formulation rule in Pennsylvania

2017Accordingly, in Montagazzi we reiterated that “the question of assumption of the risk typically remains for the jury,” and that “only where the evidence reveals a scenario so clear as to void all questions of material fact concerning the plaintiffs own conduct can the court enter summary judgment.” Montagazzi, 994 A.2d at 636 .

2015Accordingly, in Montagazzi we reiterated that “the question of assumption of the risk typically remains for the jury,” and that “only where the evidence reveals a scenario so clear as to void all questions of material fact concerning the plaintiff’s own conduct can the court enter summary judgment.” Montagazzi, 994 A.2d at 636 .

1978These cases bear out the formulation of the doctrine in Russo, supra, that ‘where the distinct crimes set forth [in an indictment] grow out of the same transaction, differing only in degree, only one penalty can be imposed after conviction.’ 293 Pa. at 324 , 142 A. at 318 .” See also, e. g., Commonwealth v. Comber, supra; Commonwealth v. McCusker, 363 Pa. 450 , 70 A.2d 273 (1950); Commonwealth ex rel.

1978These cases bear out the formulation of the doctrine in Russo, supra, that ‘where the distinct crimes set forth [in an indictment] grow out of the same transaction, differing only in degree, only one penalty can be imposed after conviction.’ 293 Pa. at 324 , 142 A. at 318 .” See also, e. g., Commonwealth v. Comber, supra; Commonwealth v. McCusker, 363 Pa. 450 , 70 A.2d 273 (1950); Commonwealth ex rel.

2023Again, accepting for purposes of our disposition that, as in Collins, an exception to the First Amendment must apply, the only plausible bases are “fighting words” or “true threats.” Concerning the former, the Commonwealth failed to establish sufficient evidence that Appellant used “fighting words.” The basic formulation of that doctrine was stated in Cohen. “[T]he States are free to ban the simple use, without a demonstration of additional justifying circumstances, of so-called ‘fighting words,’ those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter

2020“However, while the federal automobile exception evolved to require only probable cause to search an automobile, our decisional law did not so evolve, but rather maintained its adherence to the original formulation of the exception.” Id. at 120 .

2016I write separately, unconstrained by majority authorship, to express my views regarding the current formulation of this requirement.1 1 As members of this Court have previously noted, special concurrences are “somewhat unusual, but not without precedent.” Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607 , 633 n.1 (Pa. 2012) (Saylor, J., specially concurring) (collecting cases).

2002Instead, my preference would be to remand to the common pleas court, which did not consider the appropriate range of factors because it was bound by Community Service Found., Inc. v. Bucks County Bd. of Assessment and Revision of Taxes, 672 A.2d 373 (Pa. Cmwlth.1996), particularly as the determination of whether an entity qualifies as a purely public charity poses a mixed question of law and fact that is to be determined by the common pleas court in the first instance.

2002Instead, my preference would be to remand to the common pleas court, which did not consider the appropriate range of factors because it was bound by Community Service Found., Inc. v. Bucks County Bd. of Assessment and Revision of Taxes, 672 A.2d 373 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996), particularly as the determination of whether an entity qualifies as a purely public charity poses a mixed question of law and fact that is to be determined by the common pleas court in the first instance.

1991A recent formulation of the rule regarding the admissibility of evidence of distinct crimes is set forth by our supreme court in Commonwealth v. Billa, 521 Pa. 168 , 555 A.2d 835 (1989), where Justice Larsen declared: Evidence of a defendant’s distinct crimes are not generally admissible against a defendant solely to show his bad character or his propensity for committing criminal acts, as proof of the commission of one offense is not generally proof of the commission of another.

1991A recent formulation of the rule regarding the admissibility of evidence of distinct crimes is set forth by our supreme court in Commonwealth v. Billa, 521 Pa. 168 , 555 A.2d 835 (1989), where Justice Larsen declared: Evidence of a defendant’s distinct crimes are not generally admissible against a defendant solely to show his bad character or his propensity for committing criminal acts, as proof of the commission of one offense is not generally proof of the commission of another.

1985Volpe v. Johns-Manville Corp., 323 Pa.Super. 130 , 470 A.2d 164 (1983).

1985Volpe v. Johns-Manville Corp., 323 Pa.Super. 130 , 470 A.2d 164 (1983).

1984In the words of that Court, they were struggling “to define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment.” Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at 325 , 94 S.Ct. at 3000 .

1984In the words of that Court, they were struggling “to define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment.” Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at 325 , 94 S.Ct. at 3000 .

1980See, e. g., Klingensmith v. Klingensmith, 375 Pa. 178 , 100 A.2d 76 (1953); Brotman v. Brotman, 353 Pa. 570 , 46 A.2d 175 (1946).

1980See, e. g., Klingensmith v. Klingensmith, 375 Pa. 178 , 100 A.2d 76 (1953); Brotman v. Brotman, 353 Pa. 570 , 46 A.2d 175 (1946).

