forfeiture clause in Texas

2024See Giles, 554 U.S. at 365 (“The absence of a forfeiture rule covering this sort of conduct [intended to prevent a witness from testifying] would create an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them.”); Gonzalez, 195 S.W.3d at 117 (“The doctrine is based on the principle that any tampering with a witness should once [and] for all estop the tamperer from making any objection based on the results of his own chicanery.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023“The Supreme Court has explained that the forfeiture rule applies only when the defendant’s conduct is ‘designed to prevent the witness from testifying.’” Id. (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 359 ).

2023Ferguson v. Ferguson, 111 S.W.3d 589 , 598−99 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (the determination of whether a forfeiture clause is triggered, i.e., whether the contesting party’s actions fall within the terms of the forfeiture clause, is a question of law).

2023“If the purpose of a suit involving a will is to thwart the testator’s intention, the forfeiture clause should be effected.” Ferguson v. Ferguson, 111 S.W.3d 589, 599 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet denied).

2008See Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 , 25 L.Ed. 244 .

2008See Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 , 25 L.Ed. 244 .

2003Id.; Hodge v. Ellis, 268 S.W.2d 275, 287 (Tex. Civ.

2003Id.; Hodge v. Ellis, 268 S.W.2d 275, 287 (Tex. Civ.

2026App. 1999) (Meyers, J., dissenting) (declining to find waiver because record did not show that defendant “affirmatively accepted, as part of his plea bargain, the relinquishment of a statutory provision or right”); cf. Prall v. State, No. 03-24-00379-CR, 2025 WL 2404393 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 20, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that defendant’s “decisions voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently to accept the plea bargain and waive any right to appeal from the trial court’s cumulation order at the time that he was placed on community supervision ‘

2025Accordingly, Prall’s decisions voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently to accept the plea bargain and waive any right to appeal from the trial court’s cumulation order at the time that he was placed on community supervision “must work as a forfeiture of the claim, and he may not . . . attempt to resuscitate it in a later appeal from the revocation of his community supervision.” Wiley, 410 S.W.3d at 321 .

1992See Lovelace, 783 S.W.2d at 826 .

1991The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Court of Appeals recently held that the “thirty day period for setting a forfeiture hearing after the filing of an answer is a mandatory requirement.” Lopez v. State, 797 S.W.2d 272 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied); Lovelace v. Downey, 783 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990) (orig. proceeding); see also Clark v. State, 693 S.W.2d 23 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).

2021EST. § 254.005(b); see Lesikar v. Moon, 237 S.W.3d 361 , 370–71 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (A beneficiary has an inherent right to challenge the actions of a fiduciary, and he does not trigger a forfeiture clause by doing so.); McLendon v. McLendon, 862 S.W.2d 662, 679 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied) (“The right to challenge a fiduciary’s actions is inherent in the fiduciary/beneficiary relationship.”).

2015We therefore also hold that a beneficiary exercising his or her inherent right to challenge a fiduciary may seek injunctive and other relief, including the appointment of a receiver, from the trial court to protect what the testator or grantor intended the beneficiary to have without triggering the forfeiture clause. 17 In re Estate of Boylan, No. 02-14-00170-CV, 2015 WL 598531 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 12, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Conte v. Conte, 56 S.W.3d 830, 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). 19 See, e.g., Lesik

2011See Kubosh v. State, 241 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Tex. Crim.

2010Kubosh v. State, 241 S.W.3d 60, 63 (Tex. Crim.

2010See id. at 764 .

2010See id. at 764 .

2009Because, as detailed herein, we find that the trial court did not err in concluding that the forfeiture clause is unenforceable, we need not address this perceived am biguity. 8 Sheshunoff, 209 S.W.3d at 648 -49 (citing Light, 883 S.W.2d at 647 ).

2009Because, as detailed herein, we find that the trial court did not err in concluding that the forfeiture clause is unenforceable, we need not address this perceived am biguity. 8 Sheshunoff, 209 S.W.3d at 648 -49 (citing Light, 883 S.W.2d at 647 ).

2009Because, as detailed herein, we find that the trial court did not err in concluding that the forfeiture clause is unenforceable, we need not address this perceived am biguity. 8 Sheshunoff, 209 S.W.3d at 648 -49 (citing Light, 883 S.W.2d at 647 ).

2009Because, as detailed herein, we find that the trial court did not err in concluding that the forfeiture clause is unenforceable, we need not address this perceived am biguity. 8 Sheshunoff, 209 S.W.3d at 648 -49 (citing Light, 883 S.W.2d at 647 ).

2009See Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Hass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. 1991).

2009See Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Hass , 818 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. 1991).

