forfeiture doctrine in Washington

2016Dobbs, 180 Wn.2d at 4 (noting that “[w]ithout such a forfeiture rule, defendants would have ‘an intolerable incentive ... to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them’ ” (emphasis added) (second alteration in original) (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 365 )). ¶19 In ruling on the motion in limine, the trial judge made a factual determination that Hernandez engaged in wrongdoing by analyzing several recorded jailhouse telephone calls.

2014Without such a forfeiture rule, defendants would have “an intolerable incentive ... to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them.” Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 365 , 128 S. Ct. 2678 , 171 L.

2012“The absence of a forfeiture rule covering this sort of conduct would create an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them.” Giles, 554 U.S. at 365 . “[I]n other words, it is grounded in ‘the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.’ ” Giles, 554 U.S. at 374 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 834 , 126 S. Ct. 2266 , 165 L.

2012“The absence of a forfeiture rule covering this sort of conduct would create an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them.” Giles, 554 U.S. at 365 . “[I]n other words, it is grounded in ‘the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.’ ” Giles, 554 U.S. at 374 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 834 , 126 S. Ct. 2266 , 165 L.

2014App. at 823 (third alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 285 A.2d at 445-46 ).

2014App. at 823 ( 3rd alteration in original) ( quoting Miller, 285 A.2d at 445 -46).

1989"Where a party, in exercising its redemption right, commits a technical but harmless procedural error, a forfeiture requirement is not only unjust, but inconsistent with the very purpose of the statute." GESA, 105 Wn.2d at 256 .

1989"Where a party, in exercising its redemption right, commits *57 a technical but harmless procedural error, a forfeiture requirement is not only unjust, but inconsistent with the very purpose of the statute." GESA, 105 Wn.2d at 256 .

2020App. 51, 59 , 504 P.2d 324 (1972) (quoting In re Estate of Murphy, 191 Wash. 180, 188 , 71 P.2d 6 (1937), rev’d on other grounds, 193 Wash. 400 , 75 P.2d 916 (1938)).

2020App. 51, 59 , 504 P.2d 324 (1972) (quoting In re Estate of Murphy, 191 Wash. 180, 188 , 71 P.2d 6 (1937), rev’d on other grounds, 193 Wash. 400 , 75 P.2d 916 (1938)).

2020App. 51, 59 , 504 P.2d 324 (1972) (quoting In re Estate of Murphy, 191 Wash. 180, 188 , 71 P.2d 6 (1937), rev’d on other grounds, 193 Wash. 400 , 75 P.2d 916 (1938)).

2020App. 51, 59 , 504 P.2d 324 (1972) (quoting In re Estate of Murphy, 191 Wash. 180, 188 , 71 P.2d 6 (1937), rev’d on other grounds, 193 Wash. 400 , 75 P.2d 916 (1938)).

2020It held that the forfeiture clause in the Blackstock retirement plan was not void or invalid per se but had to be evaluated under Washington’s well-established three-part reasonableness test applicable to non- competition agreements. 85 Wn.2d at 932-33 .

2020It held that the forfeiture clause in the Blackstock retirement plan was not void or invalid per se but had to be evaluated under Washington’s well-established three-part reasonableness test applicable to non- competition agreements. 85 Wn.2d at 932-33 .

2017Under the second level due process balancing test, compliance with the provisions of the forfeiture statute, i.e., commencement of adjudicative proceedings within 90 days of the claim of ownership, has been found to meet the requisites of due process.21 But due process is flexible, and particular circumstances may impact the timing of a hearing.22 For example, this court has acknowledged other fact patterns might compel more timely proceedings despite compliance with statutory requirements.23 When analyzing a claim for more timely proceedings under due process, we consider "(1)[t]he length of

2016In re the Forfeiture of One 1988 Black Chevrolet Corvette, 91 Wn.

2009Thus, Giles overrules Mason to the extent Mason holds that a specific intent to prevent testimony is not required to apply the forfeiture doctrine. [14] Douglas Northwest, Inc. v. Bill O'Brien & Sons Const., Inc., 64 Wash.App. 661, 678 , 828 P.2d 565 (1992). [15] Id. [16] Bland v. Mentor, 63 Wash.2d 150, 154 , 385 P.2d 727 (1963); Colonial Imports v. Carlton Northwest, Inc., 83 Wash.App. 229, 238 , 921 P.2d 575 (1996). [17] In re LaBelle, 107 Wash.2d 196, 209 , 728 P.2d 138 (1986). [18] RP (Mar. 19, 2007) at 115. [19] Id. at 140. [20] Id. at 114. [21] Id. at 140. [22] Id. at 120. [23] Id. at 1

