14 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1905–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
New York v. Hillgreen1 sentence2020As we explained above, the substantive component of the Due Process Clause allows plaintiffs to challenge the “fairness of [a] procedural bar or limitation, on the ground that the right foreclosed is so fundamental or important that it is protected from extinguishment.”175 And Due Process Clause case law has further clarified that “fundamental” rights may be extinguished through the operation of procedural provisions only where those provisions survive strict scrutiny review.176 So, in other words, the substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects individuals from being deprived of | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Thurstongreen1 sentence2011These decisions reason that "[wlaiting until after the jury has rendered a verdict of guilt to raise a limitations defense for the first time is inconsistent with the characterization of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense and would unfairly sandbag the government." See United States v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 63 (1st Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1097 , 125 S.Ct. 984 , 160 L.Ed.2d 988 (2005). 128 The State argues that we should adopt a forfeiture rule here to prevent Jackson from "sandbagging" the prosecution by failing to raise the defense until after the jury | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2011P. 12(f) ("Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial ... shall constitute waiver thereof."). 132 Third, we are not convinced that Jackson will undoubtedly succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, thereby making the forfeiture rule "an exercise in futility." See Williams, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 981 P.2d at 45 . 2011P. 12(f) ("Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial ... shall constitute waiver thereof."). 132 Third, we are not convinced that Jackson will undoubtedly succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, thereby making the forfeiture rule "an exercise in futility." See Williams, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 981 P.2d at 45 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kerbygreen1 sentence2011Were we to adopt that rule here, for example, this defendant undoubtedly would simply claim counsel was ineffective for not raising the statute of limitations at trial." Id. at 45; 10 see also State v. Kerby, 2007-NMSC-O14, 141 NM. 413, TT 17-20, 156 P.3d 704, 706 (following Williams and holding that where the state charged and convicted the defendant of a crime barred by the statute of limitations, the defense had not been forfeited by the failure to raise the defense at trial because "the statute of limitations is a substantive right that may only be waived by a defendant after consultation | 1 | 1 |
State v. Woodlandgreen1 sentence2011The forfeiture rule simply treats the statute of limitations defense like most other defenses and arguments not raised before or at trial. "[A] thorough colloquy is explicitly required only for effective waiver of rights guaranteed by the constitution." State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 670 (Utah 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Giles v. Californiagreen1 sentence2010Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280 ; see Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2682-83 ; Doan, 548 F.3d at 458 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Andres Aguiargreen1 sentence2010State v. Byrd, 198 N.J. 319 , 967 A.2d 285, 303 (2009); See United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir.1992); Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1105 (Colo.2007); 21A Am.Jur.2d Criminal *528 Law § 1095 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Byrdgreen1 sentence2010State v. Byrd, 198 N.J. 319 , 967 A.2d 285, 303 (2009); See United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir.1992); Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1105 (Colo.2007); 21A Am.Jur.2d Criminal *528 Law § 1095 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
Vasquez v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2010See Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1104 (Colo.2007) (“The forfeiture doctrine prevents defendants from profiting by their own misconduct; a defendant who eliminates a witness would otherwise be rewarded with the exclusion of that witness’s out-of-court statements.”). ¶ 17 Given the plain language of the Utah confrontation clause and the public policy at the time of the state’s founding, Utah law, like its federal counterpart and that of a number of sister states, recognizes the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 2010State v. Byrd, 198 N.J. 319 , 967 A.2d 285, 303 (2009); See United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir.1992); Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1105 (Colo.2007); 21A Am.Jur.2d Criminal *528 Law § 1095 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
Russell v. Park City Utah Corporationgreen1 sentence2009See, eg., Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 548 P.2d 889, 891 (Utah 1976); Bess v. Jensen, 782 P.2d 542, 544-45 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 9 . | 1 | 1 |
