myriad factors (Tennessee) · Go Syfert
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myriad factors in Tennessee

8 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2011 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Nicholsgreen
tenn · 1994 · cited in 4 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1996–2011
2 sentences

2011We have construed the statute to permit the sentencing jury “to consider ‘a myriad of factors’ relevant to ... establishing and assigning weight to aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” 10 Terry, 46 S.W.3d at 156-57; Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 890 (“[0]nce a capital sentencing jury finds that a defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, the jury is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment to the offense and the individual defendant.”); State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 731 (Tenn.1994)

2000Cf. State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 731 (Tenn.1994) ("Once a capital sentencing jury finds that a defendant falls within the legislatively-defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, the jury ís free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the punishment appropriate to the offense and the individual defendant.”) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1005 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (198

34
Barclay v. Floridagreen
scotus · 1983 · cited in 4 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1994–2011
2 sentences

2011The Court concluded that " ‘[ojnce the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.’ ” Id. at 950 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983)); cf. id. at 967, 103 S.Ct. 3418 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Tjhe Constitution does not prohibit consideration at the sentencing phase of information not directly related to either statutory aggravatin

2011The Court concluded that " ‘[ojnce the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.’ ” Id. at 950 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983)); cf. id. at 967, 103 S.Ct. 3418 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Tjhe Constitution does not prohibit consideration at the sentencing phase of information not directly related to either statutory aggravatin

14
California v. Ramosgreen
scotus · 1983 · cited in 3 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1994–2011
2 sentences

2011We have construed the statute to permit the sentencing jury “to consider ‘a myriad of factors’ relevant to ... establishing and assigning weight to aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” 10 Terry, 46 S.W.3d at 156-57; Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 890 (“[0]nce a capital sentencing jury finds that a defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, the jury is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment to the offense and the individual defendant.”); State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 731 (Tenn.1994)

2011The Court concluded that " ‘[ojnce the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.’ ” Id. at 950 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983)); cf. id. at 967, 103 S.Ct. 3418 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Tjhe Constitution does not prohibit consideration at the sentencing phase of information not directly related to either statutory aggravatin

13
Terry v. Stategreen
tenn · 2001 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011Furthermore, the Teny decision established that the "myriad of factors” that may be considered by the jury are guided by statute, which allows evidence of "the nature and circumstances of the crime; the defendant's character, background history, and physical evidence; any evidence tending to establish or rebut the aggravating circumstances; and any evidence tending to establish or rebut any mitigating factors.” 46 S.W.3d at 156-57 (internal quotations omitted).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Zant v. Stephens green
scotus · 1983
2 sentences

2000Cf. State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 731 (Tenn.1994) ("Once a capital sentencing jury finds that a defendant falls within the legislatively-defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, the jury ís free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the punishment appropriate to the offense and the individual defendant.”) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1005 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (198

2000Cf. State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 731 (Tenn.1994) ("Once a capital sentencing jury finds that a defendant falls within the legislatively-defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, the jury ís free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the punishment appropriate to the offense and the individual defendant.”) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1005 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (198

21994–2000
State v. Gomez green
tenn · 2005
1 sentence

2006The Appellant now claims that “even after a modification, [his] sentence remained enhanced above the statutory minimum based upon a myriad of factors neither admitted at trial nor proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” He contends that in view of Blakely, his sentence should be “modified to reflect the 32 ½ year statutory minimum.” We note initially that the Blakely claim has been rendered moot by the Tennessee Supreme Court’s April 15, 2005 decision in State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005).

12006–2006
State v. Nesbit green
tenn · 1998
2 sentences

2001Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 890 .

2001Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 890 .

12001–2001

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (7) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206 (6)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 39 (1977–2023) TX 32 (1960–2026) CA 31 (1981–2023) NY 28 (1980–2024) AL 25 (2002–2025) PA 23 (1959–2025) OH 19 (1995–2025) NJ 15 (1987–2026) IN 14 (1970–2024) MO 11 (1967–2024) WV 9 (1995–2022) TN 8 (1994–2011) MD 7 (1971–2004) VA 7 (1990–2014) FL 7 (1986–2019) CT 6 (1995–2025) IA 6 (2008–2025) ID 5 (1978–2018) OR 5 (1987–2012) UT 4 (1983–2019) NM 4 (2013–2019) RI 4 (1985–2003) GA 4 (1997–2021) WA 4 (1984–2012) NC 3 (1979–2024) MA 3 (2003–2020) WY 3 (1986–2006) MN 3 (1986–2023) MT 2 (1985–1990) NE 2 (1981–2018) CO 2 (1988–1999) AK 2 (1982–1982) NV 2 (1985–1993) SC 2 (2017–2022) AZ 2 (2006–2025) DE 2 (2016–2017)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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