forfeiture rule in Illinois

2026People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 611-12 (2010). ¶ 19 The defendant, however, requests this court to review the issue under the doctrine of plain error which provides a narrow and limited exception to the forfeiture rule.

2024“When a defendant has forfeited appellate review of an issue, the reviewing court will consider only plain error.” People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 611 , 939 N.E.2d 403, 412 (2010). ¶ 19 The forfeiture rule must logically be applied to probation and, similarly, supervision revocation proceedings.

2026While our supreme court has recognized an exception to the forfeiture rule where the basis for the objection is the trial court’s own conduct (People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398, 400-01 (1963)), it has also made clear the application of this exception is appropriate only in “extraordinary circumstances, such as when a trial judge makes inappropriate remarks to a jury [citation] or relies on social commentary, rather than evidence, in sentencing a defendant to death” (People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 488 (2009)).

2023In Sprinkle, our Supreme Court held that a less rigid application of the forfeiture rule “should prevail where the basis for the objection is the conduct of the trial judge.” Id. at 401 .

2023Accordingly, we find the prosecutor did not impermissibly express his personal opinions regarding Ms. Wright’s involvement with the case. ¶ 84 Mr. Walker contends that we should review his remaining claims of improper comments during argument under the plain-error exception to the forfeiture rule or, alternatively, as ineffective assistance of counsel. - 18 - No. 1-19-1917 ¶ 85 Under the plain-error doctrine, we may consider an unpreserved error when a clear or obvious error occurs and (1) “the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against

2021The plain-error doctrine is a narrow and limited exception to the forfeiture rule, permitting a reviewing court to review unpreserved errors when a clear or obvious error occurs and (1) “ ‘the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error,’ ” or (2) the “ ‘error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.’ ” People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 593 (2008) (quotin

2026While our supreme court has recognized an exception to the forfeiture rule where the basis for the objection is the trial court’s own conduct (People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398, 400-01 (1963)), it has also made clear the application of this exception is appropriate only in “extraordinary circumstances, such as when a trial judge makes inappropriate remarks to a jury [citation] or relies on social commentary, rather than evidence, in sentencing a defendant to death” (People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 488 (2009)).

2024Under the Sprinkle doctrine, the forfeiture rule may be relaxed when a trial judge oversteps its authority in the jury’s presence or when counsel has been effectively prevented from objecting because it would have “fallen on deaf ears.” Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 613 ; see People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 488 (2009) (same).

2025See People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544 (2010). ¶ 27 There is, however, a well-established exception to the forfeiture rule.

2024See Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 544 ; see also People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 15 (“This forfeiture rule also prevents criminal defendants from sitting idly by and knowingly allowing an irregular proceeding to go forward only to seek reversal due to the error when the outcome of the proceeding is not favorable.”).

2026Indeed, the two prongs of the plain error doctrine offer “two different ways to ensure the same thing—namely, a fair trial.” Id. at 179 . ¶ 66 Because the plain error doctrine is a “ ‘ “narrow and limited exception” ’ ” to the forfeiture rule (People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 100 (1992) (quoting People v. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83, 94 (1986), quoting People v. Pastorino, 91 Ill. 2d 178, 188 (1982))), second-prong plain errors are similarly and necessarily a very narrow and limited group (Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 28 ).

2024This forfeiture rule encourages defendants “to raise issues before the trial court, allowing the court to correct its own errors.” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 175 .

2020However, our supreme court has stated that relaxing the forfeiture rule is “warranted when the trial court has overstepped its authority in the presence of the jury or when counsel is effectively prevented from objecting as any objection would have ‘fallen on deaf ears.’ ” People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74, 118 (2010) (quoting People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill.2d 478, 488 (2009)). ¶ 46 Here, after the court read the incorrect instruction to the jury, the court immediately attempted to correct the instruction to ensure the jury received the correct instruction.

2017This concept is known as the Sprinkle doctrine, as it arises from People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398, 401 (1963), in which our supreme court held that less rigid application of the forfeiture rule “should prevail where the basis for the objection is the conduct of the trial judge.” In the context of a bench trial, this less rigid forfeiture rule should be applied “when counsel has been effectively prevented from objecting because it would have ‘ “fallen on deaf ears.” ’ ” People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 612 (2010) (quoting People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74, 118 (2010), quoting People v. Mc

2011As we explain below, the State's argument overlooks the fact that the sentencing enhancement has additional elements. ¶ 17 ANALYSIS ¶ 18 On this postconviction appeal, the State asks us to remand for resentencing with instructions to the trial court to impose a 25-year sentencing enhancement for the attempted murder charge. ¶ 19 First, the State has forfeited this claim, many times over. [3] People v. McKown, 236 Ill.2d 278, 308 , 338 Ill.Dec. 415 , 924 N.E.2d 941 (2010) (doctrine of forfeiture applies to the State as well as to the defendant); People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 306, 347 , 250 Ill

2011As we explain below, the State's argument overlooks the fact that the sentencing enhancement has additional elements. ¶ 17 ANALYSIS ¶ 18 On this postconviction appeal, the State asks us to remand for resentencing with instructions to the trial court to impose a 25-year sentencing enhancement for the attempted murder charge. ¶ 19 First, the State has forfeited this claim, many times over. [3] People v. McKown, 236 Ill.2d 278, 308 , 338 Ill.Dec. 415 , 924 N.E.2d 941 (2010) (doctrine of forfeiture applies to the State as well as to the defendant); People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 306, 347 , 250 Ill

2025Application of the forfeiture rule “is particularly appropriate when a defendant argues that the State failed to lay the proper technical foundation for the admission of evidence, and a defendant’s lack of a timely and specific objection deprives the State of the opportunity to correct any deficiency in the foundational proof at the trial level.” Id.

