forfeiture hearing in Georgia

2014If the forfeiture doctrine did not admit unconfronted prior testimony at common law, the conclusion must be, not that the forfeiture doctrine requires no specific intent in order to render unconfronted testimony available, but that unconfronted testimony is subject to no forfeiture doctrine at all.” (citation omitted)). 19 Ga. 402, 402-03 (1856) (“It was resolved, upon the trial of Lord Morley, for murder... that in case oath should be made that any witness who had been examined by the Crown, and was then absent, was detained by the means or procurement of the prisoner, and the Court should be

2014If the forfeiture doctrine did not admit unconfronted prior testimony at common law, the conclusion must be, not that the forfeiture doctrine requires no specific intent in order to render unconfronted testimony available, but that unconfronted testimony is subject to no forfeiture doctrine at all.” (citation omitted)). 24 Williams v. State, 19 Ga. 402, 402-03 (1856) (“It was resolved, upon the trial of Lord Morley, for murder . . . that in case oath should be made that any witness who had been examined by the Crown, and was then absent, was detained by the means or procurement of the prisoner

2014Davis, 547 U. S. at 833 (TV) (“We take no position on the standards necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture, but federal courts using Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (b) (6), which codifies the forfeiture doctrine, have generally held the Government to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.

2014The friend then went to Jones’s house around 2:30 p.m., just as Jones’s older daughter was returning home 26 Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 (IV) (“We take no position on the standards necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture, but federal courts using Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (b) (6), which codifies the forfeiture doctrine, have generally held the Government to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.

2013See OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (4) (“If... no [timely] answer has been filed, the court shall order the disposition of the seized property....”); State of Ga. v. Adams, 264 Ga. 842, 842 (1) ( 452 SE2d 117 ) (1995) (“The 60-day time period [in which to conduct a forfeiture hearing] does not commence to run until the filing of a sufficient answer, as determined by the requirements of OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3).” (punctuation omitted)); McFarley v. State of Ga., 268 Ga. App. 621, 623 ( 602 SE2d 341 ) (2004) (the failure to file a sufficient answer is the equivalent of filing no answer at all and results in

2013See OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (4) (“If... no [timely] answer has been filed, the court shall order the disposition of the seized property....”); State of Ga. v. Adams, 264 Ga. 842, 842 (1) ( 452 SE2d 117 ) (1995) (“The 60-day time period [in which to conduct a forfeiture hearing] does not commence to run until the filing of a sufficient answer, as determined by the requirements of OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3).” (punctuation omitted)); McFarley v. State of Ga., 268 Ga. App. 621, 623 ( 602 SE2d 341 ) (2004) (the failure to file a sufficient answer is the equivalent of filing no answer at all and results in

2013See OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (4) (“If... no [timely] answer has been filed, the court shall order the disposition of the seized property....”); State of Ga. v. Adams, 264 Ga. 842, 842 (1) ( 452 SE2d 117 ) (1995) (“The 60-day time period [in which to conduct a forfeiture hearing] does not commence to run until the filing of a sufficient answer, as determined by the requirements of OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3).” (punctuation omitted)); McFarley v. State of Ga., 268 Ga. App. 621, 623 ( 602 SE2d 341 ) (2004) (the failure to file a sufficient answer is the equivalent of filing no answer at all and results in

2013See OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (4) (“If... no [timely] answer has been filed, the court shall order the disposition of the seized property....”); State of Ga. v. Adams, 264 Ga. 842, 842 (1) ( 452 SE2d 117 ) (1995) (“The 60-day time period [in which to conduct a forfeiture hearing] does not commence to run until the filing of a sufficient answer, as determined by the requirements of OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3).” (punctuation omitted)); McFarley v. State of Ga., 268 Ga. App. 621, 623 ( 602 SE2d 341 ) (2004) (the failure to file a sufficient answer is the equivalent of filing no answer at all and results in

2013See OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (4) (“If... no [timely] answer has been filed, the court shall order the disposition of the seized property....”); State of Ga. v. Adams, 264 Ga. 842, 842 (1) ( 452 SE2d 117 ) (1995) (“The 60-day time period [in which to conduct a forfeiture hearing] does not commence to run until the filing of a sufficient answer, as determined by the requirements of OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3).” (punctuation omitted)); McFarley v. State of Ga., 268 Ga. App. 621, 623 ( 602 SE2d 341 ) (2004) (the failure to file a sufficient answer is the equivalent of filing no answer at all and results in

