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23 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Arbogastgreen1 sentence2024See State v. Arbogast, 199 Wn.2d 356 , 371, 506 P.3d 1238 (2022). 9 57530-2-II Riley standard, holding that where there is credible yet conflicting evidence as to what preceded the incident in question, an aggressor instruction is proper. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2022VI; see also State v. Clark, 187 Wn.2d 641 , 648- 49, 389 P.3d 462 (2017). 2022VI; see also State v. Clark, 187 Wn.2d 641 , 648- 49, 389 P.3d 462 (2017). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hoviggreen1 sentence2015In holding that the facts supported the jury's fmding that Mr. McKague had caused his victim sufficient injuries to meet the clarified standard, the court also cited with approval State v. Hovig, 149 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Terhune v. A. H. Robins Co.
green
2 sentences2017While the court acknowledged that comment k "does not purport to state what is 'proper warning' where [an unavoidably unsafe] product is involved," id. at 13 , the court clarified that the warning was proper in that case, stating that a manufacturer "fulfills its duty if it warns the physician of the dangers attendant upon its use, and need not warn the patient as well." !d. at 17. 2017While the court acknowledged that comment k “does not purport to state what is ‘proper warning’ where [an unavoidably unsafe] product is involved,” id. at 13 , the court clarified that the warning was proper in that case, stating that a manufacturer “fulfills its duty if it warns the physician of the dangers attendant upon its use, and need not warn the patient as well.” Id. at 17 . ¶41 Following Terhune , we answered a certified question asking whether comment k applied to blood products. | 3 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Valencia
green
2 sentences2015State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 786-91 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010). 2015State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 786-91 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010). | 3 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Valencia
green
2 sentences2015State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 786-91 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010). 2015State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 786-91 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010). | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Rickman v. Premera Blue Cross
green
2 sentences2016Rickman, 184 Wn.2d at 304 . 2016Rickman, 184 Wn.2d at 304 . | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Blakely v. Washington
green
2 sentences2010In Blakely , the Court clarified this rule, holding "that the `statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. " 542 U.S. at 303 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 . 2010In Blakely , the Court clarified this rule, holding “that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” 542 U.S. at 303 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
In Re Marriage of Shoemaker
green
2 sentences2000In the more recent case of In re Marriage of Shoemaker, 128 Wn.2d 116 , 904 P.2d 1150 (1995), the court clarified the standard for granting retrospective equitable relief. 2000In the more recent case of In re Marriage of Shoemaker, 128 Wash.2d 116 , 904 P.2d 1150 (1995), the court clarified the standard for granting retrospective equitable relief. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
In re the Marriage of Shoemaker
green
2 sentences2000In the more recent case of In re Marriage of Shoemaker, 128 Wn.2d 116 , 904 P.2d 1150 (1995), the court clarified the standard for granting retrospective equitable relief. 2000In the more recent case of In re Marriage of Shoemaker, 128 Wash.2d 116 , 904 P.2d 1150 (1995), the court clarified the standard for granting retrospective equitable relief. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
In Re the Marriage of Hunter
green
2 sentences2000There, the court held that although courts have equitable powers to make retrospective modifications when required to reach a just result, those powers "can only be exercised within the `framework of established equitable principles'." Id., at 122-23, 904 P.2d 1150 ( quoting In re Marriage of Hunter, 52 Wash. App. 265, 269 , 758 P.2d 1019 (1988)). 2000There, the court held that although courts have equitable powers to make retrospective modifications when required to reach a just result, those powers "can only be exercised within the `framework of established equitable principles'." Id., at 122-23, 904 P.2d 1150 ( quoting In re Marriage of Hunter, 52 Wash. App. 265, 269 , 758 P.2d 1019 (1988)). | 2 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Westwood
green
1 sentence2024Often, the “same criminal conduct” analysis turns on the first component, “same criminal intent.” In State v. Westwood, 2 Wn.3d 157 , 534 P.3d 1162 (2023), the court clarified the analysis of the same criminal intent component. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Francis v. Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence2024Id. at 63 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Arndt
