective advantage does not require proof of a legally binding contract. [Citation.] The chief practical distinction between interference with contract an

2015Bottini cites no authority that Taylor can be held liable for breach of contract based on the alleged misconduct of third parties, nor does the record contain any suggestion that Bottini claims Taylor failed to satisfy any of her contractual obligations to Bottini. 24 designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant." (Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 71, fn. 6 .) The principal distinctions between this cause of action and a cause of action for intentional interference with

2014(Id. at p. __ [ 132 S.Ct. at p. 2468 ]; see ante, at p. 26.) We understand Miller to require a sentencing court to admit and consider relevant evidence of the following: First, a court must consider a juvenile offender’s “chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [ 132 S.Ct. at p. 2468 ]; see, e.g., ibid. [“To be sure, Jackson learned on the way to the video store that his friend Shields was carrying a gun, but his age could well have 41 affected his calculation of the ri

2014(Id. at p. __ [ 132 S.Ct. at p. 2468 ]; see ante, at p. 26.) We understand Miller to require a sentencing court to admit and consider relevant evidence of the following: First, a court must consider a juvenile offender’s “chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. __ [ 132 S.Ct. at p. 2468 ]; see, e.g., ibid. [“To be sure, Jackson learned on the way to the video store that his friend Shields was carrying a gun, but his age could well have 41 affected his calculation of the ri

2014(Sierra Club, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1510 [applying CEQA case law to interpretation of “infeasible” in a specific plan].) “ ‘[F]easibility’ under CEQA encompasses ‘desirability’ to the extent that desirability is based on a reasonable balancing of the relevant economic, environmental, social, and technological factors.’ ” (City of Del Mar v. City of San Diego (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 401, 417 .) To determine whether an alternative is infeasible, “an agency must necessarily weigh and balance its pros and cons taking account of a broad range of factors. [Citations.]” (2 Kostka & Zischke, supr

2014(Sierra Club, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1510 [applying CEQA case law to interpretation of “infeasible” in a specific plan].) “ ‘[F]easibility’ under CEQA encompasses ‘desirability’ to the extent that desirability is based on a reasonable balancing of the relevant economic, environmental, social, and technological factors.’ ” (City of Del Mar v. City of San Diego (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 401, 417 .) To determine whether an alternative is infeasible, “an agency must necessarily weigh and balance its pros and cons taking account of a broad range of factors. [Citations.]” (2 Kostka & Zischke, supr

1996(People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 932.) “Such an instruction ‘ensures that the jury is aware of the complete range of factors that the state considers relevant to the penalty determination.

1996The statute impliedly requires instruction on any factor applicable on the record of the case, and we have noted the better practice is for a court to instruct on all the statutory penalty factors. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 932.) "Such an instruction `ensures that the jury is aware of the complete range of factors that the state considers relevant to the penalty determination.

1995(Buckaloo v. Johnson (1975) 14 Cal.3d 815, 826-827 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 537 P.2d 865 ].) The primary difference between interference with prospective economic advantage and interference with contract is that a broader range of privilege to interfere is recognized when the relationship or economic advantage interfered with is only prospective.

1995(Buckaloo v. Johnson (1975) 14 Cal.3d 815, 826-827 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 537 P.2d 865 ].) The primary difference between interference with prospective economic advantage and interference with contract is that a broader range of privilege to interfere is recognized when the relationship or economic advantage interfered with is only prospective.

1994Of course, this burden may not be unduly harsh or unfair. [Citations.]’ (In re Andre R., supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at p. 342 ; see also Morrison v. California (1934) 291 U.S. 82, 91 [ 78 L.Ed. 664, 670-671 , 54 S.Ct. 281 ] [the burden may be shifted to the accused in the event of ‘a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge, as, for instance, where a general prohibition is applicable to every one who is unable to bring himself within the range of an exception’].)”

1994Of course, this burden may not be unduly harsh or unfair. [Citations.]’ (In re Andre R., supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at p. 342 ; see also Morrison v. California (1934) 291 U.S. 82, 91 [ 78 L.Ed. 664, 670-671 , 54 S.Ct. 281 ] [the burden may be shifted to the accused in the event of ‘a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge, as, for instance, where a general prohibition is applicable to every one who is unable to bring himself within the range of an exception’].)”

1990We have addressed the identical claim in recent cases in which we have explained that the “presentation of the entire range of factors is necessary in order to allow the jury to decide for itself whether asserted factors are present on the record before it, and to weigh those factors accordingly.” ( Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 915, 965 ; see Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 776-777 .) Nonetheless, defendant contends the prosecutor emphasized, to defendant’s prejudice, the assertedly “inapplicable” statutory factors because he used a chálkboard to outline each factor and essentially “checked off,” und

1990We have addressed the identical claim in recent cases in which we have explained that the "presentation of the entire range of factors is necessary in order to allow the jury to decide for itself whether asserted factors are present on the record before it, and to weigh those factors accordingly." ( Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 915, 965 ; see Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 776-777 .) (44) Nonetheless, defendant contends the prosecutor emphasized, to defendant's prejudice, the assertedly "inapplicable" statutory factors because he used a chalkboard to outline each factor and essentially "checked off,

1983“Nevertheless, over the years, this court and the Courts of Appeal have established decisionally certain implied exceptions where it would be impossi *103 ble, impracticable or futile due to causes beyond a party’s control to bring an action to trial during the five-year period. [Citations.] ‘Whether it is impossible, impracticable or futile to proceed to trial must be determined in the light of the circumstances in each case. [Citations.]’ (Woley v. Turkus [(1958)] 51 Cal.2d 402, 407 [ 334 P.2d 12 ]; [additional citations omitted].) “A broad range of factors has been recognized as giving rise