2024Courts have explained that “the application of the forfeiture rule ‘is particularly appropriate when a defendant argues that the State failed to lay the proper technical foundation for the admission of evidence’ for the first time on appeal.” People v. Cook, 2018 IL App (1st) 142134, ¶ 55 (quoting People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005)).

2025See People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 564 (2003) (concluding the State waived its timeliness argument and declining to address it, stating, “[i]f the State wished to argue that the defendant’s section 2-1401 petition was untimely, it should have done so before the trial court, where any amendments could have been made and any factual disputes could have been resolved”); People v. Lucas, 231 Ill. 2d 169, 175 (2008) (stating the doctrine of forfeiture applies to the State as well as to the defendant). ¶ 35 Instead, in the interest of judicial economy, we choose to review the substance of pet

2024See People v. Lucas, 231 Ill. 2d 169, 175 (2008) (noting, the doctrine of forfeiture applies to the State, as well).

2020People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 485-86 (2009) -8- (citing People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 161 (1998) (although both an objection at trial and a written posttrial motion raising the issue are necessary to preserve an alleged error for review, application of the rule is less rigid where the basis for the objection is the trial judge’s conduct), and People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398, 400-01 (1963) (holding that judicial misconduct could provide a basis for relaxing the forfeiture rule)).

2020People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 485-86 (2009) (citing People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 161 (1998) (although both an objection at trial and a written posttrial motion raising the issue are necessary to preserve an alleged error for review, application of the rule is less rigid where the basis for the objection is the trial judge’s conduct) and People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398, 400-01 (1963) (holding that judicial misconduct could provide a basis for relaxing the forfeiture rule)).

2025“However, the forfeiture rule is an admonition to the parties and not a jurisdictional limitation on the reviewing court.” Id. (citing People v. Porter, 372 Ill.

2023We find no compelling reason, under Sprinkle, to relax the forfeiture rule here. ¶ 20 Defendant next argues, citing Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190 , that because the issue raised is a constitutional one, we should grant review under the constitutional issue exception.

2020See People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423, 455 (1990) (citing People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill.2d 398, 400-01 (1963)).

2014Nevertheless, defendant, citing People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423 (1990), asserts the issue involves the conduct of the trial court and should not be considered forfeited. ¶ 23 Although judicial misconduct may provide a basis for relaxing the forfeiture rule under the Sprinkle doctrine (People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74, 117 (2010)), our supreme court has made clear this exception applies only in extraordinary situations, such as when a judge makes inappropriate comments to the jury or relies on social commentary in sentencing defendant to -6- death.

2023In -8- 2023 IL App (2d) 200695-U response, the State initially contends that defendant failed to properly preserve this issue because he failed to raise it in his posttrial motion, and that we should decline to review it. ¶ 27 Defendant concedes that he failed to raise this claim in his posttrial motion but asserts, in pertinent part, that the forfeiture exception for constitutional issues that was recognized in People v. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 20 , applies here because the denial of his motion to suppress raises a Fourth Amendment violation.

2022However, as defendant notes, in People v. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 16 , our supreme court recognized that Enoch carved out an exception to the forfeiture rule for “constitutional issues that were properly raised at trial and may be raised later in a postconviction petition.” The State argues that this exception “swallow[s]” the Enoch forfeiture rule.

2025See People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22 (the forfeiture doctrine is relaxed where forfeiture stems from the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).

2023See id. (holding the forfeiture doctrine may be relaxed in proceedings under the Act where facts relating to the issue do not appear in the original appellate record); see also People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48 (noting the Act is available to resolve constitutional issues dependent upon facts not found in the record). ¶ 28 C.

2025App. 3d 973, 977 (2007), quoting People v. Normand, 215 Ill. 2d 539, 544 (2005)).

2009Where the trial court commits an error, we relax forfeiture rules because the forfeiture of issues is a limitation on the parties and not the court (People v. Normand, 215 Ill. 2d 539, 544 (2005), citing In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 323 (1995); see also People v. Carter, 208 Ill. 2d 309, 319 (2003)); and because the doctrine of forfeiture, like waiver, can be relaxed where the facts relating to the claim do not appear on the face of the original appellate record, such as the dates when the defendant’s trial counsel became members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar and qualified to represent h

2024While it is well-settled that issues, theories, or arguments not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal (see, e.g., In re Estate of Chaney, 2013 IL App (3d) 120565, ¶ 8 ), it is also true that the forfeiture rule is a limitation on the parties, not the court, and that we may, in order to provide a just result or maintain a sound and uniform body of precedent, relax forfeiture principles (see, e.g., Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 505 (2002)).

