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19 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dorngreen2 sentences2025However, the court may not amend "[a]n error relating to the substance or 'essence' of an offense . . . by operation of that [Rule]." State v. Dorn, 233 N.J. 81, 94 (2018). "[T]he analysis as to whether an indictment was sufficient and whether an amendment under Rule 3:7-4 was appropriate hinges upon whether the defendant was provided with adequate notice of the charges and whether an amendment would prejudice [the] defendant in the formulation of a defense." Id. at 96 . 2025However, the court may not amend "[a]n error relating to the substance or 'essence' of an offense . . . by operation of that [Rule]." State v. Dorn, 233 N.J. 81, 94 (2018). "[T]he analysis as to whether an indictment was sufficient and whether an amendment under Rule 3:7-4 was appropriate hinges upon whether the defendant was provided with adequate notice of the charges and whether an amendment would prejudice [the] defendant in the formulation of a defense." Id. at 96 . | 3 | 5 |
State v. LeFurgegreen2 sentences2018See LeFurge , 101 N.J. at 415 , 502 A.2d 35 ; Middleton , 299 N.J. 2018See LeFurge , 101 N.J. at 415 , 502 A.2d 35 ; Middleton , 299 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 697green1 sentence2009We hold that, as so restricted, “membership” in the “municipal family” establishes a per se “substantial risk that the lawyer’s responsibilities to the public entity would limit the lawyer’s ability to provide independent advice or diligent and competent representation to either the public entity or the client” and, therefore, a per se proscribed conflict of interest. [Id. at 566, 911 A.2d 51 (emphasis supplied).] Thus, the best formulation of the test remains that prescribed in Reardon, supra. Its application was best described by Justice Clifford, despite the court’s explicit disavowal of th | 1 | 1 |
Maynard v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fundgreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Maynard, supra, 113 N.J. at 177-79 , 549 A.2d 1213 (Stein, J., concurring and O’Hern, J., dissenting); Ciecwisz v. Bd. of Trs., Police and Firemen’s Ret. 2007See, e.g., Maynard, supra, 113 N.J. at 177-79 , 549 A.2d 1213 (Stein, J., concurring and O’Hern, J., dissenting); Ciecwisz v. Bd. of Trs., Police and Firemen’s Ret. | 1 | 1 |
North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnetgreen2 sentences1992In 1932, in North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 , 52 S.Ct. 613 , 76 L.Ed. 1197 (1932), Justice Brandéis set forth the classic formulation of this doctrine as follows: If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required to [report on his tax] return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent. [ 286 U.S. at 424 , 52 S.Ct. at 615 , 76 L.Ed. at 1200-01 (citations omitted).] 1992In 1932, in North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 , 52 S.Ct. 613 , 76 L.Ed. 1197 (1932), Justice Brandéis set forth the classic formulation of this doctrine as follows: If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required to [report on his tax] return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent. [ 286 U.S. at 424 , 52 S.Ct. at 615 , 76 L.Ed. at 1200-01 (citations omitted).] | 1 | 1 |
Berko v. Fredagreen2 sentences1992See, e.g., Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 85 , 459 A. 2d 663 (1983) ("Case law draws a distinction between injuries stemming from the negligence that brought the firefighters or police to the scene in the first place and injuries suffered from independent causes that may follow."); Krauth v. Geller, supra, 31 N.J. at 273 , 157 A. 2d 129 ("It is quite generally agreed the owner or occupier is not liable to a paid fireman for negligence with respect to the creation of a fire"); Cella v. Interstate Properties, 232 N.J. 1992See, e.g., Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 85 , 459 A. 2d 663 (1983) ("Case law draws a distinction between injuries stemming from the negligence that brought the firefighters or police to the scene in the first place and injuries suffered from independent causes that may follow."); Krauth v. Geller, supra, 31 N.J. at 273 , 157 A. 2d 129 ("It is quite generally agreed the owner or occupier is not liable to a paid fireman for negligence with respect to the creation of a fire"); Cella v. Interstate Properties, 232 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Olesak v. Central Mut. Ins. Co.green1 sentence1988Co., 215 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Gullo v. American Lead Pencil Co.green1 sentence1977But if "[t]here must come a time when the employee is on his own" during trips to and from work, Gullo v. American Lead Pencil Co., 119 N.J.L. 484, 486 (E. & A. 1937), and thus not be covered, we think it should be limited to travel which has no special circumstances suggesting particular benefits to the employer. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
green