2013See OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (4) (“If... no [timely] answer has been filed, the court shall order the disposition of the seized property....”); State of Ga. v. Adams, 264 Ga. 842, 842 (1) ( 452 SE2d 117 ) (1995) (“The 60-day time period [in which to conduct a forfeiture hearing] does not commence to run until the filing of a sufficient answer, as determined by the requirements of OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3).” (punctuation omitted)); McFarley v. State of Ga., 268 Ga. App. 621, 623 ( 602 SE2d 341 ) (2004) (the failure to file a sufficient answer is the equivalent of filing no answer at all and results in

2014VI. 13 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (III) (A) ( 124 SCt 1354 , 158 LE2d 177) (2004). 10 where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”14 Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States has determined that interrogations by law-enforcement officers fall within the ambit of testimonial statements with which the Confrontation Clause is concerned.15 Nevertheless, in Giles v. California,16 the Supreme Court of the United States made clear that, notwithstanding a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront th

2014VI. 13 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (III) (A) ( 124 SCt 1354 , 158 LE2d 177) (2004). 10 where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”14 Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States has determined that interrogations by law-enforcement officers fall within the ambit of testimonial statements with which the Confrontation Clause is concerned.15 Nevertheless, in Giles v. California,16 the Supreme Court of the United States made clear that, notwithstanding a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront th

2014Nor does he contend that trial counsel was ineffective in so stipulating. 16 554 U.S. 353 ( 128 SCt 2678 , 171 LE2d 488) (2008). 11 wrongdoing permits the introduction of statements made by a witness who has been “‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means or procurement’ of the defendant.”17 Indeed, Justice Scalia—after briefly describing the founding-era history of this doctrine—succinctly explained in Giles that “[t]he terms used to define the scope of the forfeiture rule suggest that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifyi

2014Nor does he contend that trial counsel was ineffective in so stipulating. 16 554 U.S. 353 ( 128 SCt 2678 , 171 LE2d 488) (2008). 11 wrongdoing permits the introduction of statements made by a witness who has been “‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means or procurement’ of the defendant.”17 Indeed, Justice Scalia—after briefly describing the founding-era history of this doctrine—succinctly explained in Giles that “[t]he terms used to define the scope of the forfeiture rule suggest that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifyi

2014Nor does he contend that trial counsel was ineffective in so stipulating. 16 554 U.S. 353 ( 128 SCt 2678 , 171 LE2d 488) (2008). 11 wrongdoing permits the introduction of statements made by a witness who has been “‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means or procurement’ of the defendant.”17 Indeed, Justice Scalia—after briefly describing the founding-era history of this doctrine—succinctly explained in Giles that “[t]he terms used to define the scope of the forfeiture rule suggest that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifyi

2014Nor does he contend that trial counsel was ineffective in so stipulating. 16 554 U.S. 353 ( 128 SCt 2678 , 171 LE2d 488) (2008). 11 wrongdoing permits the introduction of statements made by a witness who has been “‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means or procurement’ of the defendant.”17 Indeed, Justice Scalia—after briefly describing the founding-era history of this doctrine—succinctly explained in Giles that “[t]he terms used to define the scope of the forfeiture rule suggest that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifyi

2014CARLSON & MICHAEL SCOTT, CARLSON ON EVIDENCE 509-14 (2d. ed. 2014) (discussing the 19 statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness” shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.34 Because OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (5) is a procedural statute, it would apply to a retrial if we were to reverse this case.35 Accordingly, even if the trial court erroneously admitted testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay under the prior evidence code, the sam

2014CARLSON & MICHAEL SCOTT, CARLSON ON EVIDENCE 509-14 (2d. ed. 2014) (discussing the 19 statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness” shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.34 Because OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (5) is a procedural statute, it would apply to a retrial if we were to reverse this case.35 Accordingly, even if the trial court erroneously admitted testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay under the prior evidence code, the sam

2014CARLSON & MICHAEL SCOTT, CARLSON ON EVIDENCE 509-14 (2d. ed. 2014) (discussing the 19 statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness” shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.34 Because OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (5) is a procedural statute, it would apply to a retrial if we were to reverse this case.35 Accordingly, even if the trial court erroneously admitted testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay under the prior evidence code, the sam

2014CARLSON & MICHAEL SCOTT, CARLSON ON EVIDENCE 509-14 (2d. ed. 2014) (discussing the 19 statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness” shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.34 Because OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (5) is a procedural statute, it would apply to a retrial if we were to reverse this case.35 Accordingly, even if the trial court erroneously admitted testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay under the prior evidence code, the sam

2013OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5) pertinently provides, “If an answer is filed, a hearing must be held within 60 days after service of the complaint unless continued for good cause.”2 In State v. Henderson,3 the Supreme Court of Georgia construed “must” as used therein as “mandatory, rather than directory,” reasoning that such a requirement was “consistent with the apparent purpose of that paragraph, which is to ensure a speedy resolution of contested forfeiture cases in the courts, as well as a speedy resolution of property rights.”4 2 (Emphasis supplied.) 3 263 Ga. 508, 510-511 ( 436 SE2d 209 ) (1993)