Bess v. Jensengreen1 sentence2009See, eg., Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 548 P.2d 889, 891 (Utah 1976); Bess v. Jensen, 782 P.2d 542, 544-45 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 9 . | 1 | 1 |
Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc.green1 sentence2004See Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 944 P.2d 361, 364 (Utah 1997) (“The true test in determining when a cause of action arises or accrues is to establish the time when the plaintiff could have first maintained the action to a successful conclusion.” (citation and quotation omitted)). ¶ 13 The State relies on cases in which we have identified controlling law by looking to the date on which a cause of action first accrued. | 1 | 1 |
Strand v. Maynegreen2 sentences1991We will enforce a forfeiture clause unless we find that the forfeiture would be so “grossly excessive in relation to any realistic view of loss that might have been contemplated by the parties that it would so shock the conscience that a court of equity would refuse such forfeiture.” Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 97 , 485 P.2d 673, 674 (1971); accord Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355 , 384 P.2d 396 (1963); Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59 , 278 P.2d 294 (1954). 1991We will enforce a forfeiture clause unless we find that the forfeiture would be so “grossly excessive in relation to any realistic view of loss that might have been contemplated by the parties that it would so shock the conscience that a court of equity would refuse such forfeiture.” Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 97 , 485 P.2d 673, 674 (1971); accord Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355 , 384 P.2d 396 (1963); Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59 , 278 P.2d 294 (1954). | 1 | 1 |
Jensen v. Nielsengreen2 sentences1991We will enforce a forfeiture clause unless we find that the forfeiture would be so “grossly excessive in relation to any realistic view of loss that might have been contemplated by the parties that it would so shock the conscience that a court of equity would refuse such forfeiture.” Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 97 , 485 P.2d 673, 674 (1971); accord Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355 , 384 P.2d 396 (1963); Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59 , 278 P.2d 294 (1954). 1991We will enforce a forfeiture clause unless we find that the forfeiture would be so “grossly excessive in relation to any realistic view of loss that might have been contemplated by the parties that it would so shock the conscience that a court of equity would refuse such forfeiture.” Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 97 , 485 P.2d 673, 674 (1971); accord Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355 , 384 P.2d 396 (1963); Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59 , 278 P.2d 294 (1954). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2013However, because we hold that the juvenile court had already amended Allegation III to charge (continued...) 20120085‐CA 4 2013 UT App 220 In re D.M. 140 P.3d 1219 (discussing “sandbagging” in the context of untimely objections to jury makeup); State v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 318 , ¶¶ 28–34, 263 P.3d 540 (applying a forfeiture analysis to a defendant’s failure to raise a statute of limitations defense prior to his conviction on the time‐barred offense). ¶9 D.M. further argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish the crime of sexual abuse of a child because the State did no 2013However, because we hold that the juvenile court had already amended Allegation III to charge (continued...) 20120085‐CA 4 2013 UT App 220 In re D.M. 140 P.3d 1219 (discussing “sandbagging” in the context of untimely objections to jury makeup); State v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 318 , ¶¶ 28–34, 263 P.3d 540 (applying a forfeiture analysis to a defendant’s failure to raise a statute of limitations defense prior to his conviction on the time‐barred offense). ¶9 D.M. further argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish the crime of sexual abuse of a child because the State did no | 2 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Valdez
green
2 sentences2013Under these circumstances, D.M.'s complaint of unfair surprise that he was ultimately adjudicated for sexual abuse of a child is unavailing. 4 Cf. State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ¶ 44 , 140 P.3d 1219 (discussing "sandbagging" in the context of untimely objections to jury makeup); State v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 318, ¶¶ 28-34 , 263 P.3d 540 (applying a forfeiture analysis to a defendant's failure to raise a statute of limitations defense prior to his conviction on the time-barred offense). 2013However, because we hold that the juvenile court had already amended Allegation III to charge (continued...) 20120085‐CA 4 2013 UT App 220 In re D.M. 140 P.3d 1219 (discussing “sandbagging” in the context of untimely objections to jury makeup); State v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 318 , ¶¶ 28–34, 263 P.3d 540 (applying a forfeiture analysis to a defendant’s failure to raise a statute of limitations defense prior to his conviction on the time‐barred offense). ¶9 D.M. further argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish the crime of sexual abuse of a child because the State did no | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co.
