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8 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Nicholsgreen2 sentences2011We have construed the statute to permit the sentencing jury “to consider ‘a myriad of factors’ relevant to ... establishing and assigning weight to aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” 10 Terry, 46 S.W.3d at 156-57; Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 890 (“[0]nce a capital sentencing jury finds that a defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, the jury is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment to the offense and the individual defendant.”); State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 731 (Tenn.1994) 2000Cf. State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 731 (Tenn.1994) ("Once a capital sentencing jury finds that a defendant falls within the legislatively-defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, the jury ís free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the punishment appropriate to the offense and the individual defendant.”) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1005 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (198 | 3 | 4 |
Barclay v. Floridagreen2 sentences2011The Court concluded that " ‘[ojnce the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.’ ” Id. at 950 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983)); cf. id. at 967, 103 S.Ct. 3418 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Tjhe Constitution does not prohibit consideration at the sentencing phase of information not directly related to either statutory aggravatin 2011The Court concluded that " ‘[ojnce the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.’ ” Id. at 950 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983)); cf. id. at 967, 103 S.Ct. 3418 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Tjhe Constitution does not prohibit consideration at the sentencing phase of information not directly related to either statutory aggravatin | 1 | 4 |
California v. Ramosgreen2 sentences2011We have construed the statute to permit the sentencing jury “to consider ‘a myriad of factors’ relevant to ... establishing and assigning weight to aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” 10 Terry, 46 S.W.3d at 156-57; Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 890 (“[0]nce a capital sentencing jury finds that a defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, the jury is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment to the offense and the individual defendant.”); State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 731 (Tenn.1994) 2011The Court concluded that " ‘[ojnce the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.’ ” Id. at 950 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983)); cf. id. at 967, 103 S.Ct. 3418 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Tjhe Constitution does not prohibit consideration at the sentencing phase of information not directly related to either statutory aggravatin | 1 | 3 |
Terry v. Stategreen1 sentence2011Furthermore, the Teny decision established that the "myriad of factors” that may be considered by the jury are guided by statute, which allows evidence of "the nature and circumstances of the crime; the defendant's character, background history, and physical evidence; any evidence tending to establish or rebut the aggravating circumstances; and any evidence tending to establish or rebut any mitigating factors.” 46 S.W.3d at 156-57 (internal quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zant v. Stephens
green
2 sentences2000Cf. State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 731 (Tenn.1994) ("Once a capital sentencing jury finds that a defendant falls within the legislatively-defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, the jury ís free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the punishment appropriate to the offense and the individual defendant.”) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1005 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (198 2000Cf. State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 731 (Tenn.1994) ("Once a capital sentencing jury finds that a defendant falls within the legislatively-defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, the jury ís free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the punishment appropriate to the offense and the individual defendant.”) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1005 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (198 | 2 | 1994–2000 |
State v. Gomez
green
1 sentence2006The Appellant now claims that “even after a modification, [his] sentence remained enhanced above the statutory minimum based upon a myriad of factors neither admitted at trial nor proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” He contends that in view of Blakely, his sentence should be “modified to reflect the 32 ½ year statutory minimum.” We note initially that the Blakely claim has been rendered moot by the Tennessee Supreme Court’s April 15, 2005 decision in State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Nesbit
green
2 sentences2001Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 890 . 2001Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 890 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.