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11 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brooks v. Northglen Ass'ngreen1 sentence2022See Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 164 (trial court has no jurisdiction to issue a judgment declaring the rights of persons who are not a party to the action; such an opinion would be purely advisory). 12 survives today in those rare instances in which the record shows the court lacked jurisdiction . . . .”). | 1 | 1 |
Carrizales v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Accordingly, the court clarified that the doctrine “exists, in the post Jackson v. Virginia era, only in confession cases.” Id. at 739 (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Gigliobianco v. Stategreen1 sentence2008Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641-642 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Bustillos v. Stategreen1 sentence2004In Bustillos v. State, the court clarified the rule set forth in Chambers by stating that “the court may before verdict withdraw and correct its charge if convinced an erroneous charge has been given.” Bustillos v. State , 464 S.W.2d 118, 125 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Moon, Cameron
red
2 sentences2019Id. at 47 . 2017The court also clarified the standard of review when a juvenile court waives its exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to section 54.02: “[I]n evaluating a juvenile court’s decision to waive its jurisdiction, an appellate court should first review the juvenile court’s specific findings of fact regarding the Section 54.02(f) factors under ‘traditional sufficiency of the evidence review.’” Id. at 47 . | 2 | 2017–2019 |
Shields Ltd. Partnership v. Bradberry
green
2 sentences2017The Court clarified that waiver of a nonwaiver provision could not be “anchored in the same conduct the parties specifically agreed would not give rise to a waiver of contract rights.” See id. at 474 , 2017 WL 2023602, at *1 . 2017The Court clarified that waiver of a nonwaiver provision could not be “anchored in the same conduct the parties specifically agreed would not give rise to a waiver of contract rights.” See id. at 474 , 2017 WL 2023602, at *1 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Goffney v. Rabson
green
1 sentence2015Id. (citing Goffney, 56 S.W.3d at 193-94 ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Trousdale v. Henry
green
1 sentence2015Id. (citing Goffney, 56 S.W.3d at 193-94 ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
red
2 sentences2001Id. at 250 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 . 2001Id. at 250 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Wainwright v. Witt
green
2 sentences1986That standard has since been declared preferable to the stricter standard of Witherspoon, supra, by the Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). "[T]he proper standard for determining when a juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ... is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'" Id., 105 S.Ct. at 852, quoting Adams, supra. This clarified standard dispenses with Witherspoon 's reference to 1986That standard has since been declared preferable to the stricter standard of Witherspoon, supra, by the Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). "[T]he proper standard for determining when a juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ... is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'" Id., 105 S.Ct. at 852, quoting Adams, supra. This clarified standard dispenses with Witherspoon 's reference to | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences1985In Williams v. State, 662 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) this Court clarified the test for the admissibility of extraneous transactions. 1985The two step test requires a “ ‘showing by the prosecution both that the transaction is relevant to a material issue in the case; and, the relevancy value of the evidence outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial potential.’ ” 662 S.W.2d at 346 . (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.