sale violation in California

2022(Moeller, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 832 , citing Munger v. Moore, supra, at pp. 9, 11 .) Absent the rare circumstance that equity is available to void the sale for fraud, a trustor who has suffered a violation of section 2924b has no other remedy, since it is impossible to seek postponement of an unknown event.

1985Finally, Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 323 ], involved an action for damages against the trustee and beneficiary of a deed of trust for conducting a trustee’s sale in violation of the statutory provisions.

2022(Moeller, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 832 , citing Munger v. Moore, supra, at pp. 9, 11 .) Absent the rare circumstance that equity is available to void the sale for fraud, a trustor who has suffered a violation of section 2924b has no other remedy, since it is impossible to seek postponement of an unknown event.

2016The court added: “[R]egardless of any statutory violations, there exists a conclusive presumption of the regularity of the sale when the property is purchased by a bona fide purchaser. ([] § 2924[, subd. ](c); Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 831 [(Moeller)].)” As to the fifth cause of action for slander of title, the court concluded the allegations failed to “establish that the publications were not privileged, that the publications were false in some material respect, or that any false material in the publications caused Plaintiffs any direct pecuniary loss.” 3 Finally, the court f

1986(See also J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 806 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]: “[Fjoreseeability of the risk is a primary consideration in establishing the element of duty.” (Cooper v. Jevne (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 860, 869 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 724 ] [architects who designed and supervised construction of condominiums must have known they were built for sale to the public and that purchasers would suffer economically, if not bodily, for the architect’s negligence, even though they were not the sellers].) Nor does the inclusion of an “as is” provision in the trustee’s deed conveyed at

1986(See also J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 806 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]: “[Fjoreseeability of the risk is a primary consideration in establishing the element of duty.” (Cooper v. Jevne (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 860, 869 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 724 ] [architects who designed and supervised construction of condominiums must have known they were built for sale to the public and that purchasers would suffer economically, if not bodily, for the architect’s negligence, even though they were not the sellers].) Nor does the inclusion of an “as is” provision in the trustee’s deed conveyed at

1986In Sabella , the court rejected an argument that since the builder neither fraudulently misrepresented nor concealed, he was protected by the doctrine of caveat emptor, stating: “[S]ince Wisler’s liability is predicated solely upon negligence in the construction of the dwelling, rather than upon alleged misrepresentation or any implied warranty, it does not appear that the doctrine of caveat emptor has any application to the instant action. [Citations.]” (Sabella v. Wisler, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 27.) Under the reasoning of Sabella , although an “as is” provision may under some circumstances e

1986(See also J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 806 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]: “[Fjoreseeability of the risk is a primary consideration in establishing the element of duty.” (Cooper v. Jevne (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 860, 869 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 724 ] [architects who designed and supervised construction of condominiums must have known they were built for sale to the public and that purchasers would suffer economically, if not bodily, for the architect’s negligence, even though they were not the sellers].) Nor does the inclusion of an “as is” provision in the trustee’s deed conveyed at

1986(See also J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 806 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]: “[Fjoreseeability of the risk is a primary consideration in establishing the element of duty.” (Cooper v. Jevne (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 860, 869 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 724 ] [architects who designed and supervised construction of condominiums must have known they were built for sale to the public and that purchasers would suffer economically, if not bodily, for the architect’s negligence, even though they were not the sellers].) Nor does the inclusion of an “as is” provision in the trustee’s deed conveyed at

1974By reason of the pre-1963 language mentioned, the principal decisions which dealt with it involved trust deeds which had been given by vendees “to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property.” (See, e.g., Stockton Sav. & Loan Bank v. Massanet (1941) 18 Cal.2d 200, 207-209 [ 114 P.2d 592 ]; Brown v. Jensen (1953) 41 Cal.2d 193, 194-196, 197-198 [ 259 P.2d 425 ]; Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, supra, 59 Cal.2d 35 at p. 41 ; Bargioni v. Hill (1963) 59 Cal.2d 121, 122-124 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 378 P.2d 593 ].) In the one decision cited herein which involved a sale of proper