2006See United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 914 (D.C.Cir. 1997); Mayhew , 380 F. Supp. 2d at 968 ; People v. Jones , ___ Mich. App. __, ___, 2006 Mich. App. LEXIS 586 *10-13 (Mich. App. 2006). 48.

2006See United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 914 (D.C.Cir.1997); Mayhew, 380 F.Supp.2d at 968 ; People v. Jones, - Mich.App. -, -, 2006 Mich. App. LEXIS 586 *10-13 (Mich.App.2006). .

1990In State v. Boren, 654 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Tex. App.—Waco 1983, no writ), the Waco court held that the thirty-day time period for setting a forfeiture hearing was merely directory and not mandatory.

1990In State v. Boren, 654 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Tex.App.—Waco 1983, no writ), the Waco court held that the thirty-day time period for setting a forfeiture hearing was merely directory and not mandatory.

1991The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Court of Appeals recently held that the “thirty day period for setting a forfeiture hearing after the filing of an answer is a mandatory requirement.” Lopez v. State, 797 S.W.2d 272 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied); Lovelace v. Downey, 783 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990) (orig. proceeding); see also Clark v. State, 693 S.W.2d 23 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).

1990State v. $4097 in U.S. Currency, 773 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied); Clark v. State, 693 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1985, no writ).

2024See Giles, 554 U.S. at 365 (“The absence of a forfeiture rule covering this sort of conduct [intended to prevent a witness from testifying] would create an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them.”); Gonzalez, 195 S.W.3d at 117 (“The doctrine is based on the principle that any tampering with a witness should once [and] for all estop the tamperer from making any objection based on the results of his own chicanery.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023“The Supreme Court has explained that the forfeiture rule applies only when the defendant’s conduct is ‘designed to prevent the witness from testifying.’” Id. (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 359 ).

2009Id. at 1191 (citing Vernon, 301 F.2d. at 89 ).

1998Co. v. Guynes, 713 F.2d 1187, 1191 (5th Cir.1983) (applying Texas law) (“Under the statutory scheme, only those falsehoods which are ... material, fraudulently made, and which mislead the insurer and cause it to lose some valid defense, if made after the loss occurs, may be made the basis for voiding a policy pursuant to a forfeiture clause.”).

2022See Colone, 573 S.W.3d at 264 .

2021Id. at 264–65. 164 may support a finding that the crime expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution—rendering her prior statements admissible under the forfeiture doctrine.

2021EST. § 254.005(b); see Lesikar v. Moon, 237 S.W.3d 361 , 370–71 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (A beneficiary has an inherent right to challenge the actions of a fiduciary, and he does not trigger a forfeiture clause by doing so.); McLendon v. McLendon, 862 S.W.2d 662, 679 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied) (“The right to challenge a fiduciary’s actions is inherent in the fiduciary/beneficiary relationship.”).

2015We therefore also hold that a beneficiary exercising his or her inherent right to challenge a fiduciary may seek injunctive and other relief, including the appointment of a receiver, from the trial court to protect what the testator or grantor intended the beneficiary to have without triggering the forfeiture clause. 17 In re Estate of Boylan, No. 02-14-00170-CV, 2015 WL 598531 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 12, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Conte v. Conte, 56 S.W.3d 830, 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). 19 See, e.g., Lesik

2006March 23, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (holding that to apply the forfeiture doctrine in a situation in which the predicate misconduct triggering forfeiture and the crime alleged in the indictment are the same would ignore the presumption of innocence). . 362 Ill.App.3d 335 , 299 Ill.Dec. 8 , 841 N.E.2d 420 (2005). .

2006March 23, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (holding that to apply the forfeiture doctrine in a situation in which the predicate misconduct triggering forfeiture and the crime alleged in the indictment are the same would ignore the presumption of innocence). . 362 Ill.App.3d 335 , 299 Ill.Dec. 8 , 841 N.E.2d 420 (2005). .

1990In light of the court's decision in State v. $4097 in U.S. Currency, 773 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1989, writ denied) (the majority's authority), a conflict exists amongst the appellate courts concerning whether the State has a mandatory duty to set a forfeiture hearing within thirty days from the date the defendant files his answer. [1] Our Legislature, however, has attempted to correct this conflict by repealing art. 4476-15, § 5.07(a) and enacting the Act of Aug. 2, 1989, ch. 12, 1989 Tex.Gen. & Spec.Laws, 1st C.S. 14.

1990Currency, 773 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied) (the majority’s authority), a conflict exists amongst the appellate courts concerning whether the State has a mandatory duty to set a forfeiture hearing within thirty days from the date the defendant files his answer. 1 Our Legislature, however, has attempted to correct this conflict by repealing art. 4476-15, § 5.07(a) and enacting the Act of Aug. 2, 1989, ch. 12, 1989 Tex.Gen. & Spec.Laws, 1st C.S. 14.