clarified rule in California

2022(People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks); 1 People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).) Specifically, Banks clarified the factors that need to be considered in determining whether a defendant was a “major participant” in the underlying felony.” ( Banks, supra, at pp. 797-804 .) In Clark, the court clarified the factors that must be considered in determining whether a defendant acted with “reckless indifference to human life. ( Clark, supra, at pp. 611-623 .) In 2019, defendant filed a petition seeking to vacate his murder conviction and to be resentenced under former Penal Code secti

2022(People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks); 1 People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).) Specifically, Banks clarified the factors that need to be considered in determining whether a defendant was a “major participant” in the underlying felony.” ( Banks, supra, at pp. 797-804 .) In Clark, the court clarified the factors that must be considered in determining whether a defendant acted with “reckless indifference to human life. ( Clark, supra, at pp. 611-623 .) In 2019, defendant filed a petition seeking to vacate his murder conviction and to be resentenced under former Penal Code secti

2025Under Dusky, “the standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and has ‘a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” (Godinez, at p. 396.) Later, in Edwards, the United States Supreme Court faced the question of “whether the Constitution required the trial court to allow Edwards to represent himself at trial.” (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 169 , italics added.) The Edwards court departed somewhat from Faretta’s strict 2 Hasan init

2023(Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 396 , 400–401 (Godinez).) Under Dusky, “the standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and has ‘a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” (Godinez, at p. 396.) Later, in Edwards, the United States Supreme Court faced the question of “whether the Constitution required the trial court to allow Edwards to represent himself at trial.” (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 169 , italics added.) The C

2025(Id. at p. 835.) Subsequently, in Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 396 , 400–401 (Godinez), the court clarified that the standard for competence to waive counsel is identical to the standard for competence to stand trial announced in Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402 .

2023(Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 396 , 400–401 (Godinez).) Under Dusky, “the standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and has ‘a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” (Godinez, at p. 396.) Later, in Edwards, the United States Supreme Court faced the question of “whether the Constitution required the trial court to allow Edwards to represent himself at trial.” (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 169 , italics added.) The C

2025(Id. at p. 835.) Subsequently, in Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 396 , 400–401 (Godinez), the court clarified that the standard for competence to waive counsel is identical to the standard for competence to stand trial announced in Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402 .

2023(Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 .) With the proper waiver, the Court ruled that it is unconstitutional for states to “force a lawyer upon [a defendant], even when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense.” (Id. at p. 807.) The Court further explained that “a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order [to] competently and intelligently to choose self-representation.” (Id. at p. 835.) Subsequently, in Godinez v. Moran, the Court clarified that the standard for competence to waive counsel is identical to the standard for competence to stand

1952The court there adopts the same rule that was applied in Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., *711 212 Cal. 36 [ 297 P. 884 ], See, also, Cole v. Ridings, 95 Cal.App.2d 136 [ 212 P.2d 597 ]; Chakmakjian v. Lowe, 33 Cal.2d 308 [ 201 P.2d 801 ], No other errors appear.” Appellant submits “that the rule of the Tice ease, as stated above, is now the law of California” and that it has cleared up the confusion that theretofore existed.

1952The court there adopts the same rule that was applied in Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., *711 212 Cal. 36 [ 297 P. 884 ], See, also, Cole v. Ridings, 95 Cal.App.2d 136 [ 212 P.2d 597 ]; Chakmakjian v. Lowe, 33 Cal.2d 308 [ 201 P.2d 801 ], No other errors appear.” Appellant submits “that the rule of the Tice ease, as stated above, is now the law of California” and that it has cleared up the confusion that theretofore existed.

2025“In general, a defendant may raise for the first time on appeal instructional error affecting his or her substantial rights. [Citations.] But ‘[a] party may not argue on appeal that an instruction correct in law was too general or incomplete, and thus needed clarification, without first requesting such clarification at trial.’ ” (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 428 .) Even if we could conclude defendant preserved his challenge, we would reject it on the merits because it is foreclosed by binding precedent from our Supreme Court.

2024Generally, “[a] postconviction change in the law invalidating a prosecution theory is the equivalent of a trial error because it means the jury was instructed on a legally invalid theory. [Citations.] Moreover, as our high court has explained, the insufficient evidence rule barring retrial is ‘inapplicable’ in a situation where the reversal is based on a postconviction change in the law: ‘The [insufficient evidence] rule achieves its aim— i.e., of protecting the defendant against the harassment and risks of unnecessary repeated trials on the same charge—by the device of giving the prosecution

2023(Id. at p. 2122.) The high court also held that the Second Amendment right is “subject to certain reasonable, well-defined restrictions.” (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2156 .) The court clarified a test it had earlier applied in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 (Heller) for determining whether a government regulation violates that right.

2023(Id. at p. 2122.) The high court also held that the Second Amendment right is “subject to certain reasonable, well-defined restrictions.” (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2156 .) The court clarified a test it had earlier applied in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 (Heller) for determining whether a government regulation violates that right.

2023(Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 .) With the proper waiver, the Court ruled that it is unconstitutional for states to “force a lawyer upon [a defendant], even when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense.” (Id. at p. 807.) The Court further explained that “a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order [to] competently and intelligently to choose self-representation.” (Id. at p. 835.) Subsequently, in Godinez v. Moran, the Court clarified that the standard for competence to waive counsel is identical to the standard for competence to stand

2022(Id. at pp. 914-915.) In Tritek Telecom, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1385 (Tritek), a different division of the Fourth District (Division One) considered a related question: whether a director’s right to inspect corporate records should include attorney-client communications generated in defense of the director’s own suit for damages against the corporation.