2013OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5) pertinently provides, “If an answer is filed, a hearing must be held within 60 days after service of the complaint unless continued for good cause.”2 In State v. Henderson,3 the Supreme Court of Georgia construed “must” as used therein as “mandatory, rather than directory,” reasoning that such a requirement was “consistent with the apparent purpose of that paragraph, which is to ensure a speedy resolution of contested forfeiture cases in the courts, as well as a speedy resolution of property rights.”4 2 (Emphasis supplied.) 3 263 Ga. 508, 510-511 ( 436 SE2d 209 ) (1993)

2007See Russell v. KDA, Inc., 206 Ga. App. 397, 399 (2) ( 425 SE2d 406 ) (1992); see also E.

2007See Russell v. KDA, Inc., 206 Ga. App. 397, 399 (2) ( 425 SE2d 406 ) (1992); see also E.

2006We held that this claim, after a previous forfeiture claim “for the same type of offense, committed by the same defendant, with another loaner vehicle, from the same interrelated companies now rings hollow.” Id. at 10 (3) (b).

2006We held that this claim, after a previous forfeiture claim "for the same type of offense, committed by the same defendant, with another loaner vehicle, from the same interrelated companies now rings hollow." Id. at 10 (3)(b), 528 S.E.2d 523 .

2005Bank, 217 SE2d 135, 139-140 (S.C. 1975) (a forfeiture clause in a profit or pension plan which provides that upon employment with a competitor a participant is divested of rights under the plan is an invalid covenant not to compete unless it contains reasonable time and geographic limitations).

2004See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

2004See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

2004NOTES [1] Pitts v. State, of Ga., 207 Ga.App. 606, 607 , 428 S.E.2d 650 (1993); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 , 85 S.Ct. 1246 , 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965).

2004NOTES [1] Pitts v. State, of Ga., 207 Ga.App. 606, 607 , 428 S.E.2d 650 (1993); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 , 85 S.Ct. 1246 , 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965).

2004NOTES [1] Pitts v. State, of Ga., 207 Ga.App. 606, 607 , 428 S.E.2d 650 (1993); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 , 85 S.Ct. 1246 , 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965).

2004NOTES [1] Pitts v. State, of Ga., 207 Ga.App. 606, 607 , 428 S.E.2d 650 (1993); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 , 85 S.Ct. 1246 , 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965).

1998Turner “cannot complain of a result his own procedure or conduct aided in causing.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Glover v. State, 230 Ga. App. 795, 797 ( 498 SE2d 300 ) (1998).

1998Turner “cannot complain of a result his own procedure or conduct aided in causing.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Glover v. State, 230 Ga. App. 795, 797 ( 498 SE2d 300 ) (1998).

1997Banke concur. 1 We note that the appellant failed to transmit to this Court the videotape viewed by the trial court or a complete transcript of the testimony given at the forfeiture hearing. “[T]he burden is upon the party challenging the legality of a decision to prove error by the record. [Cit.] The presumption is in favor of the regularity and legality of all proceedings in the court below. [Cit.] In the absence of anything to the contrary appearing we presume that the trial judge had before him proof demonstrating [such finding].” Newton v. Newton, 222 Ga. 175, 176 (2) ( 149 SE2d 128 ) (19

1997Banke concur. 1 We note that the appellant failed to transmit to this Court the videotape viewed by the trial court or a complete transcript of the testimony given at the forfeiture hearing. “[T]he burden is upon the party challenging the legality of a decision to prove error by the record. [Cit.] The presumption is in favor of the regularity and legality of all proceedings in the court below. [Cit.] In the absence of anything to the contrary appearing we presume that the trial judge had before him proof demonstrating [such finding].” Newton v. Newton, 222 Ga. 175, 176 (2) ( 149 SE2d 128 ) (19

1997Center, 221 Ga. App. 760, 762 ( 472 SE2d 702 ) (1996); Mike’s Garage Door Co. v. Dews, 220 Ga. App. 648, 649 ( 469 SE2d 855 ) (1996); Dept. of Human Resources v. Cowan, 220 Ga. App. 230 ( 469 SE2d 384 ) (1996). 2 See also Lanier, supra at 52 (holding that it was reasonable to conclude that a defendant intended to use a truck to facilitate the transportation of drugs, when the defendant *123 arrived at the site of drug activity in the truck and had no alternative means of leaving the site after obtaining the drugs). 3 We note that Naomi Bettis may have been able to satisfy her burden of persuas