green
2 sentences2013UTAH CODE § 73-1-4(3)(f)(iii) (2002) (stating that forfeiture does not occur “when a water user has beneficially used substantially all of a water right within a five-year period”); Rocky Ford, 135 P.2d at 112 . 2013UTAH CODE § 73-1-4(3)(f)(iii) (2002) (stating that forfeiture does not occur "when a water user has beneficially used substantially all of a water right within a five-year period"); Rocky Ford, 135 P.2d at 112 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
In re D.M. (D.M. v. State)
green
1 sentence2013However, because we hold that the juvenile court had already amended Allegation III to charge (continued...) 20120085‐CA 4 2013 UT App 220 In re D.M. 140 P.3d 1219 (discussing “sandbagging” in the context of untimely objections to jury makeup); State v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 318 , ¶¶ 28–34, 263 P.3d 540 (applying a forfeiture analysis to a defendant’s failure to raise a statute of limitations defense prior to his conviction on the time‐barred offense). ¶9 D.M. further argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish the crime of sexual abuse of a child because the State did no | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District
green
1 sentence2013Id. 73-1-4(2)(a) (2013). 15 DELTA v. VINCENT Opinion of the Court flow component may be reduced in proportion to the volume reduction, at the district court’s discretion. ¶40 Materiality, or substantiality, is another important component of a forfeiture analysis. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Meza v. United States
green
1 sentence2011These decisions reason that "[wlaiting until after the jury has rendered a verdict of guilt to raise a limitations defense for the first time is inconsistent with the characterization of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense and would unfairly sandbag the government." See United States v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 63 (1st Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1097 , 125 S.Ct. 984 , 160 L.Ed.2d 988 (2005). 128 The State argues that we should adopt a forfeiture rule here to prevent Jackson from "sandbagging" the prosecution by failing to raise the defense until after the jury | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Hawkins v. United States
green
1 sentence2011These decisions reason that "[wlaiting until after the jury has rendered a verdict of guilt to raise a limitations defense for the first time is inconsistent with the characterization of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense and would unfairly sandbag the government." See United States v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 63 (1st Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1097 , 125 S.Ct. 984 , 160 L.Ed.2d 988 (2005). 128 The State argues that we should adopt a forfeiture rule here to prevent Jackson from "sandbagging" the prosecution by failing to raise the defense until after the jury | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Lenkart
green
1 sentence2011Typically, the defendant bears a heavy burden to establish counsel's ineffectiveness, see State v. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, ¶ 25 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Byrd
green
1 sentence2010State v. Byrd, 198 N.J. 319 , 967 A.2d 285, 303 (2009); See United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir.1992); Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1105 (Colo.2007); 21A Am.Jur.2d Criminal *528 Law § 1095 (2008). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Houlihan
green
1 sentence2010Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280 ; see Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2682-83 ; Doan, 548 F.3d at 458 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Doan v. Carter
green
1 sentence2010Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280 ; see Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2682-83 ; Doan, 548 F.3d at 458 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Jacobson v. Swan
green
2 sentences1991We will enforce a forfeiture clause unless we find that the forfeiture would be so “grossly excessive in relation to any realistic view of loss that might have been contemplated by the parties that it would so shock the conscience that a court of equity would refuse such forfeiture.” Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 97 , 485 P.2d 673, 674 (1971); accord Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355 , 384 P.2d 396 (1963); Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59 , 278 P.2d 294 (1954). 1991We will enforce a forfeiture clause unless we find that the forfeiture would be so “grossly excessive in relation to any realistic view of loss that might have been contemplated by the parties that it would so shock the conscience that a court of equity would refuse such forfeiture.” Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 97 , 485 P.2d 673, 674 (1971); accord Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355 , 384 P.2d 396 (1963); Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59 , 278 P.2d 294 (1954). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Cole v. Parker
green
2 sentences1991In Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d at 264 , 300 P.2d at 624 , the vendee had paid $11,600 toward a contract price of $40,000. 1991In Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d at 264 , 300 P.2d at 624 , the vendee had paid $11,600 toward a contract price of $40,000. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Kay v. Wood
neutral
2 sentences1977Last year in Kay v. Wood, Utah, 549 P.2d 709 (1976) we expressed the following regarding forfeiture provisions in real estate sales contracts: This court has long been committed to the rule that parties to a contract may agree as to the amount of liquidated damages that shall be paid in the case of a breach, that the agreement is enforceable if the amount stipulated to is not disproportionate to the damages actually sustained. 1977Last year in Kay v. Wood, Utah, 549 P.2d 709 (1976) we expressed the following regarding forfeiture provisions in real estate sales contracts: This court has long been committed to the rule that parties to a contract may agree as to the amount of liquidated damages that shall be paid in the case of a breach, that the agreement is enforceable if the amount stipulated to is not disproportionate to the damages actually sustained. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Leone v. Zuniga
green
2 sentences1942In the latest case, Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417 , 34 P. 2d 699, 702 , 94 A. L. 1942In the latest case, Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417 , 34 P. 2d 699, 702 , 94 A. L. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Wilcoxson v. Stitt
green
2 sentences1931In the Rose and in the Cooley Cases the court considered and distinguished the case of Wilcoxson v. Stitt, 65 Cal. 596 , 4 P. 629 , 52 Am. 1931In the Rose and in the Cooley Cases the court considered and distinguished the case of Wilcoxson v. Stitt, 65 Cal. 596 , 4 P. 629 , 52 Am. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Towle v. . Remsen green | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.