2009Thus, Giles overrules Mason to the extent Mason holds that a specific intent to prevent testimony is not required to apply the forfeiture doctrine. [14] Douglas Northwest, Inc. v. Bill O'Brien & Sons Const., Inc., 64 Wash.App. 661, 678 , 828 P.2d 565 (1992). [15] Id. [16] Bland v. Mentor, 63 Wash.2d 150, 154 , 385 P.2d 727 (1963); Colonial Imports v. Carlton Northwest, Inc., 83 Wash.App. 229, 238 , 921 P.2d 575 (1996). [17] In re LaBelle, 107 Wash.2d 196, 209 , 728 P.2d 138 (1986). [18] RP (Mar. 19, 2007) at 115. [19] Id. at 140. [20] Id. at 114. [21] Id. at 140. [22] Id. at 120. [23] Id. at 1

2007"The Roberts approach to the Confrontation Clause undoubtedly made recourse to this doctrine less necessary, because prosecutors could show the `reliability' of ex parte statements more easily than they could show the defendant's procurement of the witness's absence." Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2280 . ¶ 24 Justice Antonin Scalia has explained that the forfeiture doctrine is grounded in equity. "[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 .

2007“The Roberts approach to the Confrontation Clause undoubtedly made recourse to this doctrine less necessary, because prosecutors could show the ‘reliability’ of ex parte statements more easily than they could show the defendant’s procurement of the witness’s absence.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 . ¶24 Justice Antonin Scalia has explained that the forfeiture doctrine is grounded in equity. “[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confronta tion claims on essentially equitable grounds.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 .

2007City of Tacoma v. Bishop, 82 Wash.App. 850, 859 , 920 P.2d 214 (1996) (citing United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100-01 (3d Cir.1995)).

2007City of Tacoma v. Bishop, 82 Wn.

2007The high court reiterated its approval of the doctrine in Davis , remanding Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.2005), to the Indiana courts to consider, if appropriate, the application of the doctrine.

2007The high court reiterated its approval of the doctrine in Davis , remanding Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), to the Indiana courts to consider, if appropriate, the application of the doctrine.

2002He argues that the forfeiture hearing should have started within 90 days of January 29, 1999, on or before March 28, 1999, 5 citing Tellevik v. 31641 West Rutherford Street, 120 Wn.2d 68 , 838 P.2d 111 (1992) (Tellevik I); Tellevik v. 31641 West Rutherford Street, 125 Wn.2d 364 , 884 P.2d 1319 (1994) (Tellevik II); and Espinoza v. City of Everett, 87 Wn.

2002He argues that the forfeiture hearing should have started within 90 days of January 29, 1999, on or before March 28, 1999, 5 citing Tellevik v. 31641 West Rutherford Street, 120 Wn.2d 68 , 838 P.2d 111 (1992) (Tellevik I); Tellevik v. 31641 West Rutherford Street, 125 Wn.2d 364 , 884 P.2d 1319 (1994) (Tellevik II); and Espinoza v. City of Everett, 87 Wn.

2022Because Potts fails to carry his burden in demonstrating the elements of standing, we decline to address his assignment of error based on the City’s failure to hold a forfeiture hearing for Potts Family Motors, Inc. KS Tacoma Holdings, 166 Wn.

2020App. 195, 204-05 , 312 P.3d 60 (2013) (“A trial court has the authority to excuse a condition to performance . . . where enforcing the condition would cause disproportionate forfeiture.”); RESTATEMENT, supra, § 229. “‘To justify a forfeiture for the violation of the condition, the violation must be wilful and substantial.’” Port of Walla Walla v. Sun-Glo Producers, Inc., 8 Wn.

2020App. 51, 59 , 504 P.2d 324 (1972) (quoting In re Estate of Murphy, 191 Wash. 180, 188 , 71 P.2d 6 (1937), rev’d on other grounds, 193 Wash. 400 , 75 P.2d 916 (1938)).

2017But the lack of probable cause for a seizure goes to the merits of a forfeiture claim, and not to a court’s jurisdiction to hear the claim. $401,333.44, 164 Wn.

2016Id.

2016Id. at 652 .

2016Id. at 224-25 .

2014“When an appeal is moot, it should be dismissed.” Klickitat County, 122 Wn.2d at 631 . ¶22 The forfeiture challenge is moot for two reasons.

2012Mason, 160 Wash.2d at 927 , 162 P.3d 396 (quoting State v. Davis, 154 Wash.2d 291, 305 , 111 P.3d 844 (2005)).

2012State v. Fallentine, 149 Wn.