range factors in Michigan

2022The trial court may consider a range of factors, including “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42 ; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citations omitted).

2022The trial court may consider a range of factors, including “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41 - 42 (citations omitted).

2022Other relevant factors are “the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714 ; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).

2022Other relevant factors are “the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714 ; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).

2023And, before “dismissing a no-fault claim under MCL 500.3153, the trial court should “carefully consider all available options on the record and conclude that the sanction of dismissal is just and proper.” Id. at ___; slip op at 11.

2023To determine if the sanction is just, the trial court must consider “a range of factors.” Id.

2020An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision falls outside the range of principle outcomes. [People v Anderson, 501 Mich 175, 181-182 ; 912 NW2d 503 (2018), quoting People v Seewald, 499 Mich 111, 116 ; 879 NW2d 237 (2016) (quotation marks and citations removed).] In Michigan, the role of a magistrate during a preliminary examination is to determine whether probable cause exists to conclude that a defendant has committed a crime, and therefore will be bound over for trial.

2020An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision falls outside the range of principle outcomes. [People v Anderson, 501 Mich 175, 181-182 ; 912 NW2d 503 (2018), quoting People v Seewald, 499 Mich 111, 116 ; 879 NW2d 237 (2016) (quotation marks and citations removed).] In Michigan, the role of a magistrate during a preliminary examination is to determine whether probable cause exists to conclude that a defendant has committed a crime, and therefore will be bound over for trial.

2020An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision falls outside the range of principle outcomes. [People v Anderson, 501 Mich 175, 181-182 ; 912 NW2d 503 (2018), quoting People v Seewald, 499 Mich 111, 116 ; 879 NW2d 237 (2016) (quotation marks and citations removed).] In Michigan, the role of a magistrate during a preliminary examination is to determine whether probable cause exists to conclude that a defendant has committed a crime, and therefore will be bound over for trial.

2020An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision falls outside the range of principle outcomes. [People v Anderson, 501 Mich 175, 181-182 ; 912 NW2d 503 (2018), quoting People v Seewald, 499 Mich 111, 116 ; 879 NW2d 237 (2016) (quotation marks and citations removed).] In Michigan, the role of a magistrate during a preliminary examination is to determine whether probable cause exists to conclude that a defendant has committed a crime, and therefore will be bound over for trial.

2019Id. at 617 .

2018Id. at 625 .

2015That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between “the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” [Id. at_; 132 S Ct at 2469 , quoting Roper, 543 US at 573 (emphasis added).] Thus, after Miller, mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional in all cases; however, in homicide cases, an individualized life-without-parole sentence may be imposed when the crime reflects “irre

2015That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ [Id. at 424, quoting Roper, 543 US at 573 (emphasis added).] Thus, after Miller, mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional in all cases; however, in homicide cases, an individualized life without parole sentence may be imposed where the crime reflects “irreparable corrupt

1997Pulver [supra] Bower, supra. Because the magistrate’s analysis under Pulver was incomplete, we exercise our limited fact finding powers recognized in Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257 (1992) and conclude plaintiff’s refusal was unreasonable under the range of factors recited in Pulver and when contrasted to the statutory purposes cited in Bower .

1997Pulver, [supra]; Bower, supra. Because the magistrate’s analysis under Pulver was incomplete, we exercise our limited fact finding power recognized in Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257 [ 484 NW2d 227 ] (1992) and conclude plaintiff’s refusal was unreasonable under the broad range of factors recited in Pulver and when contrasted to the statutory purposes cited in Bower .

1997Pulver [supra] Bower, supra. Because the magistrate’s analysis under Pulver was incomplete, we exercise our limited fact finding powers recognized in Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257 (1992) and conclude plaintiff’s refusal was unreasonable under the range of factors recited in Pulver and when contrasted to the statutory purposes cited in Bower .

1997Pulver, [supra]; Bower, supra. Because the magistrate’s analysis under Pulver was incomplete, we exercise our limited fact finding power recognized in Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257 [ 484 NW2d 227 ] (1992) and conclude plaintiff’s refusal was unreasonable under the broad range of factors recited in Pulver and when contrasted to the statutory purposes cited in Bower .

1997Pulver, [supra]; Bower, supra. Because the magistrate’s analysis under Pulver was incomplete, we exercise our limited fact finding power recognized in Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257 [ 484 NW2d 227 ] (1992) and conclude plaintiff’s refusal was unreasonable under the broad range of factors recited in Pulver and when contrasted to the statutory purposes cited in Bower .

1995In re Westchester, n 20 supra, pp 530-531; Cruzan v Harmon, 760 SW2d 408, 425 (Mo, 1988), aff'd Cruzan v Director, n 20 supra. See also DeGrella v Elston , stating: In all but two states, Missouri and New York, even when the court has been unable to precisely determine the express wishes of the patient, it has allowed the patient's family, or the patient's guardian, to exercise substituted judgment as to what the patient would wish. [ 858 SW2d 698 , 706 (Ky, 1993).] [30] See n 5. [31] The majority describes the "substituted judgment" standard as "entail[ing] some level of objective analysis" b

1916Reasonable latitude is therefore necessarily allowed in the range of inquiry as to damages in actions ex delicto, for which no fixed rule of exclusion or inclusion can be formulated; but it is recognized as a general proposition that where the damages, or any part of them, cannot be ascertained with certainty, it is permissible to lay before the jury “all the facts and circumstances of the case, having any tendency to show damages, or their probable amount; so as to enable them to make the most intelligible and probable estimate which the nature of the case will permit.” Allison v. Chandler, 1