1974By reason of the pre-1963 language mentioned, the principal decisions which dealt with it involved trust deeds which had been given by vendees “to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property.” (See, e.g., Stockton Sav. & Loan Bank v. Massanet (1941) 18 Cal.2d 200, 207-209 [ 114 P.2d 592 ]; Brown v. Jensen (1953) 41 Cal.2d 193, 194-196, 197-198 [ 259 P.2d 425 ]; Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, supra, 59 Cal.2d 35 at p. 41 ; Bargioni v. Hill (1963) 59 Cal.2d 121, 122-124 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 378 P.2d 593 ].) In the one decision cited herein which involved a sale of proper

1974By reason of the pre-1963 language mentioned, the principal decisions which dealt with it involved trust deeds which had been given by vendees “to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property.” (See, e.g., Stockton Sav. & Loan Bank v. Massanet (1941) 18 Cal.2d 200, 207-209 [ 114 P.2d 592 ]; Brown v. Jensen (1953) 41 Cal.2d 193, 194-196, 197-198 [ 259 P.2d 425 ]; Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, supra, 59 Cal.2d 35 at p. 41 ; Bargioni v. Hill (1963) 59 Cal.2d 121, 122-124 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 378 P.2d 593 ].) In the one decision cited herein which involved a sale of proper

1974By reason of the pre-1963 language mentioned, the principal decisions which dealt with it involved trust deeds which had been given by vendees “to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property.” (See, e.g., Stockton Sav. & Loan Bank v. Massanet (1941) 18 Cal.2d 200, 207-209 [ 114 P.2d 592 ]; Brown v. Jensen (1953) 41 Cal.2d 193, 194-196, 197-198 [ 259 P.2d 425 ]; Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, supra, 59 Cal.2d 35 at p. 41 ; Bargioni v. Hill (1963) 59 Cal.2d 121, 122-124 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 378 P.2d 593 ].) In the one decision cited herein which involved a sale of proper

1974By reason of the pre-1963 language mentioned, the principal decisions which dealt with it involved trust deeds which had been given by vendees “to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property.” (See, e.g., Stockton Sav. & Loan Bank v. Massanet (1941) 18 Cal.2d 200, 207-209 [ 114 P.2d 592 ]; Brown v. Jensen (1953) 41 Cal.2d 193, 194-196, 197-198 [ 259 P.2d 425 ]; Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, supra, 59 Cal.2d 35 at p. 41 ; Bargioni v. Hill (1963) 59 Cal.2d 121, 122-124 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 378 P.2d 593 ].) In the one decision cited herein which involved a sale of proper

1974By reason of the pre-1963 language mentioned, the principal decisions which dealt with it involved trust deeds which had been given by vendees “to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property.” (See, e.g., Stockton Sav. & Loan Bank v. Massanet (1941) 18 Cal.2d 200, 207-209 [ 114 P.2d 592 ]; Brown v. Jensen (1953) 41 Cal.2d 193, 194-196, 197-198 [ 259 P.2d 425 ]; Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, supra, 59 Cal.2d 35 at p. 41 ; Bargioni v. Hill (1963) 59 Cal.2d 121, 122-124 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 378 P.2d 593 ].) In the one decision cited herein which involved a sale of proper

1968(Alderson v. Houston, 154 Cal. 1,10 [ 96 P. 884 ].) In the ease under review, the trial court expressly found that the contract here involved was an “exclusive right to sell” agreement, but denied recovery because the plaintiffs failed to use “due diligence in procuring a purchaser for the land.” The court erred in applying the “due diligence” test inasmuch as such a finding is the equivalent of stating that the brokers failed to perform the contract by not procuring a buyer ready, willing and able to purchase on the terms specified in the listing agreement, which rule of performance by the br

1968(Alderson v. Houston, 154 Cal. 1,10 [ 96 P. 884 ].) In the ease under review, the trial court expressly found that the contract here involved was an “exclusive right to sell” agreement, but denied recovery because the plaintiffs failed to use “due diligence in procuring a purchaser for the land.” The court erred in applying the “due diligence” test inasmuch as such a finding is the equivalent of stating that the brokers failed to perform the contract by not procuring a buyer ready, willing and able to purchase on the terms specified in the listing agreement, which rule of performance by the br

