clarified standard in Utah

2024The court clarified that this standard does not “weaken” that adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which uses the language “beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Id. at 977 n.19; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (Am.

2019Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 44 (citation omitted) (internal quotation 13 marks omitted). 14 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Dahl, 2015 UT 79 , ¶ 119 (“Thus, we will uphold the decision of the district court on appeal ‘unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.’” (citation omitted)); Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, ¶ 7 , 76 P.3d 716 (quoting Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)) (explaining that when reviewing the trial court’s findings of fact, “we will reverse only if the findings are clearly erroneous”). 7 GARD

2019Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 44 (citation omitted) (internal quotation 13 marks omitted). 14 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Dahl, 2015 UT 79 , ¶ 119 (“Thus, we will uphold the decision of the district court on appeal ‘unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.’” (citation omitted)); Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, ¶ 7 , 76 P.3d 716 (quoting Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)) (explaining that when reviewing the trial court’s findings of fact, “we will reverse only if the findings are clearly erroneous”). 7 GARD

2019And we cautioned that while there may be cases where a defendant may be guilty of the aggravator 37 STATE v. SOSA-HURTADO PEARCE, J., dissenting where the endangered third party is physically removed from the defendant’s conduct, “such cases require a careful consideration of a defendant’s intent and knowledge of the risk and the endangered person’s proximity in time and place to the murder.” Id.23 ¶97 Employing this clarified standard, we held that the aggravator did not apply in Johnson because “[t]he State [had] produced no evidence indicating that [wife] was placed at grave risk of death b

2018Additionally, although the court of appeals incorrectly interpreted the applicable special mitigation standard when concluding the error was harmless, we reach the same conclusion as the court of appeals under the clarified standard we announced in State v. Lambdin , 2017 UT 46 , --- P.3d ----.

1993The court clarified the standard, however, in State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992), when it held that “[i]n reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence, under rule 403, we will not overturn the court’s determination unless it was an "abuse of discretion.” See [State v.] Verde, 770 P.2d [116,] 120 [(Utah 1989) ].

1993To state the matter more precisely, we review the trial court’s 403 ruling admitting or denying admission to evidence by deciding whether, as a matter of law, the trial court’s decision that 'the unfairly prejudicial potential of the evidence outweighs [or does not outweigh] its probativeness’ was beyond the limits of reasonability.” Id. at 239-40 (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784 n. 3) (last brackets in original).

1993To state the matter more precisely, we review the trial court’s 403 ruling admitting or denying admission to evidence by deciding whether, as a matter of law, the trial court’s decision that 'the unfairly prejudicial potential of the evidence outweighs [or does not outweigh] its probativeness’ was beyond the limits of reasonability.” Id. at 239-40 (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784 n. 3) (last brackets in original).

1985As defense counsel correctly points out, in State v. Baker, Utah, 671 P.2d 152 (1983), this Court clarified the standard for determining whether a trial court must give an instruction on a lesser included offense.