myriad factors in Ohio

2001Co. (1999), 132 Ohio App.3d 203 , 724 N.E.2d 860 , held that the ultimate determination of when interest is due “depends on a myriad of factors, and therefore, must be resolved on a case by case basis.” Id. at 208 , 724 N.E.2d 860 .

2001Co. (1999), 132 Ohio App.3d 203 , 724 N.E.2d 860 , held that the ultimate determination of when interest is due “depends on a myriad of factors, and therefore, must be resolved on a case by case basis.” Id. at 208 , 724 N.E.2d 860 .

1995As a matter of Eighth Amendment requirements, “ ‘[o]nce the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, * * * the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment’ [and] may be given ‘unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed * * ” Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2639 , 129 L.Ed.2d at 764 , quoting California v. Ramos (1983), 463 U.S. 992, 1008 , 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3457 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1185 , and Zant, supra, 462 U.S. at 875 , 103 S

1995As a matter of Eighth Amendment requirements, “ ‘[o]nce the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, * * * the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment’ [and] may be given ‘unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed * * ” Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2639 , 129 L.Ed.2d at 764 , quoting California v. Ramos (1983), 463 U.S. 992, 1008 , 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3457 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1185 , and Zant, supra, 462 U.S. at 875 , 103 S

1995As a matter of Eighth Amendment requirements, “ ‘[o]nce the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, * * * the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment’ [and] may be given ‘unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed * * ” Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2639 , 129 L.Ed.2d at 764 , quoting California v. Ramos (1983), 463 U.S. 992, 1008 , 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3457 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1185 , and Zant, supra, 462 U.S. at 875 , 103 S

1995As a matter of Eighth Amendment requirements, “ ‘[o]nce the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, * * * the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment’ [and] may be given ‘unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed * * ” Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2639 , 129 L.Ed.2d at 764 , quoting California v. Ramos (1983), 463 U.S. 992, 1008 , 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3457 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1185 , and Zant, supra, 462 U.S. at 875 , 103 S

2014Of N. Ohio, 900 F.2d 882 , 889 (6th Cir.1990).

2005Cos. (2001), 146 Ohio App.3d 282, 286 , 765 N.E.2d 967 .

2005Cos. (2001), 146 Ohio App.3d 282, 286 , 765 N.E.2d 967 .

2001Mancari, 914 F.2d at 1019 .

2001On appeal, the court of appeals in Nelloms stated "[i]n multi-count situations, the judge imposes a sentence as a package, taking into consideration a myriad of factors." Citing numerous federal and United States Supreme Court cases, the court of appeals went on to state that "when one or more counts constituting the original sentence are vacated, the trial court should be able to review what remains and reconstruct the sentence in light of the original sentencing plan." Id.

2001As stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Wurzelbacher v. Kroeger (1974), 40 Ohio St.2d 90 , at paragraph two of the syllabus: "Where subsequent events have rendered it no longer equitable that a judgment should have prospective application, it is an abuse of discretion to deny a proper motion for relief from that judgment." In the case sub judice , a myriad of error has prevented a plaintiff from receiving his day in court.

2000Appellants claim that this approach, reaching the merits of a case, runs counter to Ojalvo v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., supra. Ojalvo , a breach of contract case, stands for the proposition that a trial court, when determining whether to certify a class action, may not deny certification where the court “requires a certainty that a common issue of fact ‘probably exists’ based on the merits of the class claim.” Id. at syllabus.

2000Appellants claim that this approach, reaching the merits of a case, runs counter to Ojalvo v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., supra. Ojalvo , a breach of contract case, stands for the proposition that a trial court, when determining whether to certify a class action, may not deny certification where the court “requires a certainty that a common issue of fact ‘probably exists’ based on the merits of the class claim.” Id. at syllabus.

1999Accordingly, "[t]he determination of a reasonable fee must be reached through an evaluation of a myriad of factors, all within the knowledge of the trial court, examined in light of the congressional policy underlying the substantive portions of the statute providing for the award of fees." Id.

1999The United States Court observed that the purpose of the FLSA attorney fees provision is "to insure effective access to the judicial process by providing attorney fees for prevailing plaintiffs with wage and hour grievances," id. at 502 , and that courts should not place an undue emphasis on the amount of the plaintiff's recovery because an award of attorney fees here "encourage[s] the vindication of congressionally identified policies and rights." Id. at 503 .