green
2 sentences2022Standard of Review In State v. Arndt, this court clarified the test for analyzing whether the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense has been violated. 194 Wn.2d 784, 797-98 , 453 P.3d 696 (2019); U.S. CONST. amend. 2022Standard of Review In State v. Arndt, this court clarified the test for analyzing whether the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense has been violated. 194 Wn.2d 784, 797-98 , 453 P.3d 696 (2019); U.S. CONST. amend. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru
green
2 sentences2021Importantly, the Court clarified that the factors discussed in Hosanna-Tabor were not meant to be a “checklist.” Id. at 2067 . 2021The “recognition of the significance of those factors . . . did not mean that they must be met— or even that they are necessarily important—in all other cases.” Id. at 2063 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Wright v. Group Health Hospital
green
1 sentence2019Wright, 103 Wn.2d at 201-02 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Rogers v. Miles Laboratories, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017Rogers v. Miles Labs., Inc., 116 Wn.2d 195 , 802 P.2d 1346 (1991). 2017Rogers v. Miles Labs., Inc., 116 Wn.2d 195 , 802 P.2d 1346 (1991). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Blazina
green
2 sentences2016In State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827 , 832 n.1, 344 P.3d 680 (2015), the court clarified that a challenge to the trial court’s entry of an LFO order under RCW 10.01.160(3) is ripe for judicial determination. 2016In State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827 , 832 n.1, 344 P.3d 680 (2015), the court clarified that a challenge to the trial court’s entry of an LFO order under RCW 10.01.160(3) is ripe for judicial determination. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. W.R.
green
2 sentences2016Thus, the propriety of the negates analysis is no longer in doubt.” 181 Wn.2d 757, 764 , 336 P.3d 1134 (2014) (citing Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 , 107 S. Ct. 1098 , 94 L. 2016Thus, the propriety of the negates analysis is no longer in doubt.” 181 Wn.2d 757, 764 , 336 P.3d 1134 (2014) (citing Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 , 107 S. Ct. 1098 , 94 L. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Martin v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2016Thus, the propriety of the negates analysis is no longer in doubt.” 181 Wn.2d 757, 764 , 336 P.3d 1134 (2014) (citing Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 , 107 S. Ct. 1098 , 94 L. 2016Thus, the propriety of the negates analysis is no longer in doubt.” 181 Wn.2d 757, 764 , 336 P.3d 1134 (2014) (citing Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 , 107 S. Ct. 1098 , 94 L. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Ashcraft
green
1 sentence2015App. 1,5, 13 , 202 P.3d 318 (2009) (red and violet teeth marks lasting up to two weeks constituted substantial bodily injury); and State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wn. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Hovig
green
1 sentence2015App. 1,5, 13 , 202 P.3d 318 (2009) (red and violet teeth marks lasting up to two weeks constituted substantial bodily injury); and State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wn. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Estelle v. McGuire
green
2 sentences1997Later, the Court clarified the test: "[T]he proper inquiry is not whether an instruction 'could have’ been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury did so apply it.” Victor, 511 U.S. at 6 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 72 n.4, 112 S. Ct. 475 , 116 L. 1997Later, the Court clarified the test: "[T]he proper inquiry is not whether an instruction 'could have’ been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury did so apply it.” Victor, 511 U.S. at 6 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 72 n.4, 112 S. Ct. 475 , 116 L. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Victor v. Nebraska
green
1 sentence1997Later, the Court clarified the test: "[T]he proper inquiry is not whether an instruction 'could have’ been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury did so apply it.” Victor, 511 U.S. at 6 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 72 n.4, 112 S. Ct. 475 , 116 L. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Wethered
green
2 sentences1989After criticism that the Gunwall criteria could be misinterpreted to support the view now espoused by the dissent, [8] this court clarified the test in State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 472 , 755 P.2d 797 (1988). 1989After criticism that the Gunwall criteria could be misinterpreted to support the view now espoused by the dissent, [8] this court clarified the test in State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 472 , 755 P.2d 797 (1988). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.