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7 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2004 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Zant v. Stephensgreen2 sentences2003“Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.” Indeed, the sentencer may be given “unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty.” Zant, supra, at 875 [, 103 S.Ct. 2733 ]; see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948-951 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983) (plura 1995“Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.” California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 , 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3457 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1185 (1983). “ ‘[T]he Constitution does not require the jury to ignore other possible ... factors in the process of selecting ... those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death.’ ” Id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2743 , 77 L.E | 1 | 2 |
California v. Ramosgreen2 sentences2003Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, as did respondent's jury in determining the truth of the alleged special circumstance, the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment." California v. Ramos, [ 463 U.S. 992 ,] 1008, [ 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3457 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1185 ] (1983). 2003Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, as did respondent's jury in determining the truth of the alleged special circumstance, the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment." California v. Ramos, [ 463 U.S. 992 ,] 1008, [ 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3457 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1185 ] (1983). | 1 | 2 |
Barclay v. Floridagreen2 sentences2003"Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment." Indeed, the sentencer may be given "unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty." Zant, supra, at 875 [, 103 *1143 S.Ct. 2733]; see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948-951 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983) ( 2003"Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment." Indeed, the sentencer may be given "unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty." Zant, supra, at 875 [, 103 *1143 S.Ct. 2733]; see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948-951 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983) ( | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Montgomery County Department of Social Services v. Sanders
green
2 sentences2004The criteria for judicial determination includes, but is not limited to, 1) fitness of the parents, 2) character and reputation of the parties, 3) desire of the natural parents and agreements between the parties, 4) potentiality of maintaining natural family relations, 5) preference of the child, 6) material opportunities affecting the future life of the child, 7) age, health and sex of the child, 8) residences of parents and opportunity for visitation, 9) length of separation from the natural parents, and 10) prior voluntary abandonment or surrender. 38 Md.App. at 420 , 381 A.2d 1154 (emphasi 2004The criteria for judicial determination includes, but is not limited to, 1) fitness of the parents, 2) character and reputation of the parties, 3) desire of the natural parents and agreements between the parties, 4) potentiality of maintaining natural family relations, 5) preference of the child, 6) material opportunities affecting the future life of the child, 7) age, health and sex of the child, 8) residences of parents and opportunity for visitation, 9) length of separation from the natural parents, and 10) prior voluntary abandonment or surrender. 38 Md.App. at 420 , 381 A.2d 1154 (emphasi | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Wesley Chapel Bluemount Ass'n v. Baltimore County
green
2 sentences1997In Baltimore County v. Wesley Chapel Bluemount Ass’n, 110 Md.App. 585, 599-600 , 678 A.2d 100 (1996), rev’d on other grounds, 347 Md. 125, 149 , 699 A.2d 434 (1997), we summarized the rules of statutory interpretation: The fundamental goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature. 1997In Baltimore County v. Wesley Chapel Bluemount Ass’n, 110 Md.App. 585, 599-600 , 678 A.2d 100 (1996), rev’d on other grounds, 347 Md. 125, 149 , 699 A.2d 434 (1997), we summarized the rules of statutory interpretation: The fundamental goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Baltimore County v. Wesley Chapel Bluemount Ass'n
green
2 sentences1997In Baltimore County v. Wesley Chapel Bluemount Ass’n, 110 Md.App. 585, 599-600 , 678 A.2d 100 (1996), rev’d on other grounds, 347 Md. 125, 149 , 699 A.2d 434 (1997), we summarized the rules of statutory interpretation: The fundamental goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature. 1997In Baltimore County v. Wesley Chapel Bluemount Ass’n, 110 Md.App. 585, 599-600 , 678 A.2d 100 (1996), rev’d on other grounds, 347 Md. 125, 149 , 699 A.2d 434 (1997), we summarized the rules of statutory interpretation: The fundamental goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
In Re Penny N.
green
2 sentences1982In yet another case, In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269 , 414 A.2d 541 (1980), the court held that the trial judge had jurisdiction to consider a petition for sterilization, but it refused to order the procedure because sufficient safeguards had not been utilized. 1982In yet another case, In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269 , 414 A.2d 541 (1980), the court held that the trial judge had jurisdiction to consider a petition for sterilization, but it refused to order the procedure because sufficient safeguards had not been utilized. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Culombe v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences1973If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his [action] offends due process.’ Culombe v. Connecticut [ 367 U. S. 568 , 81 S. Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961).] ” After cataloguing the myriad factors, bearing on both the conduct of the police and on the character of the accused, Schneckloth concluded: “The significant fact about all of these decisions is that none of them turned on the presence or absence of a single controlling criterion; each reflected a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances. . . . 1973If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his [action] offends due process.’ Culombe v. Connecticut [ 367 U. S. 568 , 81 S. Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961).] ” After cataloguing the myriad factors, bearing on both the conduct of the police and on the character of the accused, Schneckloth concluded: “The significant fact about all of these decisions is that none of them turned on the presence or absence of a single controlling criterion; each reflected a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances. . . . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Quinn v. Quinn
green
1 sentence1971As Chief Judge Murphy said for this Court in Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.