1968(Seppala v. Neal (1949) 323 Mich. 697, 700-702 [ 36 N.W.2d 186, 187-188 ].) It has been noted: “A long line of Michigan eases interpreting these statutes and their antecedents provide ample authority for the proposition that a sale in violation of these provisions is void and that monies paid under the terms of such a void contract can be recovered by the purchaser.” (Waldron v. Drury’s Van Lines, Inc. (1965) 1 Mich.App. 601, 608 [ 137 N.W.2d 743, 746 ].) In that ease it was noted that no such result would follow when, as in the principal case, the vehicle was destroyed by the negligent act of

1968(Seppala v. Neal (1949) 323 Mich. 697, 700-702 [ 36 N.W.2d 186, 187-188 ].) It has been noted: “A long line of Michigan eases interpreting these statutes and their antecedents provide ample authority for the proposition that a sale in violation of these provisions is void and that monies paid under the terms of such a void contract can be recovered by the purchaser.” (Waldron v. Drury’s Van Lines, Inc. (1965) 1 Mich.App. 601, 608 [ 137 N.W.2d 743, 746 ].) In that ease it was noted that no such result would follow when, as in the principal case, the vehicle was destroyed by the negligent act of

1968(Leonard v. Fallas, 51 Cal.2d 649, 652 [ 335 P.2d 665 ].) The owner may breach the agreement by negotiating a sale in violation of the agreement (Lowe v. Loyd, supra) or by action which renders the broker’s performance impossible.

1968(Leonard v. Fallas, 51 Cal.2d 649, 652 [ 335 P.2d 665 ].) The owner may breach the agreement by negotiating a sale in violation of the agreement (Lowe v. Loyd, supra) or by action which renders the broker’s performance impossible.

1968(Seppala v. Neal (1949) 323 Mich. 697, 700-702 [ 36 N.W.2d 186, 187-188 ].) It has been noted: “A long line of Michigan eases interpreting these statutes and their antecedents provide ample authority for the proposition that a sale in violation of these provisions is void and that monies paid under the terms of such a void contract can be recovered by the purchaser.” (Waldron v. Drury’s Van Lines, Inc. (1965) 1 Mich.App. 601, 608 [ 137 N.W.2d 743, 746 ].) In that ease it was noted that no such result would follow when, as in the principal case, the vehicle was destroyed by the negligent act of

1968(Seppala v. Neal (1949) 323 Mich. 697, 700-702 [ 36 N.W.2d 186, 187-188 ].) It has been noted: “A long line of Michigan eases interpreting these statutes and their antecedents provide ample authority for the proposition that a sale in violation of these provisions is void and that monies paid under the terms of such a void contract can be recovered by the purchaser.” (Waldron v. Drury’s Van Lines, Inc. (1965) 1 Mich.App. 601, 608 [ 137 N.W.2d 743, 746 ].) In that ease it was noted that no such result would follow when, as in the principal case, the vehicle was destroyed by the negligent act of

1968(Terpstra v. Grand Mobile Trailer Sales (1958) 352 Mich. 546, 554 [ 90 N.W.2d 504, 508 ].) The following pronouncement of the Michigan Supreme Court may be accepted as a more accurate statement of the requisites for transfer: ‘ ‘If the sale of a motor vehicle is otherwise effected, title thereto passes, and the sale becomes fully consummated, upon delivery of the certificate of title properly executed.

1968(Terpstra v. Grand Mobile Trailer Sales (1958) 352 Mich. 546, 554 [ 90 N.W.2d 504, 508 ].) The following pronouncement of the Michigan Supreme Court may be accepted as a more accurate statement of the requisites for transfer: ‘ ‘If the sale of a motor vehicle is otherwise effected, title thereto passes, and the sale becomes fully consummated, upon delivery of the certificate of title properly executed.

1947(Model Baking Co. v. Dittman (Tex.Civ.App.) 266 S.W. 802, 803 ; Walker v. Mason, 272 Pa. 315 [ 116 A. 305 ]; Bradford & Carson v. Montgomery Furniture Co., 115 Tenn. 610, 617 [ 92 S.W. 1104 , 9 L.R.A.N.S. 979 ] ; Fisher v. Berg, 158 Wash 176, 179 [ 290 P. 984 ]; Gulf States Creosoting v. Loving, 120 F.2d 195, 199 ; see 6 C.J.S. 1075.) No interest of the seller would be served by preventing the rights under this contract for the sale of standard goods from passing to a copartnership continuing the business of the corporation formed by its sole stockholders, who were entitled to the assets of th