forfeiture clause in Maryland

2022Conversely, in Golt, the tenant was entitled to restitution precisely because, due to the poor conditions of the property in addition to the lack of a license, the landlord was precluded from enforcing the lease. 308 Md. at 12-14 .

2022Conversely, in Golt, the tenant was entitled to restitution precisely because, due to the poor conditions of the property in addition to the lack of a license, the landlord was precluded from enforcing the lease. 308 Md. at 12-14 .

1980In Popplein v. Foley, 61 Md. 381 , it is said: 'While specific execution is a matter not of absolute right in the party, but of sound discretion in the court, yet if a contract respecting real property is in writing and is certain and fair in all its parts, for an adequate consideration and capable of being performed, it is as much a matter of course for a court of equity to decree specific performance of it as it is for a court of law to give damages for breach of it.’ Cochran v. Pascault, 54 Md. 1 ; Lucas v. Long, 125 Md. 427 .” 2 The Court of Appeals affirmed this rule in Armstrong v. Stiff

1922In Popplein v. Foley, 61 Md. 381 , it is said: “While specific execution is a matter not of absolute right in the party, but of sound discretion in the court, yet if a contract respecting real property is in writing and is certain and fair in all its. parts, for an adequate consideration and capable of being performed, it is as much a matter of course for a court of equity to decree specific performance of it as it is for a court of Jaw to give damages for a breach of it.” Cochran v. Pascault, 54 Md. 1 ; Lucas v. Long, 125 Md. 427 .

1980In Popplein v. Foley, 61 Md. 381 , it is said: 'While specific execution is a matter not of absolute right in the party, but of sound discretion in the court, yet if a contract respecting real property is in writing and is certain and fair in all its parts, for an adequate consideration and capable of being performed, it is as much a matter of course for a court of equity to decree specific performance of it as it is for a court of law to give damages for breach of it.’ Cochran v. Pascault, 54 Md. 1 ; Lucas v. Long, 125 Md. 427 .” 2 The Court of Appeals affirmed this rule in Armstrong v. Stiff

1922In Popplein v. Foley, 61 Md. 381 , it is said: “While specific execution is a matter not of absolute right in the party, but of sound discretion in the court, yet if a contract respecting real property is in writing and is certain and fair in all its. parts, for an adequate consideration and capable of being performed, it is as much a matter of course for a court of equity to decree specific performance of it as it is for a court of Jaw to give damages for a breach of it.” Cochran v. Pascault, 54 Md. 1 ; Lucas v. Long, 125 Md. 427 .

2014This view of the law was error, but the court is free to consider evidence of the defendant’s intent on remand. 554 U.S. at 377 , 128 S.Ct. 2678 (emphasis supplied).

2014This view of the law was error, but the court is free to consider evidence of the defendant’s intent on remand. 554 U.S. at 377 , 128 S.Ct. 2678 (emphasis supplied).

2007The Court stated that the testator “could have included in her will a forfeiture clause or ‘gift over’ in the event the Home did not strictly comply with the will” but “did not do so,” pointing out “[tjhere is no residuary clause in this will.” Id. at 270-71 , 64 A.2d 102 .

2007The Court stated that the testator “could have included in her will a forfeiture clause or ‘gift over’ in the event the Home did not strictly comply with the will” but “did not do so,” pointing out “[tjhere is no residuary clause in this will.” Id. at 270-71 , 64 A.2d 102 .

2001The Court of Appeals found no ambiguity with the term “scheduled,” stating: “Had the Legislature intended that a hearing on the forfeiture petition was to be held within 30 days of conviction, it could have said so; it did not, and with good reason.” Harley Davidson, 303 Md. at 159 , 492 A.2d 896 .

2001The Court of Appeals found no ambiguity with the term “scheduled,” stating: “Had the Legislature intended that a hearing on the forfeiture petition was to be held within 30 days of conviction, it could have said so; it did not, and with good reason.” Harley Davidson, 303 Md. at 159 , 492 A.2d 896 .

1999At the forfeiture hearing, petitioner initially moved to dismiss the ease because, he alleged, the evidence necessary to prove respondent’s case, the bags of cocaine, had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and thus should be suppressed under the “exclusionary rule.” See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).

1999At the forfeiture hearing, petitioner initially moved to dismiss the ease because, he alleged, the evidence necessary to prove respondent’s case, the bags of cocaine, had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and thus should be suppressed under the “exclusionary rule.” See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).

1999At the forfeiture hearing, petitioner initially moved to dismiss the ease because, he alleged, the evidence necessary to prove respondent’s case, the bags of cocaine, had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and thus should be suppressed under the “exclusionary rule.” See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).

1999At the forfeiture hearing, petitioner initially moved to dismiss the ease because, he alleged, the evidence necessary to prove respondent’s case, the bags of cocaine, had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and thus should be suppressed under the “exclusionary rule.” See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).

1999At the forfeiture hearing, however, respondent's counsel admitted that the criminal prosecutor "was not sure whether or not she would be able to win on a motion to suppress." [2] Legislative changes to section 297 since 1996, when respondent initiated its case, have not substantially altered the relevant subsections. [3] Part of the Court of Special Appeals's criticism of Plymouth Sedan is its "total reliance" on Boyd , which that court says "has been completely repudiated." See One 1995 Corvette, 119 Md.App. at 726 , 706 A.2d at 61 .

1999At the forfeiture hearing, however, respondent's counsel admitted that the criminal prosecutor "was not sure whether or not she would be able to win on a motion to suppress." [2] Legislative changes to section 297 since 1996, when respondent initiated its case, have not substantially altered the relevant subsections. [3] Part of the Court of Special Appeals's criticism of Plymouth Sedan is its "total reliance" on Boyd , which that court says "has been completely repudiated." See One 1995 Corvette, 119 Md.App. at 726 , 706 A.2d at 61 .