2 sentences2010Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 212 , 536 A.2d 243 (1988), the Tax Court nonetheless concluded that “the best formulation of the test remains that prescribed in Reardon[.]” City of Atlantic City, supra, 25 N.J. 2010Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 212 , 536 A.2d 243 (1988), the Tax Court nonetheless concluded that “the best formulation of the test remains that prescribed in Reardon[.]” City of Atlantic City, supra, 25 N.J. | 2 | 2009–2010 |
State v. Sugar
green
2 sentences2019The court followed the formulation of that doctrine adopted for use in New Jersey in State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214 (1985) (Sugar II). 2019The court followed the formulation of that doctrine adopted for use in this State in State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214 (1985) (Sugar II), which has a three-pronged test that the State must satisfy by clear and convincing evidence. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Middleton
green
1 sentence2018See LeFurge , 101 N.J. at 415 , 502 A.2d 35 ; Middleton , 299 N.J. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Ruiz v. Mero
green
2 sentences2012Although the original formulation of the rule was limited to bar recovery only for the negligence that was the source of the emergency requiring response, eventually the rule was expanded to “any tangential negligent act ‘posing a hazard that is incidental to and inherent in the performance of the officer’s duties.’ ” Id. at 532 , 917 A.2d 239 (quoting Rosa v. Dunkin’ Donuts, 122 N.J. 66, 76 , 583 A.2d 1129 (1991)). 2012Although the original formulation of the rule was limited to bar recovery only for the negligence that was the source of the emergency requiring response, eventually the rule was expanded to “any tangential negligent act ‘posing a hazard that is incidental to and inherent in the performance of the officer’s duties.’ ” Id. at 532 , 917 A.2d 239 (quoting Rosa v. Dunkin’ Donuts, 122 N.J. 66, 76 , 583 A.2d 1129 (1991)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Rosa v. Dunkin' Donuts of Passaic
green
2 sentences2012Although the original formulation of the rule was limited to bar recovery only for the negligence that was the source of the emergency requiring response, eventually the rule was expanded to “any tangential negligent act ‘posing a hazard that is incidental to and inherent in the performance of the officer’s duties.’ ” Id. at 532 , 917 A.2d 239 (quoting Rosa v. Dunkin’ Donuts, 122 N.J. 66, 76 , 583 A.2d 1129 (1991)). 2012Although the original formulation of the rule was limited to bar recovery only for the negligence that was the source of the emergency requiring response, eventually the rule was expanded to “any tangential negligent act ‘posing a hazard that is incidental to and inherent in the performance of the officer’s duties.’ ” Id. at 532 , 917 A.2d 239 (quoting Rosa v. Dunkin’ Donuts, 122 N.J. 66, 76 , 583 A.2d 1129 (1991)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2009The rule of collateral estoppel directs that once an issue of ultimate fact has been litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot again be relitigated in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. [ State v. Yormark, 117 N.J.Super. 315, 333 , 284 A. 2d 549 (App.Div.1971), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 138 , 286 A. 2d 511 , cert. denied, Perwin v. N.J., 409 U.S. 862 , 93 S.Ct. 151 , 34 L.Ed. 2d 109 (1972).] We have recently summarized the current formulation of the principle of collateral estoppel. [I]n order for collateral estoppel to foreclose re-litigation of an 2009The rule of collateral estoppel directs that once an issue of ultimate fact has been litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot again be relitigated in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. [ State v. Yormark, 117 N.J.Super. 315, 333 , 284 A. 2d 549 (App.Div.1971), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 138 , 286 A. 2d 511 , cert. denied, Perwin v. N.J., 409 U.S. 862 , 93 S.Ct. 151 , 34 L.Ed. 2d 109 (1972).] We have recently summarized the current formulation of the principle of collateral estoppel. [I]n order for collateral estoppel to foreclose re-litigation of an | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Yormark
green
2 sentences2009The rule of collateral estoppel directs that once an issue of ultimate fact has been litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot again be relitigated in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. [ State v. Yormark, 117 N.J.Super. 315, 333 , 284 A. 2d 549 (App.Div.1971), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 138 , 286 A. 2d 511 , cert. denied, Perwin v. N.J., 409 U.S. 862 , 93 S.Ct. 151 , 34 L.Ed. 2d 109 (1972).] We have recently summarized the current formulation of the principle of collateral estoppel. [I]n order for collateral estoppel to foreclose re-litigation of an 2009The rule of collateral estoppel directs that once an issue of ultimate fact has been litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot again be relitigated in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. [ State v. Yormark, 117 N.J.Super. 315, 333 , 284 A. 2d 549 (App.Div.1971), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 138 , 286 A. 2d 511 , cert. denied, Perwin v. N.J., 409 U.S. 862 , 93 S.Ct. 151 , 34 L.Ed. 2d 109 (1972).] We have recently summarized the current formulation of the principle of collateral estoppel. [I]n order for collateral estoppel to foreclose re-litigation of an | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Brown v. Wisconsin State Department of Public Welfare