1997Center, 221 Ga. App. 760, 762 ( 472 SE2d 702 ) (1996); Mike’s Garage Door Co. v. Dews, 220 Ga. App. 648, 649 ( 469 SE2d 855 ) (1996); Dept. of Human Resources v. Cowan, 220 Ga. App. 230 ( 469 SE2d 384 ) (1996). 2 See also Lanier, supra at 52 (holding that it was reasonable to conclude that a defendant intended to use a truck to facilitate the transportation of drugs, when the defendant *123 arrived at the site of drug activity in the truck and had no alternative means of leaving the site after obtaining the drugs). 3 We note that Naomi Bettis may have been able to satisfy her burden of persuas

1997Center, 221 Ga. App. 760, 762 ( 472 SE2d 702 ) (1996); Mike’s Garage Door Co. v. Dews, 220 Ga. App. 648, 649 ( 469 SE2d 855 ) (1996); Dept. of Human Resources v. Cowan, 220 Ga. App. 230 ( 469 SE2d 384 ) (1996). 2 See also Lanier, supra at 52 (holding that it was reasonable to conclude that a defendant intended to use a truck to facilitate the transportation of drugs, when the defendant *123 arrived at the site of drug activity in the truck and had no alternative means of leaving the site after obtaining the drugs). 3 We note that Naomi Bettis may have been able to satisfy her burden of persuas

1997Center, 221 Ga. App. 760, 762 ( 472 SE2d 702 ) (1996); Mike’s Garage Door Co. v. Dews, 220 Ga. App. 648, 649 ( 469 SE2d 855 ) (1996); Dept. of Human Resources v. Cowan, 220 Ga. App. 230 ( 469 SE2d 384 ) (1996). 2 See also Lanier, supra at 52 (holding that it was reasonable to conclude that a defendant intended to use a truck to facilitate the transportation of drugs, when the defendant *123 arrived at the site of drug activity in the truck and had no alternative means of leaving the site after obtaining the drugs). 3 We note that Naomi Bettis may have been able to satisfy her burden of persuas

1997Banke concur. 1 We note that the appellant failed to transmit to this Court the videotape viewed by the trial court or a complete transcript of the testimony given at the forfeiture hearing. “[T]he burden is upon the party challenging the legality of a decision to prove error by the record. [Cit.] The presumption is in favor of the regularity and legality of all proceedings in the court below. [Cit.] In the absence of anything to the contrary appearing we presume that the trial judge had before him proof demonstrating [such finding].” Newton v. Newton, 222 Ga. 175, 176 (2) ( 149 SE2d 128 ) (19

1997Banke concur. 1 We note that the appellant failed to transmit to this Court the videotape viewed by the trial court or a complete transcript of the testimony given at the forfeiture hearing. “[T]he burden is upon the party challenging the legality of a decision to prove error by the record. [Cit.] The presumption is in favor of the regularity and legality of all proceedings in the court below. [Cit.] In the absence of anything to the contrary appearing we presume that the trial judge had before him proof demonstrating [such finding].” Newton v. Newton, 222 Ga. 175, 176 (2) ( 149 SE2d 128 ) (19

1995When a lease recites that the original lessee is to remain liable even if the lease is assigned, the lessee is not relieved from its contractual obligation merely because the lessor gives his written consent to the assignment.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Worth County Indus. &c. v. Lehigh Valley Indus., 183 Ga. App. 634, 636 (1) ( 359 SE2d 707 ) (1987).

1995When a lease recites that the original lessee is to remain liable even if the lease is assigned, the lessee is not relieved from its contractual obligation merely because the lessor gives his written consent to the assignment.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Worth County Indus. &c. v. Lehigh Valley Indus., 183 Ga. App. 634, 636 (1) ( 359 SE2d 707 ) (1987).

1993Birdsong & Sledge v. Brooks, 7 Ga. 88, 89 (1849) (cited and relied upon by the Court of Appeals as authority in the instant case).

1993Birdsong & Sledge v. Brooks, 7 Ga. 88, 89 (1849) (cited and relied upon by the Court of Appeals as authority in the instant case).

1993See Butler v. State, 207 Ga. App. 824 ( 429 SE2d 280 ) (1993).

1993See Butler v. State, 207 Ga. App. 824 ( 429 SE2d 280 ) (1993).

1990OCGA § 5-6-30; compare Ace Bonding Co. v. State, 180 Ga. App. 261 ( 349 SE2d 15 ) (direct appeal from the overruling and dismissal of motion to set aside judgments of final forfeiture on bonds).

1990OCGA § 5-6-30; compare Ace Bonding Co. v. State, 180 Ga. App. 261 ( 349 SE2d 15 ) (direct appeal from the overruling and dismissal of motion to set aside judgments of final forfeiture on bonds).