1978These cases bear out the formulation of the doctrine in Russo, supra, that ‘where the distinct crimes set forth [in an indictment] grow out of the same transaction, differing only in degree, only one penalty can be imposed after conviction.’ 293 Pa. at 324 , 142 A. at 318 .” See also, e. g., Commonwealth v. Comber, supra; Commonwealth v. McCusker, 363 Pa. 450 , 70 A.2d 273 (1950); Commonwealth ex rel.

1978These cases bear out the formulation of the doctrine in Russo, supra, that `where the distinct crimes set forth [in an indictment] grow out of the same transaction, differing only in degree, only one penalty can be imposed after conviction.' 293 Pa. at 324 , 142 A. at 318 ." See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Comber, supra ; Commonwealth v. McCusker, 363 Pa. 450 , 70 A.2d 273 (1950); Commonwealth ex rel.

1978These cases bear out the formulation of the doctrine in Russo, supra, that ‘where the distinct crimes set forth [in an indictment] grow out of the same transaction, differing only in degree, only one penalty can be imposed after conviction.’ 293 Pa. at 324 , 142 A. at 318 .” See also, e. g., Commonwealth v. Comber, supra; Commonwealth v. McCusker, 363 Pa. 450 , 70 A.2d 273 (1950); Commonwealth ex rel.

1978These cases bear out the formulation of the doctrine in Russo, supra, that `where the distinct crimes set forth [in an indictment] grow out of the same transaction, differing only in degree, only one penalty can be imposed after conviction.' 293 Pa. at 324 , 142 A. at 318 ." See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Comber, supra ; Commonwealth v. McCusker, 363 Pa. 450 , 70 A.2d 273 (1950); Commonwealth ex rel.

1973The drift in this direction was abetted by the opinion in Noonday Club of Delaware County, Inc. Liquor License, 433 Pa. 458 , 252 A. 2d 568 (1969), which contains the following language: “In the instant case had [the lower court found the facts to be as found by the Board], the court below as well as the Superior Court would have been powerless to modify the penalty imposed no matter how harsh or severe". 433 Pa. at 465 . 3 Similarly, recent decisions of the Superior Court have omitted the qualification as to abuse of discretion and unduly harsh penalties, and instead speak only of “authority”

1973The drift in this direction was abetted by the opinion in Noonday Club of Delaware County, Inc. Liquor License, 433 Pa. 458 , 252 A. 2d 568 (1969), which contains the following language: “In the instant case had [the lower court found the facts to be as found by the Board], the court below as well as the Superior Court would have been powerless to modify the penalty imposed no matter how harsh or severe". 433 Pa. at 465 . 3 Similarly, recent decisions of the Superior Court have omitted the qualification as to abuse of discretion and unduly harsh penalties, and instead speak only of “authority”

1971Justice Jones” opinion held, to the contrary, “that the unusual strain doctrine is to be applied according to the work history of the individual involved and not according to the work patterns of his profession in general”, and approved the formulation of the rule by the Superior Court in Pudlosky v. Follmer Trucking Co., 206 Pa. Superior Ct. 450 , 214 A. 2d 270 (1965). 434 Pa. at 99 .

1971Justice JONES' opinion held, to the contrary, "that the unusual strain doctrine is to be applied according to the work history of the individual involved and not according to the work patterns of his profession in general", and approved the formulation of the rule by the Superior Court in Pudlosky v. Follmer Trucking Co., 206 Pa. Superior Ct. 450 , 214 A. 2d 270 (1965). 434 Pa. at 99 .

1971Justice Jones” opinion held, to the contrary, “that the unusual strain doctrine is to be applied according to the work history of the individual involved and not according to the work patterns of his profession in general”, and approved the formulation of the rule by the Superior Court in Pudlosky v. Follmer Trucking Co., 206 Pa. Superior Ct. 450 , 214 A. 2d 270 (1965). 434 Pa. at 99 .

1971Justice Jones” opinion held, to the contrary, “that the unusual strain doctrine is to be applied according to the work history of the individual involved and not according to the work patterns of his profession in general”, and approved the formulation of the rule by the Superior Court in Pudlosky v. Follmer Trucking Co., 206 Pa. Superior Ct. 450 , 214 A. 2d 270 (1965). 434 Pa. at 99 .

1960Reprint 154 (1887); Colonial Laundries v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332 , 138 Atl. 47 (1927) ; cases collected in Annot., 165 A.L.R. 1453 ; cases cited at note 8, infra. *578 Compare the formulation of the rule in the Restatement, Torts, §757: “One who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if (a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him. . . .” (Emphasis supplied). 5 See generally, Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Co

1960Reprint 154 (1887); Colonial Laundries v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332 , 138 Atl. 47 (1927) ; cases collected in Annot., 165 A.L.R. 1453 ; cases cited at note 8, infra. *578 Compare the formulation of the rule in the Restatement, Torts, §757: “One who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if (a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him. . . .” (Emphasis supplied). 5 See generally, Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Co