myriad factors in Pennsylvania

2015In New York, in In the Matter of Mariah Ruby Eberhardt, 83 A.D.3d 116, 123-24 , 920 N.Y.S.2d 216, 221 (2011), the court stated that anting the myriad of factors a court may consider, several warranted special mention: the extent to which a child identifies with and uses ’ a particular surname; the child’s expressed preference, if of sufficient age and maturity to articulate a basis for preferring a particular surname; whether the child's surname differs from the surname of the custodial parent; the effect of the proposed name change on the child's relationship with either parent; whether the-c

2015In New York, in In the Matter of Mariah Ruby Eberhardt, 83 A.D.3d 116, 123-24 , 920 N.Y.S.2d 216, 221 (2011), the court stated that anting the myriad of factors a court may consider, several warranted special mention: the extent to which a child identifies with and uses ’ a particular surname; the child’s expressed preference, if of sufficient age and maturity to articulate a basis for preferring a particular surname; whether the child's surname differs from the surname of the custodial parent; the effect of the proposed name change on the child's relationship with either parent; whether the-c

2015In Ohio, the June 29, 1982 enactment of R.C. 3111.13(C) (139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2170, 2187, 2188), authorizes a name change that is in "the best interest of the child.” The Supreme Court of Ohio, in Bobo v. Jewell, 38 Ohio St.3d 330, 335 , 528 N.E.2d 180, 185 (1988), set forth the following factors to guide the best interest analysis: The length of time that the child has used a surname, the effect of the change on the father-child relationship and on the mother-child relationship, the identification of the child as part of a family unit, the embarrassment, discomfort or inconvenience that may

2015In Ohio, the June 29, 1982 enactment of R.C. 3111.13(C) (139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2170, 2187, 2188), authorizes a name change that is in "the best interest of the child.” The Supreme Court of Ohio, in Bobo v. Jewell, 38 Ohio St.3d 330, 335 , 528 N.E.2d 180, 185 (1988), set forth the following factors to guide the best interest analysis: The length of time that the child has used a surname, the effect of the change on the father-child relationship and on the mother-child relationship, the identification of the child as part of a family unit, the embarrassment, discomfort or inconvenience that may

2010We begin our analysis by noting that, "[generally, the question of whether the PCRA court erred in its determination that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present sufficient mitigating evidence depends upon a myriad of factors, including the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, the mitigation evidence that was actually presented, and the mitigation evidence that could have been presented." Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 A.2d at 1149 (citations omitted).

2010We begin our analysis by noting that, "[generally, the question of whether the PCRA court erred in its determination that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present sufficient mitigating evidence depends upon a myriad of factors, including the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, the mitigation evidence that was actually presented, and the mitigation evidence that could have been presented." Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 A.2d at 1149 (citations omitted).

2015While this court has not considered when a request to proceed pro se is deemed “unequivocal” a review of federal case law reveals that the courts generally consider a myriad of factors in concluding whether a request was unequivocal including: whether the request was for hybrid representation, see, e.g., [United States v. Callwood, 66 F.3d 1110, 1113 (10th Cir. 1995)], or merely for the appointment of standby or advisory counsel, [United States v. Baker, 84 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir.1996)]; the trial court’s response to a request, [United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614 - 19 - J-A10035-15 (9

2005Callwood, 66 F.3d at 1113 , or merely for the appointment of standby or advisory counsel, Baker, 84 F.3d at 1267 ; the trial court's response to a request, Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614 ; whether a defendant has consistently vacillated in his request, Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607 (5th Cir.1982); and whether a request is the result of an emotional outburst, Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882 (9th Cir.1990); see also Reese v. Nix, 942 F.2d 1276 (8th Cir.1991) (finding that request that was merely an impulsive response to the trial court's denial of a request for new counsel was not unequivocal).

2014Commonwealth v. Ligons, 601 Pa. 103 , 971 A.2d 1125, 1149 (2009); Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45 , 888 A.2d 564, 580 (2005).

2014Commonwealth v. Ligons, 601 Pa. 103 , 971 A.2d 1125, 1149 (2009); Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45 , 888 A.2d 564, 580 (2005).

2015While this court has not considered when a request to proceed pro se is deemed “unequivocal” a review of federal case law reveals that the courts generally consider a myriad of factors in concluding whether a request was unequivocal including: whether the request was for hybrid representation, see, e.g., [United States v. Callwood, 66 F.3d 1110, 1113 (10th Cir. 1995)], or merely for the appointment of standby or advisory counsel, [United States v. Baker, 84 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir.1996)]; the trial court’s response to a request, [United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614 - 19 - J-A10035-15 (9

2005Callwood, 66 F.3d at 1113 , or merely for the appointment of standby or advisory counsel, Baker, 84 F.3d at 1267 ; the trial court's response to a request, Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614 ; whether a defendant has consistently vacillated in his request, Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607 (5th Cir.1982); and whether a request is the result of an emotional outburst, Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882 (9th Cir.1990); see also Reese v. Nix, 942 F.2d 1276 (8th Cir.1991) (finding that request that was merely an impulsive response to the trial court's denial of a request for new counsel was not unequivocal).