2021Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 504-05 (2002) (the forfeiture rule is an admonition to the parties and not a limitation on the jurisdiction of this court). ¶ 88 F. Scope of the Warrant ¶ 89 The validity of Feehan’s search depends on whether it was within the scope of the portion of the warrant that was unresolved by the acquittal.

2025Exceptions to the forfeiture doctrine exist that “may allow otherwise barred claims to proceed.” Blair, 215 Ill. 2d at 450 .

2025Citing People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427 (2005), the trial court noted that issues that could have been raised in the direct appeal, but were not, were barred by the doctrine of forfeiture.

2026While the failure to object and raise an issue in a post-trial motion generally forfeits an issue on appeal, “application of the forfeiture rule is less rigid where the basis of the objection is the circuit court’s own conduct.” In re Tamesha T., 2014 IL App (1st) 132986, ¶ 25 (citing In re Maher, 314 Ill.

2025However, we need not delve into the plain error doctrine to review the merits of respondent’s claim, as we recognize that “application of the forfeiture rule is less rigid when the basis of the objection is the trial court’s conduct.” Id. (citing Tamesha T., 2014 IL App (1st) 132986, ¶ 25 ). “ ‘Specifically, where the trial court departs from its role and becomes an advocate for the State’s position, no objection by opposing counsel is necessary to preserve the issue for review.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Maher, 314 Ill.

2026However, the forfeiture doctrine is “relaxed where fundamental fairness so requires, where the forfeiture stems from the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, or where the facts relating to the issue do not appear on the face of the original appellate record.” Id. (citing People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 233 (2004)). ¶ 18 The State argues that the basis for defendant’s ineffective assistance claim was apparent on the face of the record at the time of his direct appeal and defendant therefore forfeited the claim by failing to raise it then.

2023See id. (issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are forfeited). ¶ 75 We note, however, that the doctrine of forfeiture is “relaxed where fundamental fairness so requires, where the forfeiture stems from the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, or where the facts relating to the issue do not appear on the face of the original appellate record.” Id. (citing People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 233 (2004)).

2025Nevertheless, he argues that we may review the matter under either prong of the plain error doctrine. ¶ 43 The plain error doctrine is not a “general savings clause,” but rather a “narrow and limited exception to the typical forfeiture rule applicable to unpreserved claims.” People v. Johnson, 238 Ill. 2d 478, 484 (2010).

2024See In re Chance H., 2019 IL App (1st) 180053, ¶ 47 , 139 N.E.3d 88 (stating while the plain error rule is most commonly applied in criminal proceedings, a ruling affecting a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in raising his or her child may also be reviewed for plain error). ¶ 22 The plain error rule provides a “narrow and limited exception to the typical forfeiture rule applicable to unpreserved claims.” People v. Johnson, 238 Ill. 2d 478, 484 , 939 N.E.2d 475, 480 (2010).

2026People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (2010).

2023People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (2010).

2018People v. Love , 177 Ill. 2d 550 , 564, 227 Ill.Dec. 109 , 687 N.E.2d 32 (1997) ; see also People v. Carreon , 2011 IL App (2d) 100391 , ¶ 11, 355 Ill.Dec. 783 , 960 N.E.2d 665 ("where a trial court imposes [the public defender fee] without following the appropriate procedural requirements, application of the forfeiture rule is inappropriate"). ¶ 15 The State concedes that the trial court's inquiry did not sufficiently comport with the statutory hearing requirements outlined in section 113-3.1(a) of the Code.

2018People v. Love , 177 Ill. 2d 550 , 564, 227 Ill.Dec. 109 , 687 N.E.2d 32 (1997) ; see also People v. Carreon , 2011 IL App (2d) 100391 , ¶ 11, 355 Ill.Dec. 783 , 960 N.E.2d 665 ("where a trial court imposes [the public defender fee] without following the appropriate procedural requirements, application of the forfeiture rule is inappropriate"). ¶ 15 The State concedes that the trial court's inquiry did not sufficiently comport with the statutory hearing requirements outlined in section 113-3.1(a) of the Code.

2022While our supreme court may relax the forfeiture rule by invoking its supervisory power, this court “is not free, *** to excuse, in the context of postconviction proceedings, an appellate waiver caused by the failure of a defendant to include issues in his or her postconviction petition.” Jones, 213 Ill. 2d at 508 . ¶ 17 In his petition, defendant asserted that the first degree murder statute (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2010)) “originated from” Public Act 84-1450, which violated the ex post facto clause of the Illinois Constitution, citing People v. Shumpert, 126 Ill. 2d 344 (1989).

2021Our supreme court may relax the forfeiture rule by invoking its supervisory power, but this court “is not free *** to excuse, in the context of postconviction proceedings, an appellate waiver caused by the failure of a defendant to include issues in his or her postconviction petition.” People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 508 (2004); see also People v. Jones, 2017 IL App (1st) 123371, ¶ 60 (claim not considered where the defendant abandoned his claim of actual innocence and reformed it as a cause-and-prejudice theory on appeal); People v. Hunter, 376 Ill.