2022(Saline, at p. 914.) However, the court clarified that this principle should “only be applied in extreme circumstances where a preponderance of the evidence establishes the director’s clear intent to use the documents to commit an egregious tort—one that cannot be easily remedied by subsequent monetary damages—against the corporation.” (Id. at p. 915.) The Saline court refused to limit the inspection rights of a director despite evidence that the director had a conflict of interest, breached fiduciary duties, breached a confidentiality agreement, and publicly defamed management, because there

2014In Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 114 , this court clarified the rule for determining when a defendant suffers prejudice if he must exhaust his peremptory challenges in order to remove jurors who should have been removed for cause.

2014In Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 114 , this court clarified the rule for determining when a defendant suffers prejudice if he must exhaust his peremptory challenges in order to remove jurors who should have been removed for cause.

2013“Because defendant expressly agreed to this instruction, he is barred from challenging it on appeal under the doctrine of invited error.” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 539 .) Although, in this context, application of the doctrine of invited error requires there be some tactical purpose apparent in appellant‟s agreement or acquiescence in the particular jury instruction (People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 695, fn. 32 ), here that tactical purpose is evident: appellant sought to ensure the instruction more fully and specifically elaborated the segregation of the time periods and act

2000The court stated, “Whatever the ambiguities of our earlier cases on this point, we now hold that when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.” (Id. at p. 153 [ 111 S.Ct. at p. 491 ].) This clarified the rule previously announced in Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [ 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-1885 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 ], where the court had held that once a suspect requests an attorney, he is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been

2000Co. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 870 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 509 , 710 P.2d 309 ], the court clarified that this privilege does not shield all postlitigation conduct by an insurer.

2000Co. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 870 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 509 , 710 P.2d 309 ], the court clarified that this privilege does not shield all postlitigation conduct by an insurer.

1986Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).

1986Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).

1986Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).

1952The court there adopts the same rule that was applied in Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., *711 212 Cal. 36 [ 297 P. 884 ], See, also, Cole v. Ridings, 95 Cal.App.2d 136 [ 212 P.2d 597 ]; Chakmakjian v. Lowe, 33 Cal.2d 308 [ 201 P.2d 801 ], No other errors appear.” Appellant submits “that the rule of the Tice ease, as stated above, is now the law of California” and that it has cleared up the confusion that theretofore existed.

1952The court there adopts the same rule that was applied in Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., *711 212 Cal. 36 [ 297 P. 884 ], See, also, Cole v. Ridings, 95 Cal.App.2d 136 [ 212 P.2d 597 ]; Chakmakjian v. Lowe, 33 Cal.2d 308 [ 201 P.2d 801 ], No other errors appear.” Appellant submits “that the rule of the Tice ease, as stated above, is now the law of California” and that it has cleared up the confusion that theretofore existed.

1952The court there adopts the same rule that was applied in Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., *711 212 Cal. 36 [ 297 P. 884 ], See, also, Cole v. Ridings, 95 Cal.App.2d 136 [ 212 P.2d 597 ]; Chakmakjian v. Lowe, 33 Cal.2d 308 [ 201 P.2d 801 ], No other errors appear.” Appellant submits “that the rule of the Tice ease, as stated above, is now the law of California” and that it has cleared up the confusion that theretofore existed.

1952The court there adopts the same rule that was applied in Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., *711 212 Cal. 36 [ 297 P. 884 ], See, also, Cole v. Ridings, 95 Cal.App.2d 136 [ 212 P.2d 597 ]; Chakmakjian v. Lowe, 33 Cal.2d 308 [ 201 P.2d 801 ], No other errors appear.” Appellant submits “that the rule of the Tice ease, as stated above, is now the law of California” and that it has cleared up the confusion that theretofore existed.

1951Co., 208 Cal. 568 [ 283 P. 61 ].) See, also, Ellison v. Lang Transportation Co., 12 Cal.2d 355 [ 84 P.2d 510 ], In Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585, 587 [ 128 P.2d 16 ], the clarified rule in respect to the application of such a presumption appeaxs to be that an instruction as to the rebuttable presumption set forth in section 1963, subdivision 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure may properly be given to the jury in certain situations, but such an instruction should not bé given where the evidence introduced by the plaintiff discloses the acts and conduct of the injured party immediately prior to o

1951Co., 208 Cal. 568 [ 283 P. 61 ].) See, also, Ellison v. Lang Transportation Co., 12 Cal.2d 355 [ 84 P.2d 510 ], In Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585, 587 [ 128 P.2d 16 ], the clarified rule in respect to the application of such a presumption appeaxs to be that an instruction as to the rebuttable presumption set forth in section 1963, subdivision 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure may properly be given to the jury in certain situations, but such an instruction should not bé given where the evidence introduced by the plaintiff discloses the acts and conduct of the injured party immediately prior to o

1951Co., 208 Cal. 568 [ 283 P. 61 ].) See, also, Ellison v. Lang Transportation Co., 12 Cal.2d 355 [ 84 P.2d 510 ], In Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585, 587 [ 128 P.2d 16 ], the clarified rule in respect to the application of such a presumption appeaxs to be that an instruction as to the rebuttable presumption set forth in section 1963, subdivision 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure may properly be given to the jury in certain situations, but such an instruction should not bé given where the evidence introduced by the plaintiff discloses the acts and conduct of the injured party immediately prior to o

1951Co., 208 Cal. 568 [ 283 P. 61 ].) See, also, Ellison v. Lang Transportation Co., 12 Cal.2d 355 [ 84 P.2d 510 ], In Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585, 587 [ 128 P.2d 16 ], the clarified rule in respect to the application of such a presumption appeaxs to be that an instruction as to the rebuttable presumption set forth in section 1963, subdivision 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure may properly be given to the jury in certain situations, but such an instruction should not bé given where the evidence introduced by the plaintiff discloses the acts and conduct of the injured party immediately prior to o