forfeiture rule in District of Columbia

2013In re Evans, 411 A.2d 984, 995 (D.C.1980) (bias does not result from a "judicial determination derived from evidence and lengthy proceedings before the court.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 530-31 (4th Cir.2008) (holding that, in determining that the defendant had procured the victim's death and thereby forfeited his objections to the admission of her statements, the "court, using a preponderance of the evidence standard, made the necessary factual findings to determine the evidentiary question before it and, in doing so, did not exhibit such 'favoritism' or antagonis

2013That must sometimes be done under the forfeiture rule that we adopt — when, for example, the defendant is on trial for murdering a witness in order to prevent his testimony.”); State v. Meeks, 277 Kan. 609 , 88 P.3d 789, 794 (2004) ("If the trial court determines as a threshold matter that the reason the victim cannot testify at trial is that the accused murdered her, then the accused should be deemed to have *998 forfeited the confrontation right, even though the act with which the accused is charged is the same as the one by which he allegedly rendered the witness unavailable.”) (internal qu

2013That must sometimes be done under the forfeiture rule that we adopt — when, for example, the defendant is on trial for murdering a witness in order to prevent his testimony.”); State v. Meeks, 277 Kan. 609 , 88 P.3d 789, 794 (2004) ("If the trial court determines as a threshold matter that the reason the victim cannot testify at trial is that the accused murdered her, then the accused should be deemed to have *998 forfeited the confrontation right, even though the act with which the accused is charged is the same as the one by which he allegedly rendered the witness unavailable.”) (internal qu

2013In re Evans, 411 A.2d 984, 995 (D.C.1980) (bias does not result from a "judicial determination derived from evidence and lengthy proceedings before the court.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 530-31 (4th Cir.2008) (holding that, in determining that the defendant had procured the victim's death and thereby forfeited his objections to the admission of her statements, the "court, using a preponderance of the evidence standard, made the necessary factual findings to determine the evidentiary question before it and, in doing so, did not exhibit such 'favoritism' or antagonis

2007Nevertheless, Mr. Gatlin argues that even though Crawford preserved the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, the evi-dentiary standard for admitting Mr. Jones’ grand jury testimony after Crawford should be “higher” in order to prove “an equitable exception to the Confrontation Clause.” The Supreme Court in Davis, supra, took “no position on the standards necessary to demonstrate [ ] forfeiture [by wrongdoing],” Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2280 , but indicated that federal courts generally have imposed the preponderance of the evidence standard when “using Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which codifi

2007LEXIS 16670 , at *52 (“in the Second Circuit ... the government need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant was responsible for a witness’s unavailability”). 9 After contemplating the proper standard of proof following Crawford, one federal trial court observed: “Although there are few post-Crawford cases analyzing the sufficiency of evidence necessary to find that defendant forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights, it is fair to conclude from [the] evidence that the Government has met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that [appellant] threatened [a

1991Having found that appellant was in clear violation of the lease and never attempted to cure the breach during the cure period, however, the trial court found no basis for granting him relief from the forfeiture. “[R]efusal to grant equitable relief to a tenant who has deliberately breached a covenant of his lease is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Smith v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 126 A.2d 152, 153 (D.C.1956).

1978Richardson v. Richardson, 72 App.D.C. 67, 69 , 112 F.2d 19, 21 (1940); Moore v. Moore, supra. The courts of Maryland have clearly explained the policy interests lying behind their rejection of the Moore doctrine.

1978Richardson v. Richardson, 72 App.D.C. 67, 69 , 112 F.2d 19, 21 (1940); Moore v. Moore, supra. The courts of Maryland have clearly explained the policy interests lying behind their rejection of the Moore doctrine.