2015While this court has not considered when a request to proceed pro se is deemed “unequivocal” a review of federal case law reveals that the courts generally consider a myriad of factors in concluding whether a request was unequivocal including: whether the request was for hybrid representation, see, e.g., [United States v. Callwood, 66 F.3d 1110, 1113 (10th Cir. 1995)], or merely for the appointment of standby or advisory counsel, [United States v. Baker, 84 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir.1996)]; the trial court’s response to a request, [United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614 - 19 - J-A10035-15 (9

2005Callwood, 66 F.3d at 1113 , or merely for the appointment of standby or advisory counsel, Baker, 84 F.3d at 1267 ; the trial court's response to a request, Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614 ; whether a defendant has consistently vacillated in his request, Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607 (5th Cir.1982); and whether a request is the result of an emotional outburst, Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882 (9th Cir.1990); see also Reese v. Nix, 942 F.2d 1276 (8th Cir.1991) (finding that request that was merely an impulsive response to the trial court's denial of a request for new counsel was not unequivocal).

2005See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425 , 856 A.2d 767 (2004) (indicating that counsel's ineffectiveness for failure to investigate depends upon a myriad of factors including the mitigation evidence that was actually presented, the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, and the mitigation evidence that could have been presented).

2005See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425 , 856 A.2d 767 (2004) (indicating that counsel’s ineffectiveness for failure to investigate depends upon a myriad of factors including the mitigation evidence that was actually presented, the reasonableness of counsel’s investigation, and the mitigation evidence that could have been presented).

2005See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425 , 856 A.2d 767 (2004) (indicating that counsel's ineffectiveness for failure to investigate depends upon a myriad of factors including the mitigation evidence that was actually presented, the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, and the mitigation evidence that could have been presented).

2005See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425 , 856 A.2d 767 (2004) (indicating that counsel’s ineffectiveness for failure to investigate depends upon a myriad of factors including the mitigation evidence that was actually presented, the reasonableness of counsel’s investigation, and the mitigation evidence that could have been presented).

1959As Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) STERN stated in King Estate, 361 Pa. 629, 635, 636 , 66 A. 2d 68 : "The *69 necessity of preserving intact value does not mean a preservation in the sense of the estate's actually obtaining the amount of that intact value in cash, but only a preservation of its book value; intact value and market value are, for this purpose, wholly unrelated; many stocks sell on the market for less than one-tenth of their book values, while other stocks, especially if speculative in nature, sell for many times their book values; the value of a stock in the market depends up

1959As Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) STERN stated in King Estate, 361 Pa. 629, 635, 636 , 66 A. 2d 68 : "The *69 necessity of preserving intact value does not mean a preservation in the sense of the estate's actually obtaining the amount of that intact value in cash, but only a preservation of its book value; intact value and market value are, for this purpose, wholly unrelated; many stocks sell on the market for less than one-tenth of their book values, while other stocks, especially if speculative in nature, sell for many times their book values; the value of a stock in the market depends up

2002For example, in Birdsboro Municipal Auth. v. Reading Co. and Wilmington & Northern R.R., 758 A.2d 222, 227 (Pa.Super.2000), the court held that a mere failure to maintain and repair existing tracks did not amount to an intent to abandon.

2002For example, in Birdsboro Municipal Auth. v. Reading Co. and Wilmington & Northern R.R., 758 A.2d 222, 227 (Pa.Super.2000), the court held that a mere failure to maintain and repair existing tracks did not amount to an intent to abandon.

2001In the end the court will decide whether there is a duty on the basis of the mores of the community, "always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding of mankind." Althaus, 562 Pa. at 552-53 , 756 A.2d at 1169 (quoting Sinn, 486 Pa. at 164 , 404 A.2d at 681 (citations omitted)). [12] A proper resolution of the duty question may depend upon a myriad of factors, including the nature and incentive structure of the managed care entity; the applicable legislative and regulatory requirements for services

2001In the end the court will decide whether there is a duty on the basis of the mores of the community, "always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding of mankind." Althaus, 562 Pa. at 552-53 , 756 A.2d at 1169 (quoting Sinn, 486 Pa. at 164 , 404 A.2d at 681 (citations omitted)). [12] A proper resolution of the duty question may depend upon a myriad of factors, including the nature and incentive structure of the managed care entity; the applicable legislative and regulatory requirements for services

1987See also, Commonwealth v. Bracey, 501 Pa. 356, 364 , 461 A.2d 775 (1983) citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 , 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) and Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976).

1987See also, Commonwealth v. Bracey, 501 Pa. 356, 364 , 461 A.2d 775 (1983) citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 , 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) and Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976).

1987See also, Commonwealth v. Bracey, 501 Pa. 356, 364 , 461 A.2d 775 (1983) citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 , 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) and Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976).

1987See also, Commonwealth v. Bracey, 501 Pa. 356, 364 , 461 A.2d 775 (1983) citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 , 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) and Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976).

1987See also, Commonwealth v. Bracey, 501 Pa. 356, 364 , 461 A.2d 775 (1983) citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 , 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) and Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976).

1987See also, Commonwealth v. Bracey, 501 Pa. 356, 364 , 461 A.2d 775 (1983) citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 , 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) and Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976).