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5 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daniel Brewington v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2015However, in Young the court clarified that this standard no longer requires the alleged error to have been “sufficiently ‘egregious’ or ‘blatant’ [such] that the trial court should have acted sua sponte.” Id. at 726 n. 6 (clarifying Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 974 (Ind.2014)). [11] Indiana’s courts have recognized fundamental error in the context of probation revocation proceedings before. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hanson v. Denckla
green
2 sentences2015The Court later clarified this test to mean that the nonresident defendant must engage in “some act by which [he] purposefully avails [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 , 78 S. Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). 2015The Court later clarified this test to mean that the nonresident defendant must engage in “some act by which [he] purposefully avails [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 , 78 S. Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). | 2 | 2009–2015 |
Arizona v. Gant
green
2 sentences2017Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1609-CR-2079 | August 30, 2017 Page 10 of 17 The search incident to arrest trilogy concludes with [Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 , 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)], which analyzed searches of an arrestee’s vehicle. 2017Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1609-CR-2079 | August 30, 2017 Page 10 of 17 The search incident to arrest trilogy concludes with [Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 , 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)], which analyzed searches of an arrestee’s vehicle. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
California v. Acevedo
green
2 sentences2017A few years later, the Court clarified that this exception was limited to “personal property . . . immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 , 97 S. Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (200-pound, locked footlocker could not be searched incident to arrest), abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 , 111 S. Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991). 2017A few years later, the Court clarified that this exception was limited to “personal property . . . immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 , 97 S. Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (200-pound, locked footlocker could not be searched incident to arrest), abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 , 111 S. Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Chadwick
red
2 sentences2017A few years later, the Court clarified that this exception was limited to “personal property . . . immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 , 97 S. Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (200-pound, locked footlocker could not be searched incident to arrest), abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 , 111 S. Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991). 2017A few years later, the Court clarified that this exception was limited to “personal property . . . immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 , 97 S. Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (200-pound, locked footlocker could not be searched incident to arrest), abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 , 111 S. Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Marquise Lee v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2015However, in Young the court clarified that this standard no longer requires the alleged error to have been “sufficiently ‘egregious’ or ‘blatant’ [such] that the trial court should have acted sua sponte.” Id. at 726 n. 6 (clarifying Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 974 (Ind.2014)). [11] Indiana’s courts have recognized fundamental error in the context of probation revocation proceedings before. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co.
green
2 sentences1996In McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co., 605 N.E.2d 175 (Ind.1993), this Court clarified the rule concerning disclosure of rebuttal witnesses and held that “the nondisclosure of a rebuttal witness is excused only when that witness was unknown and unanticipated; known and anticipated witnesses, even if presented in rebuttal, must be identified pursuant to a court order, such as a pre-trial order, or a proper discovery request.” Id. at 179 . 1996In McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co., 605 N.E.2d 175 (Ind.1993), this Court clarified the rule concerning disclosure of rebuttal witnesses and held that “the nondisclosure of a rebuttal witness is excused only when that witness was unknown and unanticipated; known and anticipated witnesses, even if presented in rebuttal, must be identified pursuant to a court order, such as a pre-trial order, or a proper discovery request.” Id. at 179 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.