1994In State v. One 1985 Ford, supra, a case also involving the forfeiture of a motor vehicle for possession of marijuana, the Court of Special Appeals said that in terms of the ultimate forfeiture hearing, “the merits of the forfeiture issue are to be controlled by the provisions of [§ 297(b) ].” 72 Md.App. at 146 , 527 A.2d 1311 .

1994In State v. One 1985 Ford, supra, a case also involving the forfeiture of a motor vehicle for possession of marijuana, the Court of Special Appeals said that in terms of the ultimate forfeiture hearing, “the merits of the forfeiture issue are to be controlled by the provisions of [§ 297(b) ].” 72 Md.App. at 146 , 527 A.2d 1311 .

1992“Despite the siren-like quality of these arguments, they are unsupported by authority and contrary to what we perceive to be the law.” Cinelli, 785 F.2d at 266 .

1987To exonerate an insurer from responsibility on its contract merely because the applicant has misstated a fact which the insurer’s own records disclose, or ought to disclose, and which the applicant has no knowledge of at all, would convert this forfeiture clause into a provision, not for the protection of the insurer against deception, but for the infliction of gross injustice upon a confiding and innocent beneficiary. 108 Md. at 157, 63 A. at 212 .

1981The Municipal Court of Appeals disagreed, based upon the complaint filed by the seller: "It is true that at the end of the complaint plaintiff alleged that she had been 'damaged by defendants’ breach of contract,’ but in the body of the complaint it was made quite plain that the suit was based on the forfeiture clause of the contract, and that plaintiff claimed that a forfeiture had been worked by defendants’ default and that they should be required to pay the amount of the dishonored check.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 805 .

1980In Stewart v. Griffith, 217 U.S. 323 , the Supreme Court of the United States, under a somewhat similar state of facts, decreed a specific performance of the contract.

1980In Popplein v. Foley, 61 Md. 381 , it is said: 'While specific execution is a matter not of absolute right in the party, but of sound discretion in the court, yet if a contract respecting real property is in writing and is certain and fair in all its parts, for an adequate consideration and capable of being performed, it is as much a matter of course for a court of equity to decree specific performance of it as it is for a court of law to give damages for breach of it.’ Cochran v. Pascault, 54 Md. 1 ; Lucas v. Long, 125 Md. 427 .” 2 The Court of Appeals affirmed this rule in Armstrong v. Stiff

1980The sellers further contend that the construction of the clause should be determined by their conduct, as revealed in their correspondence with the buyers, that they viewed the forfeiture of deposit as only a portion of their damages. *274 Although the practical construction which the parties have given to a contract is persuasive evidence of the parties’ intent in entering into the agreement, Hughes v. Thurman, 213 Md. 169, 177 , 131 A.2d 479 (1957), and notwithstanding the rule that a contract is construed against its draftsman where the meaning is doubtful, Burroughs Corp. v. Ches.

1980The sellers further contend that the construction of the clause should be determined by their conduct, as revealed in their correspondence with the buyers, that they viewed the forfeiture of deposit as only a portion of their damages. *274 Although the practical construction which the parties have given to a contract is persuasive evidence of the parties’ intent in entering into the agreement, Hughes v. Thurman, 213 Md. 169, 177 , 131 A.2d 479 (1957), and notwithstanding the rule that a contract is construed against its draftsman where the meaning is doubtful, Burroughs Corp. v. Ches.

1970“The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions.” Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 239 , as quoted in New York Times, at 284, which continues, quoting with approval Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134, 146 , N.W.2d 719, 725 (1959), “[t]he showing of malice required for the forfeiture of the privilege is not presumed but is a matter of proof by the plaintiff * * We hold that the grant of appellee’s motion was error requiring reversal. 16 *77 We also find error requiring reversal in the denial of appellant’s motion for a directed verdict made at the close

1970“The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions.” Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 239 , as quoted in New York Times, at 284, which continues, quoting with approval Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134, 146 , N.W.2d 719, 725 (1959), “[t]he showing of malice required for the forfeiture of the privilege is not presumed but is a matter of proof by the plaintiff * * We hold that the grant of appellee’s motion was error requiring reversal. 16 *77 We also find error requiring reversal in the denial of appellant’s motion for a directed verdict made at the close

1922The provisions of the forfeiture clause were: “If for any reason, the parties of the second part shall fail in any particular to perform the covenants, conditions and stipula: tions herein expressed, on their part to be performed, within the time specified, to wit, January 2, 1921, then all sums paid on account of said purchase money and all buildings erected on the above described property and all crops planted thereon shall be forfeited and retained by the said vendors as liquidated damages for the breach thereof, and this contract shall be void.” In Maryland Clay Co. v. Simpers, 96 Md. 8 ,

1922The provisions of the forfeiture clause were: “If for any reason, the parties of the second part shall fail in any particular to perform the covenants, conditions and stipula: tions herein expressed, on their part to be performed, within the time specified, to wit, January 2, 1921, then all sums paid on account of said purchase money and all buildings erected on the above described property and all crops planted thereon shall be forfeited and retained by the said vendors as liquidated damages for the breach thereof, and this contract shall be void.” In Maryland Clay Co. v. Simpers, 96 Md. 8 ,

1906An., supra, we said “There can be no doubt *508 that the Legislature may use such language in a charter as will make a forfeiture clause self-executing, and the corporation will ipso facto cease to exist, but it requires strong and unmistakable language to work such results, and ‘in the construction of clauses prescribing a condition or contingency, the Courts seem generally opposed to that which supports a forfeiture ipso facto without judgment of dissolution in a Court proceeding,’ 9 Ency of Law, 555,” and .later in that opinion we added, that “Authorities are numerous in this-State, to the