green
1 sentence2009The rule of collateral estoppel directs that once an issue of ultimate fact has been litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot again be relitigated in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. [ State v. Yormark, 117 N.J.Super. 315, 333 , 284 A. 2d 549 (App.Div.1971), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 138 , 286 A. 2d 511 , cert. denied, Perwin v. N.J., 409 U.S. 862 , 93 S.Ct. 151 , 34 L.Ed. 2d 109 (1972).] We have recently summarized the current formulation of the principle of collateral estoppel. [I]n order for collateral estoppel to foreclose re-litigation of an | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Carter v. Roberts
neutral
1 sentence2009The rule of collateral estoppel directs that once an issue of ultimate fact has been litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot again be relitigated in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. [ State v. Yormark, 117 N.J.Super. 315, 333 , 284 A. 2d 549 (App.Div.1971), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 138 , 286 A. 2d 511 , cert. denied, Perwin v. N.J., 409 U.S. 862 , 93 S.Ct. 151 , 34 L.Ed. 2d 109 (1972).] We have recently summarized the current formulation of the principle of collateral estoppel. [I]n order for collateral estoppel to foreclose re-litigation of an | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Yormark
neutral
2 sentences2009The rule of collateral estoppel directs that once an issue of ultimate fact has been litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot again be relitigated in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. [ State v. Yormark, 117 N.J.Super. 315, 333 , 284 A. 2d 549 (App.Div.1971), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 138 , 286 A. 2d 511 , cert. denied, Perwin v. N.J., 409 U.S. 862 , 93 S.Ct. 151 , 34 L.Ed. 2d 109 (1972).] We have recently summarized the current formulation of the principle of collateral estoppel. [I]n order for collateral estoppel to foreclose re-litigation of an 2009The rule of collateral estoppel directs that once an issue of ultimate fact has been litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot again be relitigated in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. [ State v. Yormark, 117 N.J.Super. 315, 333 , 284 A. 2d 549 (App.Div.1971), certif. denied, 60 N.J. 138 , 286 A. 2d 511 , cert. denied, Perwin v. N.J., 409 U.S. 862 , 93 S.Ct. 151 , 34 L.Ed. 2d 109 (1972).] We have recently summarized the current formulation of the principle of collateral estoppel. [I]n order for collateral estoppel to foreclose re-litigation of an | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, Inc.
green
1 sentence2003That subsection defines “compensable occupational disease[s]” as those diseases established by a preponderance of the credible evidence to have arisen “out of and in the course of employment, which are due in a material degree to causes and conditions which are or were characteristic of or peculiar to a particular trade, occupation, process or place of employment.” Ibid. (emphasis added). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
East Cape May Associates v. State
green
2 sentences2001In East Cape May I, we examined the federal and state case law addressing the denominator issue, and developed the following list of ten, nonexclusive factual questions that "may affect the formulation of the rule for the definition of the `property.' " Id. at 353-54 , 693 A. 2d 114 . 2001In East Cape May I, we examined the federal and state case law addressing the denominator issue, and developed the following list of ten, nonexclusive factual questions that "may affect the formulation of the rule for the definition of the `property.' " Id. at 353-54 , 693 A. 2d 114 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Karam v. State
green
2 sentences2001Protection, 308 N.J.Super. 225, 238-39 , 705 A. 2d 1221 (App.Div.), aff'd o.b., 157 N.J. 187 , 723 A. 2d 943 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 814 , 120 S.Ct. 51 , 145 L.Ed. 2d 45 (1999), we observed that the questions posed by East Cape May I, pertained to the history of the ownership and development of the property. 2001Protection, 308 N.J.Super. 225, 238-39 , 705 A. 2d 1221 (App.Div.), aff'd o.b., 157 N.J. 187 , 723 A. 2d 943 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 814 , 120 S.Ct. 51 , 145 L.Ed. 2d 45 (1999), we observed that the questions posed by East Cape May I, pertained to the history of the ownership and development of the property. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Karam v. STATE, DEPT. OF ENVIR. PROTECTION
green