1983“Nevertheless, over the years, this court and the Courts of Appeal have established decisionally certain implied exceptions where it would be impossi *103 ble, impracticable or futile due to causes beyond a party’s control to bring an action to trial during the five-year period. [Citations.] ‘Whether it is impossible, impracticable or futile to proceed to trial must be determined in the light of the circumstances in each case. [Citations.]’ (Woley v. Turkus [(1958)] 51 Cal.2d 402, 407 [ 334 P.2d 12 ]; [additional citations omitted].) “A broad range of factors has been recognized as giving rise

1972A broad range of factors has been recognized as giving rise to impossibility, impracticability or futility in proceeding to trial within the five-year period. 5 On the one hand there is the policy that the law favors disposing of litigation on the merits rather than on procedural grounds (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 468 P.2d 193 ]); on the other, there is the burden imposed on the plaintiff of exercising diligence in proceeding to trial.

1972A broad range of factors has been recognized as giving rise to impossibility, impracticability or futility in proceeding to trial within the five-year period. 5 On the one hand there is the policy that the law favors disposing of litigation on the merits rather than on procedural grounds (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 468 P.2d 193 ]); on the other, there is the burden imposed on the plaintiff of exercising diligence in proceeding to trial.

2025(See, e.g., People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 347 [“The fact that these incidents occurred outside of the courtroom does not diminish their relevance or their support for the trial court's order.”]; Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390 [“Given the serious potential consequences on both sides of the scale, the range of factors the court may consider in assessing and weighing the risks [of using restraints] should be broad.”].) We therefore conclude that the trial court properly considered the evidence of appellant’s behavior and mental state and did not abuse its discretion in ordering res

2025(See, e.g., People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 347 [“The fact that these incidents occurred outside of the courtroom does not diminish their relevance or their support for the trial court's order.”]; Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390 [“Given the serious potential consequences on both sides of the scale, the range of factors the court may consider in assessing and weighing the risks [of using restraints] should be broad.”].) We therefore conclude that the trial court properly considered the evidence of appellant’s behavior and mental state and did not abuse its discretion in ordering res

2024(Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 292, fn. 11 .) A showing that the defendant plans to attempt to escape or intends to nonviolently disrupt the proceeding may be sufficient.

2022Given the serious potential consequences on both sides of the scale, the range of factors the court may consider in assessing and weighing the risks should be broad.” (Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390 .) The necessary individualized assessment requires a determination, based on the totality of the circumstances, that a defendant presently intends to engage in nonconforming courtroom behavior, i.e., conduct that “ ‘would disrupt the judicial process if 17 PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. unrestrained.’ ” (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 651 (Cox), disapproved on

2021Counsel for Mata described her as “younger” and confirmed at the conclusion of voir dire his view that she “fit [into] the category of younger Hispanics.”7 Citing Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 1172 , Mata argues the trial court should have questioned the prosecutor about his concern with Prospective Juror No. 15’s marital status because “the objection [was] not obvious.” In Gutierrez the Supreme Court cautioned that, “when it is not self-evident why an advocate would harbor a concern, the question of whether a neutral explanation is genuine and made in good faith becomes more pressing.”

2021Counsel for Mata described her as “younger” and confirmed at the conclusion of voir dire his view that she “fit [into] the category of younger Hispanics.”7 Citing Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 1172 , Mata argues the trial court should have questioned the prosecutor about his concern with Prospective Juror No. 15’s marital status because “the objection [was] not obvious.” In Gutierrez the Supreme Court cautioned that, “when it is not self-evident why an advocate would harbor a concern, the question of whether a neutral explanation is genuine and made in good faith becomes more pressing.”

2025(See, e.g., People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 347 [“The fact that these incidents occurred outside of the courtroom does not diminish their relevance or their support for the trial court's order.”]; Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390 [“Given the serious potential consequences on both sides of the scale, the range of factors the court may consider in assessing and weighing the risks [of using restraints] should be broad.”].) We therefore conclude that the trial court properly considered the evidence of appellant’s behavior and mental state and did not abuse its discretion in ordering res

2024Given the serious potential consequences on both sides of the scale, the range of factors the court may consider in assessing and weighing the risks should be broad.’ [Citation.] The necessary individualized assessment requires a determination, based on the totality of the circumstances, that a defendant presently intends to engage in nonconforming courtroom behavior, i.e., conduct that ‘ “would disrupt the judicial process if unrestrained.” ’ ” (People v. Bracamontes, supra, 12 Cal. 5th at p. 992 .) “ ‘ “In deciding whether restraints are justified, the trial court may ‘take into account the

2023(Id. at pp. 477-480 [“‘“rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption”’”]; Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1379 .) The Court discussed a range of factors relevant to a sentencing court’s determination whether a defendant is a “‘rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’” ( Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 479-480; Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190, 208 [LWOP unconstitutional for juvenile homicide offender “whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth”].) In Gutierrez, our Supreme Court interpreted Miller to require sentencing

2022Given the serious potential consequences on both sides of the scale, the range of factors the court may consider in assessing and weighing the risks should be broad.” (Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390 .) The necessary individualized assessment requires a determination, based on the totality of the circumstances, that a defendant presently intends to engage in nonconforming courtroom behavior, i.e., conduct that “ ‘would disrupt the judicial process if 17 PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. unrestrained.’ ” (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 651 (Cox), disapproved on

2022Given the serious potential consequences on both sides of the scale, the range of factors the court may consider in assessing and weighing the risks should be broad.” (Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390 .) The necessary individualized assessment requires a determination, based on the totality of the circumstances, that a defendant presently intends to engage in nonconforming courtroom behavior, i.e., conduct that “ ‘would disrupt the judicial process if 17 PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. unrestrained.’ ” (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 651 (Cox), disapproved on