2 sentences2001Protection, 308 N.J.Super. 225, 238-39 , 705 A. 2d 1221 (App.Div.), aff'd o.b., 157 N.J. 187 , 723 A. 2d 943 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 814 , 120 S.Ct. 51 , 145 L.Ed. 2d 45 (1999), we observed that the questions posed by East Cape May I, pertained to the history of the ownership and development of the property. 2001Protection, 308 N.J.Super. 225, 238-39 , 705 A. 2d 1221 (App.Div.), aff'd o.b., 157 N.J. 187 , 723 A. 2d 943 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 814 , 120 S.Ct. 51 , 145 L.Ed. 2d 45 (1999), we observed that the questions posed by East Cape May I, pertained to the history of the ownership and development of the property. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2001In his concurring opinion in that case, Chief Justice Rehnquist lamented the majority's confusing use of the "exceedingly persuasive" phrase, and he offered his clarification that the "phrase is best confined, as it was first used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself." Id. at 559 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 , (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 2001In his concurring opinion in that case, Chief Justice Rehnquist lamented the majority's confusing use of the "exceedingly persuasive" phrase, and he offered his clarification that the "phrase is best confined, as it was first used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself." Id. at 559 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 , (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States v. Morrison
green
2 sentences2001Furthermore, in Morrison, supra, 529 U.S. at 620 , 120 S.Ct. 1740 , the Court reaffirmed the traditional test for assessing gender-based classification. 2001Furthermore, in Morrison, supra, 529 U.S. at 620 , 120 S.Ct. 1740 , the Court reaffirmed the traditional test for assessing gender-based classification. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
McClain v. Scharrer
green
1 sentence2001Protection, 308 N.J.Super. 225, 238-39 , 705 A. 2d 1221 (App.Div.), aff'd o.b., 157 N.J. 187 , 723 A. 2d 943 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 814 , 120 S.Ct. 51 , 145 L.Ed. 2d 45 (1999), we observed that the questions posed by East Cape May I, pertained to the history of the ownership and development of the property. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Everett v. US Airways Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Protection, 308 N.J.Super. 225, 238-39 , 705 A. 2d 1221 (App.Div.), aff'd o.b., 157 N.J. 187 , 723 A. 2d 943 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 814 , 120 S.Ct. 51 , 145 L.Ed. 2d 45 (1999), we observed that the questions posed by East Cape May I, pertained to the history of the ownership and development of the property. 2001Protection, 308 N.J.Super. 225, 238-39 , 705 A. 2d 1221 (App.Div.), aff'd o.b., 157 N.J. 187 , 723 A. 2d 943 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 814 , 120 S.Ct. 51 , 145 L.Ed. 2d 45 (1999), we observed that the questions posed by East Cape May I, pertained to the history of the ownership and development of the property. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Cella v. Interstate Properties
green
1 sentence1992See, e.g., Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 85 , 459 A. 2d 663 (1983) ("Case law draws a distinction between injuries stemming from the negligence that brought the firefighters or police to the scene in the first place and injuries suffered from independent causes that may follow."); Krauth v. Geller, supra, 31 N.J. at 273 , 157 A. 2d 129 ("It is quite generally agreed the owner or occupier is not liable to a paid fireman for negligence with respect to the creation of a fire"); Cella v. Interstate Properties, 232 N.J. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Krauth v. Israel Geller and Buckingham Homes, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992See, e.g., Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 85 , 459 A. 2d 663 (1983) ("Case law draws a distinction between injuries stemming from the negligence that brought the firefighters or police to the scene in the first place and injuries suffered from independent causes that may follow."); Krauth v. Geller, supra, 31 N.J. at 273 , 157 A. 2d 129 ("It is quite generally agreed the owner or occupier is not liable to a paid fireman for negligence with respect to the creation of a fire"); Cella v. Interstate Properties, 232 N.J. 1992See, e.g., Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 85 , 459 A. 2d 663 (1983) ("Case law draws a distinction between injuries stemming from the negligence that brought the firefighters or police to the scene in the first place and injuries suffered from independent causes that may follow."); Krauth v. Geller, supra, 31 N.J. at 273 , 157 A. 2d 129 ("It is quite generally agreed the owner or occupier is not liable to a paid fireman for negligence with respect to the creation of a fire"); Cella v. Interstate Properties, 232 N.J. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Ricciardi v. Aniero Concrete Co.
green
1 sentence1977This formulation of the rule concededly owes as much to administrative convenience and judicial manageability as to logic or policy. [2] Cf. Ricciardi v. Aniero Concrete Co., 64 N.J. 60 , 63 (1973). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.